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Abstract
In this thesis, we consider the problem of providing emergency support when ex-
isting communication infrastructure is unavailable. We propose using opportunis-
tic communications (oppcomms) among mobile devices carried by civilians for the
dissemination of emergency information. With oppcomms, devices exchange mes-
sages at a close range of a few to tens of meters with limited or no infrastructure
and messages are carried over multiple hops in a \store-carry-forward" manner by
exploiting human mobility. We specically look at the evacuation component of
emergency response and propose an emergency support system (ESS) based on op-
pcomms to provide evacuation guidance to civilians in small-scale and large-scale
urban emergencies in the absence of other means of communication. We evaluate the
evacuation performance of ESS and investigate the communication characteristics
of oppcomms for emergency support by simulation experiments. Our evaluations
show that ESS improves evacuation by up to 31% and 14% compared to shortest
path evacuation in large and small scale emergencies, respectively, and by up to 9%
compared to a static-node based building evacuation system. We also investigate
the resilience and security of oppcomms for emergency support under node failures
and network attacks. We consider insider attacks where some nodes participating
in oppcomms are compromised and misbehave. We investigate three dierent types
of misbehaviour, including dropping packets, signal jamming and a hybrid attack
on routing and evacuation that uses data falsication. Our evaluations show that
node failures up to 20% are well-tolerated, and that data falsication has the most
signicant eect on evacuation by decreasing performance by up to 54%. In order to
improve resilience of the system to such attacks, we propose a collaborative defense
mechanism that combines identity-based cryptography and content-based message
verication, and show that our defense mechanism improves performance by up to
50% in the presence of attacks.
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1 Introduction
Urban emergencies are complex situations that require quick and eective decision
making in dynamically evolving conditions. Emergency responders and civilians in
the aected areas are usually presented with ambiguous, incomplete and possibly
incorrect information on the situation, which exacerbate the diculty of planning
and executing a suitable course of action [106, 117]. Information systems can sig-
nicantly improve the decision making process and provide emergency support by
enabling communication among parties involved in the emergency, collecting data
from the environment and distributing it in a timely fashion, and suggesting courses
of action based on their observations and other input.
The advent and widening extent of ubiquitous computing and mobile telephony
have enabled a deeper involvement of civilians in information systems for emergency
support and thus in the emergency response process. Mobile computing devices car-
ried by civilians, connected to other computer networks via a wireless infrastructure
network such as 4G, provide a ubiquitous platform that can be exploited to provide
emergency communications and other support services. This platform enables civil-
ians to act as sources of information, via either embedded sensors or manual input,
and allows them to receive guidance, for example from an emergency management
center. However, a signicant disadvantage of existing systems is their dependence
on communication infrastructure, which is prone to disruptions during disasters and
emergencies. Due to the emergency, existing communication infrastructure is often
adversely aected: parts of the infrastructure may be destroyed or may otherwise
fail, the network may be congested due to unusually heavy trac, or access may be
unavailable due to prioritization of non-civilian trac.
Thus we consider the problem of providing emergency support when existing com-
munication infrastructure is unavailable. We propose the use of opportunistic com-
munications (oppcomms) [107] among mobile devices carried by civilians for the
dissemination of emergency information, which is used by the mobile devices to
provide emergency services to their users. With oppcomms, devices exchange mes-
sages at a close range of a few to tens of meters with limited or no infrastructure
15
and messages are carried over multiple hops in a \store-carry-forward" manner by
exploiting human mobility. We specically look at the evacuation component of
emergency response and propose an emergency support system (ESS) based on op-
pcomms to provide evacuation guidance to civilians in small-scale and large-scale
urban emergencies in the absence of other means of communication. We evaluate the
evacuation performance of ESS and investigate the communication characteristics
of oppcomms for emergency support by simulation experiments. We compare ESS
with shortest path evacuation and a distributed evacuation support system (DES)
based on xed decision nodes proposed in [39]. Our evaluations show the degree of
improvement oppcomms can oer.
The reliability and availability of emergency support services is important for
safe and quick evacuation of people. Oppcomms oer a means of communication
among pocket devices carried by people and enable the provisioning of navigation
services for evacuation in the absence of existing communication infrastructure. The
opportunistic network (oppnet) formed by these devices is an example of a de-
lay/disruption tolerant network (DTN) [36], where an end-to-end connected path
between source and destination may not exist, message delivery is not guaranteed
and delivery may take a long time. Oppcomms enable communication with inter-
mittent connectivity and therefore oppnets are resilient to link failures and topology
changes. However, disruptions to communications, such as node failures and at-
tacks on the network, can adversely aect communication performance and evacua-
tion outcome. We therefore investigate the resilience and security of oppcomms for
emergency support under node failures and misbehaviour of nodes participating in
oppcomms. We investigate three dierent types of misbehaviour, including dropping
packets, signal jamming and a hybrid attack on routing and evacuation that uses
data falsication. Our evaluations reveal that data falsication has the greatest ef-
fect on evacuation outcome and we propose a collaborative defense mechanism that
combines identity-based cryptography [116] with content-based message verication
to improve resilience of ESS to such attacks. We evaluate the eect of node failures
and network attacks on communication and evacuation performance, and show the
degree of improvement oered by the defense mechanism.
1.1 Contributions of Thesis
The main premise of this thesis is that oppcomms can enable emergency support,
more specically emergency evacuation support, in small-scale and large-scale urban
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emergencies when other means of communication have broken down. Contributions
of this thesis in support of this hypothesis include the following:
 We design an emergency support system (ESS) that is based on oppcomms and
is resilient to disruptions, in order to provide navigation directions to civilians
in the aected area for evacuation purposes. We discuss how ESS could be
implemented in indoor and outdoor urban areas. ESS is a novel approach to
emergency navigation and evacuation as it uses a highly disconnected mobile
communication network formed by user devices to enable navigation services
in the absence of other means of communication, which is in contrast to the
traditional approaches of using either a static node based system, e.g. a wire-
less sensor network (WSN), or depending on existing infrastructure, e.g. the
cellular network, to provide general connectivity among mobile nodes.
 We design and develop an implementation of ESS in a distributed multi-agent
simulation platform in order to evaluate ESS and oppcomms. Using a dis-
tributed platform enables us to evaluate larger scale emergencies. Using sim-
ulation experiments, we provide a comparative evaluation of the evacuation
performance of ESS and communication characteristics of oppcomms. We
consider small-scale emergency scenarios in a large three-oor oce building,
and large-scale scenarios in a city district, both modeled on real-life areas. We
compare ESS with shortest path evacuation to evaluate the benets of shar-
ing information with oppcomms and with a distributed evacuation support
system (DES) based on xed decision nodes to evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of using a disconnected but disruption-tolerant mobile commu-
nication network. We believe our evaluation of ESS and oppcomms is among
the rst of its kind in the eld of emergency navigation and evacuation and
that we provide a convincing answer to the question of whether and how much
oppcomms can improve evacuation outcome without existing communication
infrastructure.
 We show via simulation experiments that ESS improves evacuation by up to
31% and 14% compared to shortest path evacuation in large and small scale
emergencies, respectively, and by up to 9% compared to DES. These results
indicate that a mobile network of user devices communicating opportunisti-
cally can enable eective emergency navigation services when there is no other
means of communication. Our results also indicate that when the mobile net-
work has very low connectivity, e.g. when there are too few nodes in the area,
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ESS does not perform well. We therefore conclude that ESS is best suited for
densely populated urban areas.
 We evaluate the resilience of oppcomms to node failures in small-scale emer-
gencies, and show that node failures up to 20% are well-tolerated and that
performance degrades gracefully with failures.
 We evaluate the resilience and security of oppcomms for emergency support
under network attacks where nodes participating in oppcomms misbehave. We
investigate three types of attacks, including dropping packets, signal jamming
and a hybrid attack on routing and evacuation that uses data falsication. We
show that ESS is resilient to attacks on the network, i.e. dropping of packets
and signal jamming, and that data falsication has a signicant eect on evac-
uation by decreasing performance by up to 54%. In order to improve resilience
of the system to such attacks, we propose a collaborative defense mechanism
that combines identity-based cryptography and content-based message veri-
cation, and show that our defense mechanism improves performance by up to
50% in the presence of attacks.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. We provide a general introduction to
opportunistic communications and emergency navigation and evacuation systems in
Chp. 2. We rst look at various emergency navigation and evacuation systems, and
discuss their relevant advantages and disadvantages in Sec. 2.1, where we also present
the distributed evacuation system (DES) [38, 39], which is used in our comparative
evaluation. Section 2.2 provides an overview of oppcomms and delay tolerant net-
works, and presents related work that propose the use of oppcomms and DTNs for
emergency support. We discuss security issues of oppcomms in Sec. 2.3.
The design of ESS is presented in Chp. 3, where we describe how oppcomms are
used to provide evacuation support in urban emergencies. Section 3.2 presents our
evaluation of oppcomms and ESS in dierent emergency scenarios and a comparison
of ESS with other evacuation strategies. We evaluate the resilience of ESS to node
failures in Sec. 3.3. In Chp. 4, we investigate the resilience and security of oppcomms
to network attacks and evaluate the eect of three types of node misbehaviour
on evacuation and communication performance. We present our proposed defense
mechanism against data falsication attacks in Sec. 4.2 and evaluate the eect of
network attacks and of our proposed defense mechanism in Sec. 4.3. We conclude
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in Chp. 5 with a summary of our ndings, identied shortcomings of our proposed
system and evaluation method, and possible extensions of this work.
1.3 Publications
Parts of this thesis have been presented and published in the following peer-reviewed
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 Gokce Gorbil and Erol Gelenbe. Opportunistic communications for emergency
support systems. Procedia Computer Science, 5:39{47, 2011
 Avgoustinos Filippoupolitis, Gokce Gorbil, and Erol Gelenbe. Spatial comput-
ers for emergency management. In Proceedings of the 5th IEEE Conference on
Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems Workshops (SASOW), pages 61{66,
October 2011
 Avgoustinos Filippoupolitis, Gokce Gorbil, and Erol Gelenbe. Autonomous
navigation systems for emergency management in buildings. In Proceedings of
the 2011 IEEE GLOBECOM Workshops, pages 1056{1061, December 2011
 Gokce Gorbil, Avgoustinos Filippoupolitis, and Erol Gelenbe. Intelligent nav-
igation systems for building evacuation. In Erol Gelenbe, Ricardo Lent, and
Georgia Sakellari, editors, Computer and Information Sciences II, pages 339{
345. Springer London, 2012
 Avgoustinos Filippoupolitis, Gokce Gorbil, and Erol Gelenbe. Pervasive emer-
gency support systems for building evacuation. In Proceedings of the 2012
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), pages 525{527, March 2012
 Avgoustinos Filippoupolitis, Gokce Gorbil, and Erol Gelenbe. Spatial com-
puters for emergency support. The Computer Journal, 2012
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In Proceedings of the First ACM International Workshop on Practical Issues
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2 Background
In this thesis, we investigate whether opportunistic communications can be used
for emergency support when other means of communication have broken down. We
specically consider the evacuation component of emergency response and propose
an emergency support system based on oppcomms to provide emergency navigation
directions to civilians for evacuation of built and outdoor urban areas. As such,
the work presented in this thesis covers the areas of emergency navigation and
evacuation, applications of oppcomms in emergencies, and security of delay tolerant
networks (DTNs). We discuss related work in each of these areas below.
2.1 Emergency Navigation and Evacuation Systems
Most approaches to emergency navigation and evacuation rely on an immobile wire-
less sensor network (WSN) to calculate motion paths and to guide the entities (hu-
mans and/or robots) in the system. Li et al. [84] were probably the rst to look at
the problem of WSN-assisted navigation, where they consider the problem of guiding
moving objects to a target location through a eld while avoiding obstacles. They
model the user guidance problem as a robot motion planning problem and use the
WSN to distributedly compute the motion path based on articial potential elds.
Fixed sensor nodes are used as a discrete representation of the area; obstacles or
dangerous areas that need to be avoided are represented with a repulsive potential
at nearby sensors while the goal location is represented with an attractive poten-
tial. The authors then present a distributed algorithm to calculate a safe path that
avoids the obstacles, and the user is guided by the sensors incrementally along the
path. The algorithm is validated via experiments on a 50-node sensor testbed under
dierent topologies. The authors extend their work to consider the impact of node
failures on navigation and performance optimization of the algorithm via Voronoi
diagrams in [86]. One of the important shortcomings of this approach is that the
authors consider only static obstacles and therefore static hazards. However, in most
emergency scenarios the hazard will be dynamically spreading in the area. In their
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evaluation, the authors focus on the calculation of safe paths to a single goal and
do not explicitly simulate movement of entities, ignoring navigation dynamics and
eects due to physical congestion. Their algorithm may also cause the generation of
many update messages when potentials near the goal change, indicating high over-
head. This last shortcoming is addressed by Buragohain et al. in [14] by using a
skeleton graph which is a sparse subset of the sensor network to reduce communica-
tion overhead in large networks. Due to the skeleton graph, an approximately safe
path can be found with much lower communication cost.
In [130], Tseng et al. propose a distributed navigation algorithm based on the
temporally ordered routing algorithm (TORA) for mobile ad hoc networks in order
to guide evacuees to safety. They consider a 2D indoor environment with pre-
deployed static sensors where each sensor knows its location. The topology of the
area is captured in the WSN by manually dening the navigation links among sensors
during deployment. Each sensor is assigned an altitude based on its distance to the
nearest exit node; nodes closer to exits have lower altitude. Nodes near a hazard
have high altitude and paths follow sensors from high to low altitude. This approach
allows the introduction of the concept of hazard \region", where users are guided
by minimizing the distance (i.e. number of hops) they have to spend in hazardous
regions when multiple exits are available. Another advantage of this algorithm over
the one proposed by Li et al. is that it has lower communication overhead and
convergence time. The authors validate their algorithm by simulations of various
small topologies. This work is extended to 3D indoor environments by the addition of
staircase nodes in [101]. However, as in the case of Li et al., the authors only consider
static hazards, and they focus on the calculation of paths and ignore evacuation
dynamics.
One of the earlier work that studies both spreading hazards and evacuation dy-
namics is by Barnes et al. [6], who propose a distributed algorithm for building
evacuation that takes into account predictions of movement speed of people and
the expected spread of the hazard. The authors assume that a WSN is deployed
in the building; the sensor locations correspond to vertices in two directed graphs
that capture these predictions. Edges in the hazard and navigation graphs represent
pathways through which hazard can spread and physical paths people can follow,
while edge weights are the times taken by the hazard to spread and a person to move
between the two locations, respectively. There may be edges which are not common
to both graphs since the hazard can spread via paths that may not be traversable
by humans. When the hazard starts, sensors distributedly calculate the expected
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time when their location will become dangerous using the pre-dened hazard graph
and edge weights. They also compute the safest path from their position to the
nearest exit, where path safety is measured as the margin of time an evacuee has
in order to reach any node in the path before it becomes hazardous. Although this
work explicitly considers the spreading of a hazard, it requires both the layout of the
building and expected speed of people, i.e. the navigation graph and associated edge
costs, and the expected spreading paths and speed of the hazard, i.e. the hazard
graph and associated edge costs, to be known beforehand. Since a single navigation
graph is used, it is impossible to dierentiate between people with dierent speeds.
Likewise, it is not possible to represent dierent spreading paths and speeds of a
hazard which may arise due to various aspects of the hazard, such as smoke and
re. Furthermore, the system does not incorporate real-time observations about the
actual movement of people and spreading of the hazard1, which limits its applicabil-
ity in realistic conditions. Some of these shortcomings are addressed in [127], where
the concepts of the hazard graph and path safety introduced by Barnes et al. are
extended to dynamic graphs where edge weights can change over time according
to sensor observations. The drawback of the approach in [127] is that it uses a
centralized algorithm for calculating the evacuation paths.
Another work that uses a centralized approach for calculation of evacuation paths
is presented in [70]. The authors propose an indoor emergency evacuation system
based on various technologies that work together to provide navigation directions
to the user. People are assumed to be equipped with mobile phones with 3G or
similar connectivity, and also with small devices called beacon receivers. Beacons
are placed at xed locations in the building, which communicate with the beacon
receivers over a very high frequency (VHF) channel for indoor localization of people.
Using VHF-based localization oers a scalable system that is robust to noise. The
beacon receiver provides the location information via Bluetooth to the mobile phone
of the same user, which in turn sends it to the building management center via
Internet (e.g. 3G). The management center also receives data from a WSN deployed
in the building, which provides real-time information about the hazard. Evacuation
paths and directions calculated by the management center are sent back to the
mobile phones over the Internet, which displays the directions to the users. The
system proposed by the authors is quite realistic, but suers from its requirement
of many communication technologies and devices, such as WSN, mobile phones,
1The system can adjust path calculation if the hazard spreads faster than expected, but it
cannot do so if the hazard spreads slower.
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Figure 2.1: A sensor node (SN) monitors a graph edge for possible hazards. In
the DES, decision nodes (DNs) located at graph vertices receive mea-
surements from adjacent SNs and provide dynamic directions during
evacuation.
Bluetooth, 3G or WiFi infrastructure, and beacon devices with VHF, which limits
its practicality and increases complexity and cost. Furthermore, infrastructure-
based communication systems may not be available during an emergency, creating
a signicant source of failure.
A distributed building evacuation support system (DES) is proposed in [39]. DES
is composed of decision nodes (DNs) and sensors deployed in the building. Real-time
information about the hazard is provided to the DNs by nearby sensors (Fig. 2.1).
DNs form a wireless network and periodically execute a distributed shortest path
algorithm inspired by [49,54,66] to calculate the evacuation paths. Intelligent signs
attached to the DNs provide dynamic directions to civilians in the vicinity. Simu-
lations of the system take into account physical congestion, dynamic aspects of the
hazard and its eect on evacuee health and movement. Results show that the system
is able to adapt to changes in a few iterations and improve evacuation compared
to static shortest path routing. We use the DES as a performance benchmark of
evacuation support systems based on xed nodes in our evaluations.
A WSN-based navigation system that does not require information about sensor
locations is proposed in [83], where sensors build a roadmap framework of the safe
regions in the area by concatenating their medial axes. The medial axis is dened
as a set of points (nodes) each of which is the closest node to at least two dierent
nodes on the boundaries of the hazard regions. After the roadmap framework has
been constructed, the exit point is connected to this backbone and directions are
calculated using ooding through the backbone. Changes to the roadmap due to
dynamic hazard regions are computed by local updates instead of recalculating the
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roadmap from scratch. While this attempt to remove the requirement of knowing
sensor locations is commendable, the approach presented by the authors seems to
be applicable only in open spaces as it is not clear how the WSN can adapt the
roadmap to more complex layouts such as those of indoor spaces.
With the exception of [39], which simulates but does not solve congestion, none
of the works discussed so far consider the important eect of physical congestion of
paths on movement speed and evacuation. Evacuation methods that explicitly ad-
dress congestion during evacuation are presented in [23,27,87,135]. One of the earlier
work in this area is [27], which presents how WSNs can be used to direct people to
alternative paths when certain paths become congested during building evacuation.
The oor plan of the building is represented as a graph, and a sensor is deployed at
each graph node. It is assumed that sensors can measure the number of people along
adjacent edges and that each sensor knows the oor graph and its location. Floor
plans with single exits are considered and each sensor estimates its distance to the
exit based on its measurements and the updates it gets from other sensors. Sensors
run the destination-sequenced distance vector (DSDV) routing algorithm in order
to distributedly calculate shortest paths in the oor graph. Simulations show that
the proposed approach improves evacuation time compared to static evacuation by
alleviating congestion along the most heavily congested paths; greater improvement
is observed as the number of people in the area increases. While this work addresses
congestion during building evacuation, it has no concept of hazard and the proposed
system is evaluated only for small single-oor buildings with one exit.
A congestion-aware building evacuation system based on WSNs is proposed in
[135]. In this system named WILLEM, people in the building carry tags which are
read by sensors in the building. The distinguishing feature of WILLEM is that it
does not require any a-priori knowledge of the building layout as this information is
learned by the WSN using the movement of people before an emergency. During the
emergency, nodes periodically execute a gradient descent algorithm and each node
directs people to the next hop along the calculated paths. Congestion detection is
based on comparing the movement speed of people during evacuation to the values
learned by the WSN in the initialization phase. If the dierence exceeds some
threshold, nodes determine that there is a congestion on that \link" and execute a
second gradient descent with congestion information in order to nd an alternate
path. In this case, users are given both the shortest and the alternate path; it is left
up to the user to choose which path to follow. Although the idea of learning the
building layout via civilian movement is promising, evaluation of this system has
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shown a non-negligible number of false positives and false negatives, indicating the
need for ne-tuning of tag signal strength. Additionally, simulations have shown that
congestion avoidance does not improve evacuation time in most scenarios; on the
contrary, evacuation time increases with congestion avoidance, demonstrating the
diculty of designing an eective congestion-aware routing algorithm for evacuation.
An emergency rescue navigation (ERN) system based on WSNs is proposed in [87];
ERN aims to reduce congestion during building evacuation by directing emergency
responders to critical hazard locations. The area is represented as a directed graph
and civilian movement is modeled as network ows in this graph. By calculating
the maximum ow and minimum cut on the graph, the system directs responders to
hazardous areas the elimination of which would alleviate congestion the most. This
work is novel due to the inclusion of emergency responders in the evacuation process,
but we believe that an evacuation support system should be able to navigate people
safely and quickly without relying on responders since evacuees normally do not
have the luxury of the presence of emergency personnel when the emergency starts.
A signicantly dierent approach to emergency evacuation is presented in [37],
where the use of autonomous robots is proposed to set-up evacuation paths. The
authors describe a system where robots enter the building to explore the area during
an emergency and they deploy tags, i.e. small communication nodes, that facilitate
indirect communication between the robots during exploration. Information left by
robots on tags are read and updated by others as they come into contact with them.
Once an evacuation path has been constructed for a trapped civilian, she is guided
along the tags to the exit. The paper looks at the problem of discovering short
evacuation paths as early as possible in the exploration process, and consider two
distribution mechanisms to discover routes: robot-to-tag and tag-to-tag communica-
tions. The impact of the exploration algorithm on the eciency of route discovery is
analysed. While this work could be useful for evacuation of trapped civilians in case
of hazards that do not spread extensively, it is not generally applicable to emergency
evacuation due to the requirement of robots and the slow process of route discovery.
For other work that discusses the use of autonomous robots to aid in emergency
management, see e.g. [80, 129].
All of the approaches to emergency navigation and evacuation discussed so far
depend on a network of static nodes or a central server to compute evacuation
paths and provide directions to users. Tsunemine et al. [131] propose a completely
mobile system for evacuation support based on mobile terminals, e.g. smartphones,
carried by people, which form a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). Their system is
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based on three assumptions: (i) the area layout, represented as a graph, is known
to all nodes; (ii) nodes always know their location in the area; (iii) the MANET
provides connected end-to-end paths for quick communication among nodes. Each
node regularly sends its location to others via the MANET and calculates an escape
route for its user. Information on the hazard is inferred from changes in directions
of other people, more specically U-turns, which are interpreted as blocked paths.
The authors evaluate their system with simulations of evacuation of a single oor
department store, but assume a high communication range (200m), which means
that every node in the area can directly communicate. Although the idea of inferring
hazard information from civilian movement is interesting, it is not clear how robust
this method will be in realistic evacuation scenarios. Furthermore, the MANET is
assumed to have end-to-end paths and therefore allow continuous communication
among nodes. In the absence of such connectivity, dissemination of location updates
would fail, hampering evacuation.
As we discuss in our experiment methodology in Sec. 3.2.2, we do not simulate
psychological aspects of emergencies or group eects such as helping others or fol-
lowing trusted leaders. We believe that having access to an immediate emergency
support system that provides information on the emergency and evacuation direc-
tions will decrease panic during emergencies and allow people to follow directions
provided by the system more calmly. The system would also provide an incentive
to evacuate when advised to do so. Readers interested in the technical issues re-
lating to these aspects are kindly referred to the following sample works: see [62]
for simulating escape panic, [44] for a discussion on the eect of group leaders on
evacuation, and [46,106,117] for studies on evacuation behaviour in general.
With the exception of [70, 131], emergency navigation systems have been based
on WSNs or similar networks of static nodes. While these systems may perform
well under normal conditions, failures and other disruptions to communications can
greatly degrade their performance (see e.g. [40]). Such systems also fail to take
advantage of existing communication devices carried by civilians (e.g. smartphones)
and of the mobility of users during an emergency. The approach we take in ESS
is signicantly dierent from systems discussed above since the ESS uses a mobile
opportunistic communication network as the basis for the provisioning of navigation
services. By using oppcomms among mobile devices, our proposed system provides
resilient emergency navigation and evacuation services without dependence on ex-
isting communication infrastructure or requiring end-to-end connectivity.
In the next section, we discuss related work that proposes the use of oppcomms and
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DTNs for emergency management and support. As we will see, almost all of them
consider the application of oppcomms for dissemination of emergency messages, and
we are among the rst, if not the rst, to consider the application of oppcomms
specically for evacuation support.
2.2 Opportunistic Communications and Emergency
Support
In this section, we rst provide a brief overview of delay tolerant and opportunistic
networks and then review some of the proposals for the use of oppcomms and DTNs
in emergency management and support.
2.2.1 Delay tolerant and opportunistic networks
Delay tolerant networking was rst conceived as a way to deal with the large de-
lays and frequent disruptions to connectivity observed in interplanetary internets
(IPNs) [17]. In IPNs, delay is caused by the long distances signals have to travel
and connectivity is often lost due to the orbital movement of large objects in space.
Fall [36] adapted some of the IPN concepts to terrestrial and other challenged in-
ternets and coined the term delay-tolerant networking and the DTN acronym. In
the original proposal by Fall, DTNs are used as an overlay to interconnect locally
connected internets by exploiting occasional communication opportunities that may
be scheduled or random. In this original DTN concept, potential points of dis-
connection are generally known. The DTN concept was later extended to contain
opportunistic networks [107] that do not assume any a-priori knowledge about points
of disconnection or contact patterns. A signicant identifying characteristic of IPNs
is that information about future contacts, such as when contacts will be available
and how long they will last, can be predicted based on laws of physics. This type
of contacts is known as scheduled or predictable contacts [73]. Contacts between
communicating entities are called intermittent or opportunistic when they cannot
be predicted beforehand.
Opportunistic networks (oppnets) are composed of individual nodes which em-
ploy opportunistic contacts in order to communicate with intermittent connectivity.
Nodes may be disconnected for long periods of time and instantaneous end-to-end
paths between communicating entities are highly unlikely to exist. In these chal-
lenging environments, popular ad hoc routing protocols such as AODV [108] and
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DSR [76] fail to provide end-to-end communication since they rst try to establish
a complete end-to-end path and then forward the data. Although oppnets seem
similar to mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), node mobility, disconnections, link
failures, partitions, etc., are viewed as features of the network rather than exceptions
in oppnets [10]. Oppnets actually exploit node mobility to bridge gaps between parts
of the network and enable communication in a \store-carry-forward" manner where
nodes carry packets on behalf of others in local storage and forward them during
opportunistic contacts. In this approach, data is incrementally moved and stored
through the network via intermediate nodes without rst establishing an end-to-end
path in the hope that it will eventually reach its destination.
In oppnets where nodes are largely immobile or where nodes are clustered in dis-
connected groups, the use of special nodes called message ferries or data mules with
pre-determined or controllable mobility is proposed to provide connectivity [24, 85,
115,143]. The mobility pattern of these nodes is either known beforehand (e.g. like
a bus following a determined route) or they can be controlled to move to given loca-
tions. Most opportunistic routing protocols assume that node mobility is not under
control of the routing mechanism. A common method employed by these routing
protocols to increase delivery probability is to replicate a packet by forwarding multi-
ple copies. Such routing protocols are called \replication-based", which is in contrast
to \forwarding-based" protocols that use only a single packet instance for delivery.
Replication-based and forwarding-based protocols are also called multi-copy and
single-copy protocols, respectively, in literature. The advantage of forwarding-based
protocols is that they have very low overhead and they can be used in oppnets with
extremely limited resources. Their disadvantage is that their message delivery ratio
is quite low and message delay is very high. Most replication-based protocols try to
achieve a balance between delivery probability and communication overhead due to
multiple copies by using heuristic methods to carefully select which nodes are used
to forward a packet and limit the number of copies. Such methods are especially
attractive in oppnets where nodes have limited communication and storage capacity.
We next provide a brief overview of some of the popular replication-based oppor-
tunistic routing protocols. More information on oppnet and DTN routing can be
found in the following good surveys: [91, 126,142].
Epidemic routing [134] is the simplest form of replication-based routing that oods
packets obliviously in the oppnet. Most evaluations (e.g. [10,122]) have shown that
when there is no signicant contention for resources in the oppnet, e.g. for bandwidth
and node storage, epidemic routing provides the best performance in terms of both
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delivery ratio and delay. However, when network load is high relative to available
resources, due to its high overhead epidemic routing performs worse than replication-
based protocols with lower overhead that try to maximize delivery ratio based on
complementary information such as contact history, social information, etc. We
adopt epidemic routing for the dissemination of emergency information in ESS; the
reason is that both the number and size of messages generated in ESS are small, and
epidemic routing provides very good performance, i.e. low delay and high delivery
ratio, under these conditions. Furthermore, the ooding-based approach of epidemic
routing is well-aligned for the dissemination of emergency messages in ESS since
each message is intended for all nodes. In addition, since the evacuation process is
generally short and the movement pattern of people during evacuation is signicantly
dierent than normal or post-disaster conditions, history-based and context-based
protocols neither have enough time to collect useful history and context information,
nor the information collected before the emergency is applicable during evacuation.
Considering these issues, it is our opinion that pure ooding-based protocols such
as epidemic routing are best suited for ESS.
Prioritized epidemic routing (PREP) [112] tries to improve epidemic message de-
livery by deciding which copies are more \droppable" when queues are full in order
to reduce the burden on resources without greatly compromising delivery. PREP
prioritizes packet bundles based on expiry time and cost (i.e. distance) to desti-
nation, where cost is derived from per-link average availability information that is
disseminated among the nodes in an epidemic manner. Similar to PREP, we also
utilize prioritization to ensure more recent information is disseminated faster than
old information in ESS. Spray-and-wait [123,125] takes the approach of limiting the
number of message copies in order to reduce overhead: in the spray phase, a limited
m number of copies of a message are sent to m nodes, which then hold the copy until
they can deliver it to the destination directly. Spray-and-wait does reduce overhead
but at the cost of increased delay and lower delivery ratio. Spray-and-focus [124] is a
hybrid approach that combines replication-based and forwarding-based approaches:
after the initial spray phase (controlled replication phase), instead of waiting to en-
counter the destination, the single message copies are actively forwarded by the nodes
(forwarding phase). Spray-and-focus reduces delivery delay compared to spray-and-
wait in oppnets with low or correlated mobility.
Other replication-based protocols do not limit the number of copies to a xed
number as in spray-and-wait, but aim to reduce the number of copies while keep-
ing delivery ratio high by carefully selecting which nodes the copies are sent to.
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PRoPHET [89,90] uses probabilistic routing where packets are sent to intermediate
nodes based on their delivery predictions, which are calculated based on history
of encounters and transitivity of node meetings, and are exchanged between nodes
at contacts. Context-aware routing (CAR) [97] is another protocol that computes
and exchanges delivery probabilities between nodes based on history of contacts. In
contrast to PRoPHET, delivery probabilities are adjusted using context informa-
tion such as remaining battery, degree of mobility, rate of connectivity change, etc.,
and nodes copy a message to a neighbor only if the neighbor has a higher delivery
probability. The minimum estimated expected delay (MEED) metric is proposed
in [77] to estimate how long a message will have to wait before it can be transferred
to the next hop. The MEED routing protocol disseminates link-state topology in-
formation using epidemic routing and the MEED metric is used for exchanging
data packets, i.e. a data packet is exchanged only when the topology information
suggests that the neighbor is \closer" to the destination than the current node.
MaxProp [16] computes delivery probabilities from meeting frequencies and uses
this history information to prioritize packet transmissions and drops when buers
are full. MaxProp also introduces acknowledgments (ACKs) to remove copies of
packets that have been delivered from the network. The use of ACKs in ESS is un-
necessary since each message is destined for all nodes, but we prioritize both packet
transmission and dropping as in MaxProp. A similar history-based routing protocol
called HiBOp is proposed in [9]. In the RAPID protocol [4,5], DTN routing is viewed
as a resource allocation problem that translates the routing metric of interest into
per-packet utilities used for routing decisions. With this approach, RAPID aims
to aect the routing performance metric intentionally rather than incidentally as in
previous protocols. Other work [72, 136] has taken the approach of using network
coding techniques to reduce communication overhead of replication-based protocols
and improve network throughput.
The previous routing protocols focus on communication performance without ex-
plicitly considering energy issues, although by lowering the number of message copies
they indirectly lower energy consumption. Juang et al. [78] consider the energy-
eciency of opportunistic routing in ZebraNet, an animal tracking system, where
data from many nodes are to be collected by a sink node. They propose a history-
based routing protocol where nodes are given likelihoods of delivery to the sink based
on past success and packets are sent to nodes with the greatest likelihoods. Their
results show that there is a trade-o between throughput and energy consumption
as expected. A replication-based opportunistic routing protocol for disaster sce-
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narios that aims to minimize energy used for communications is proposed in [132].
The protocol uses the notion of inter-contact routing to uncover contact patterns
that reduce the oppnet to a multi-hop data-muling network. Multi-hop paths with
higher reliability are prefered in packet routing, which lower energy use at the cost
of increased delay. Performance of some replication-based and forwarding-based
protocols are evaluated in [88] in energy-constrained DTNs. In ESS, we address
energy consumption issues by operating nodes in a low-duty cycle when there is no
emergency, and switching to a high-duty cycle when an emergency is detected. We
believe that energy issues are not a primary concern during emergency evacuation
since evacuation takes a relatively short time and delivery ratio and delay are more
critical for good evacuation performance than saving energy. That being said, we
acknowledge that energy limitations must be considered when the oppnet needs to
survive for other purposes after evacuation and we leave discussion of such energy
issues as future work (see Chp. 5).
Node mobility patterns and contact properties (e.g. frequency of contacts, con-
tact duration) are important factors that aect routing performance in oppnets.
As such, while some works have looked at producing realistic synthetic mobility
models [20, 98], others have focused on collection of mobility and contact pat-
tern traces from real-world DTN experiments and on evaluation of routing pro-
tocols with these traces. There is signicant work in this eld; please refer to
[1, 16, 21, 22, 47, 61, 63{65, 81, 100, 109, 110, 122] for some examples. These works do
not immediately relate to our work in using oppcomms for emergency evacuation for
two reasons: rst, mobility and contact patterns during evacuation are signicantly
dierent than normal conditions; but more importantly, use of oppcomms for emer-
gency navigation produces two interdependent systems where mobility (and there-
fore contacts) are inuenced by oppcomms (via directions provided by the nodes),
and oppcomms are in turn aected by mobility. Because of this interdependency
between node movement and communications in ESS, previous mobility models and
traces cannot adequately capture evacuation dynamics.
2.2.2 Opportunistic communications for emergency support
Several authors have proposed the use of oppcomms and DTNs for emergency sup-
port and management. Bruno et al. [13] propose the use of an opportunistic net-
work (oppnet) in order to \glue" together parts of the surviving communication
infrastructure after a disaster. The main idea is to combine all the heterogeneous
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communication resources available during a crisis via opportunistic overlays, and the
authors evaluate a \worst-case" scenario where only mobile user devices are avail-
able. They compare the communication performance of two opportunistic routing
protocols, epidemic routing and HiBOp, using simulations and consider the met-
rics of message loss rate, average delay, communication overhead and buer use.
They conclude that when the amount of trac generated is higher than what can
be tolerated by the oppnet based on available buer space and bandwidth, context-
based multi-copy protocols (e.g. HiBOp) perform better than pure ooding-based
protocols (e.g. epidemic). Saha et al. [113] provide a much more detailed evalua-
tion of multi-copy opportunistic routing protocols in emergencies. They adopt a
modied cluster mobility model, which is intended as a more realistic representa-
tion of human movement in post-disaster scenarios, and evaluate the communication
performance of epidemic routing, PRoPHET, spray-and-wait, spray-and-focus and
MaxProp routing protocols. Their simulation-based results show that epidemic rout-
ing performs well when the number of generated messages is low, but PRoPHET and
MaxProp perform better due to their lower overhead when the number of messages
is high. Other evaluations of opportunistic routing protocols in non-emergency set-
tings, e.g. [10, 122], have generally reached similar conclusions. We adopt epidemic
routing for the dissemination of emergency information in ESS as discussed in the
previous section.
A modied epidemic routing protocol is proposed in [139] for the dissemination of
emergency messages among smartphones when cellular infrastructure is unavailable.
The authors focus on one-way unicast communications and propose to prioritize
messages by limiting their distribution: nodes remove low priority messages from
their queues and stop disseminating them after they have been forwarded a few
times to other nodes, whereas higher priority messages are kept longer. The authors
do not discuss how to assign priorities to messages. Although we do not limit the
distribution of emergency messages in ESS, we also use prioritization to ensure more
recent information is disseminated faster than stale information.
An approach similar to [139] is proposed in [74], where the authors propose the
use of oppcomms among smartphones to allow communication between emergency
control centers and registered users when other communications are unavailable.
They consider two use cases: broadcasting an emergency message from the control
center to all users, and sending a message from a member of the public to the control
center. They focus on the design of the DTN architecture on the Android system
and also consider some security issues of DTNs in an emergency setting. Their
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solution is based on the bundle security protocol draft, which depends on public key
infrastructure (PKI) to provide message integrity and condentiality. Unfortunately,
intermittent connectivity and the non-existence of end-to-end paths in a DTN greatly
hinder the use of PKI for security [2, 94]. In addition to this security solution,
the authors propose to restrict communication services available to a user based
on her authentication level (e.g. a user with low authentication level can only send
\help" messages) and to restrict the spread of messages based on their authentication
level and type (e.g. only trusted messages are sent over multiple hops). Such an
approach is not suitable for ESS since the system needs to disseminate information
about the hazard without delay so users can be provided with correct directions,
and therefore ESS cannot aord to wait for proper authentication of every user
and message under conditions of intermittent connectivity until they are allowed to
participate in oppcomms. In addition, authentication cannot prevent insider attacks
where authenticated nodes behave maliciously in case of an emergency. The defense
mechanism we propose in Chp. 4 does not aim to prevent insider attacks but to react
to malicious behaviour in the system. The authors of [74] extend their work in [75]
and acknowledge the diculties of using a PKI for security solutions in a DTN,
and they suggest that identity-based cryptography is better suited than PKI. As
we discuss in Chp. 4, cryptography alone cannot protect against insider attacks and
additional mechanisms are needed to detect and protect against node misbehaviour.
The use of oppcomms in vehicle-based communication systems to provide emer-
gency support are considered in [19, 99]. Camara et al. [19] propose a hybrid DTN
infrastructure consisting of xed road-side units and vehicles for the dissemination
of public safety messages in an emergency. The proposed system is intended as
an auxiliary mechanism to aid in the distribution of warning messages from a con-
trol center and complement other means of communication (e.g. public radio). The
system contains xed road-side units (RSUs) which are installed in the area; it is
assumed that RSUs are connected to the control center via a communication in-
frastructure (e.g. wired Internet, satellite). Emergency information generated by
the control center is received and stored by the RSUs, which then forward these
messages to passing vehicles. Vehicles complement the dissemination process via
vehicle-to-vehicle oppcomms using epidemic routing. A similar system is considered
in [99] but the authors focus on sending information the other way around, i.e. from
the public to the emergency center. The system assumes that each car is equipped
with GPS, so it knows its speed, direction and location. The authors propose an
emergency routing scheme with low delay for vehicular oppcomms, which combines
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direction-based routing with shortest path routing using Euclidean distance as the
cost metric.
Winter et al. [138] propose the use of short-range communications between mobile
entities to enable collaborative evacuation based on local knowledge. The emergency
area is represented as a graph and they consider three scenarios regarding knowledge
of the area: (i) complete knowledge, (ii) partial knowledge, obtained prior to the
emergency as the entity moves in the area, and (iii) no knowledge. The static hazard
location is not known beforehand in any scenario and a central alarm is assumed.
The authors then evaluate the utility of sharing both hazard and graph information
among entities as they come in contact during evacuation using simulation experi-
ments of three dierent graphs: densely connected, sparsely connected (similar to a
road network), and single building oor. The authors nd that in most scenarios,
sharing information improves evacuation and when a dynamic hazard is considered,
the benet of communication is even greater. This work seems to be the most sim-
ilar to our approach of using oppcomms for evacuation support and their results
support our ndings in Chp. 3 and [56] that sharing graph and hazard information
via short-range communications among mobile entities improves evacuation. While
valuable, this work focuses on the concept of local sharing of knowledge to improve
evacuation but does not provide any solutions to practical problems, such as system
design, indoor localization and real-time monitoring of the hazard.
The design of our proposed emergency support system based on oppcomms was
rst presented in [56] and showed that oppcomms can successfully enable navigation
services for evacuation in conned spaces. In [55], we compared the evacuation per-
formance of DES [39] and ESS, and observed that given enough population density,
ESS can perform as well as DES and even surpass it. We looked at how spatial pa-
rameters such as sensor and communication range aect evacuation with DES and
ESS in [41, 43] and investigated how ESS can be used as a back-up system to deal
with system failures in [40]. The resilience of ESS to node failures was evaluated
in [58]. None of the other works discussed so far, with the exception of [138], consider
the use of oppcomms for evacuation support. Furthermore, none of the mentioned
systems has been evaluated in terms of security of communications or how attacks on
the system may aect performance. In the next section, we provide a brief overview
of security issues of oppnets and review some of the proposed solutions.
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2.3 Security of Opportunistic Networks
Although previous work has discussed security issues of oppnets and DTNs, to the
best of our knowledge, our work presented here is the rst investigation into security
of oppcomms in the context of emergency navigation and evacuation. Security
requirements of DTNs and the challenges in achieving security with intermittent
connectivity are discussed in [2,94]. Authentication of origin and intermediate hops,
integrity of messages and message fragments, and condentiality and anonymity of
end-to-end communications are identied as security requirements of DTNs. While
these requirements are not specic to DTNs, intermittent connectivity, absence of
end-to-end paths and relying on potentially unknown or untrusted peers present
unique security challenges.
Digital cryptography is the main approach to provide security in wireless com-
munications, although some researchers have considered non-cryptographic security
methods (e.g. [12, 30, 59, 102, 140]). Zeng et al. [141] provide a survey of solutions
using lower/physical layer properties for user authentication and device identica-
tion in wireless networks. They nd that most of the existing non-cryptographic
methods show promising security improvements in xed wireless networks but mo-
bile networks continue to be a challenge. Such non-cryptographic security methods
may be used to supplement digital cryptography solutions in cross-layer designs for
better wireless security.
Traditional cryptography methods, such as symmetric and asymmetric (public)
key cryptography are widely used to provide security in wired and wireless net-
works. However, due to the unique properties of DTNs, traditional cryptography is
generally not suitable [94]. Symmetric-key cryptography requires the availability of
online key distribution servers for the initial distribution and maintenance of sym-
metric keys between parties. Similarly, public-key cryptography (PKC) requires a
public-key infrastructure (PKI) with directory servers to distribute public keys and
revocation information. Nodes need to access such infrastructures for exchanging
keys and verify certicates to perform secure operations, which is problematic with
intermittent connectivity. Key management and revocation also becomes an issue
due to the long end-to-end delays and frequent network partitions.
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) has been proposed to address the problems
faced by traditional cryptography methods in DTNs. Shamir [116] was the rst to
propose IBC and provide an instantiation for identity-based signatures (IBS) but it
was Boneh & Franklin [11] who produced the rst practically secure identity-based
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encryption scheme. IBC is similar to PKC but with the added twist that the public
key of an entity is based on a well-known unique identier of the entity, such as an
e-mail or network address. A trusted third party called the private key generator
(PKG) is employed to generate the corresponding private key. With IBC, any party
that knows the ID of an entity can easily generate its public key, but the private key is
only available to the entity itself. IBC removes the need for a PKI-like infrastructure
to distribute and maintain public keys, and addresses the end-to-end connectivity
issue for cryptographic operations by moving all key generation operations oine,
which make IBC quite attractive in DTNs.
Seth & Keshav [114] propose a practical end-to-end security scheme for DTNs
based on hierarchical IBC (HIBC). They consider a rural DTN where users are dis-
tributed over a large geographic area and they distribute the role of the private
key generator into multiple PKGs arranged in a hierarchy, where each sub-PKG
is responsible for a region. Trust relationships in the PKG hierarchy allow user
authentication and end-to-end condentiality across dierent regions, i.e. roaming
security. In order to deal with key revocation due to lost devices or stolen identities,
they propose the use of user-generated time-based keys, while PKG-generated time-
based keys are used for system-wide key revocation. Unfortunately, this approach
introduces key management problems since nodes would need to regularly contact
the PKG to get key updates. Kate et al. [79] improve upon the HIBC scheme
by increasing its eciency with a new key agreement mechanism and by oering
anonymity. Anonymity is provided by pseudonyms and protocols that allow DTN
routing where intermediate nodes know the pseudonym of a user but not its identity.
The proposed solution protects the sender and receiver from revealing their identi-
ties to third parties involved in the communication, such as observers and network
entities.
Although IBC is an attractive solution for providing security in DTNs, it also
has some drawbacks. Since the PKG can generate the private keys for all users,
it presents a high value target for adversaries and its security is paramount to the
security of the whole system. If the PKG is compromised, then all keys in the
system are compromised, introducing a single point of failure. The master public
and private keys of the PKG can be updated regularly to limit exposure due to a
compromised server but this would introduce key management problems. Another
issue is the requirement of a secure channel between a user and PKG for the initial
exchange of identity information and corresponding private key. An SSL-like channel
is usually used for this stage. A further requirement is the initial authentication of
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the user with the PKG to guarantee that the identity is really associated with the
user. Traditional challenge/response methods or smart cards can be used for initial
authentication. A nal point to note is that an IBC scheme does not prevent or
detect authorized nodes acting maliciously (i.e. insider attacks), although this is
also a problem observed with traditional cryptography methods.
It is argued in [118] that IBC is not immediately applicable in context- and
content-based oppnets since destinations are not specied based on identities in
these networks. Therefore the security mechanism should be adapted to the way
by which destinations are dened. A solution that extends IBC to support context-
based epidemic-like routing in oppnets is proposed in [120]. The authors describe
two renements to IBC, searchable encryption and policy-based encryption, to pro-
vide privacy in context-based oppnets. The proposed solution enables intermediate
nodes to perform context-based routing while preserving privacy by allowing par-
tial matches against encrypted message headers and preventing access to message
content via encryption. Another method for privacy in content-based oppnets is
presented in [119], where the authors propose a multi-layer commutative encryption
scheme to provide privacy. They argue that the main privacy concern in content-
based networks is the protection of receivers' interests. Intermediate nodes need to
be able to correctly set-up their routing tables and perform routing lookups without
openly accessing user interests. The proposed multi-layer encryption scheme allows
nodes to perform transformations on data without having full access and therefore
provides a mechanism to take content-based forwarding decisions without openly
accessing the content.
Other security challenges in DTNs include authentication and integrity of mes-
sage fragments [111], and initialization of security. In ESS, we require authentication
of origin and data integrity to protect nodes from malicious messages which may
contain incorrect data. Although message fragmentation normally causes additional
challenges in ensuring data integrity and may require authentication of intermediate
peers, messages in ESS are very short and therefore not subject to fragmentation.
Although message bundling is used in ESS for ecient communications, each mes-
sage is considered a self-sucient packet of information and therefore fragmentation
of bundles does not introduce any challenges. We also assume that a secure chan-
nel between a node and the PKG exists for the initialization of security and that
communication nodes which have not obtained keys prior to the emergency either
cannot participate in the oppnet or are assumed to be untrustworthy. We kindly
refer readers interested in challenges of securing message fragments and security
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initialization to [2, 71,105] and [2, 31,114,121], respectively.
Burgess et al. [15] consider the problem of routing attacks in DTNs that do not
employ security mechanisms. They use the MaxProp routing protocol in their eval-
uation and consider four attack types: dropping packets, ooding nodes with use-
less data, falsifying routing tables, and counterfeiting message acknowledgments
(ACKs). Their results identify that the ACK attack is the most damaging for Max-
Prop but replicative routing protocols (e.g. MaxProp) are generally very robust to
the considered attacks. Choo et al. [26] investigate the same problem as in [15]
but consider more sophisticated attacks. They describe two attack types: (i) non-
deliverable packet ooding, combined with routing metadata falsication, and (ii)
identity spoong. In the rst attack, malicious nodes ood packets into the network
where packet recipients are not part of the network and therefore the packets are
non-deliverable. MaxProp would normally give the lowest priority to these pack-
ets and they would eventually be dropped by intermediate hops. To prevent this,
ooding is combined with routing metadata falsication to give highest priority to
non-deliverable packets. The second attack is actually a variant of ACK counterfeit-
ing, since in this attack malicious nodes wrongly claim that they are the recipient
of messages to cause them to be prematurely removed from the network. The au-
thors present that using these sophisticated attack schemes, even a small number of
attackers can greatly aect routing performance. This result is in contrast to the
one in [15] and indicates that when attackers have better knowledge of the work-
ings of a DTN (e.g. the details of the routing protocol), they can formulate more
devastating attacks. Our results in Chp. 4 support their ndings in an emergency
context: oblivious routing attacks have small eect on evacuation performance, but
when attackers have knowledge of how the system is used for evacuation support,
i.e. when they know and attack the application logic, evacuation performance is
greatly aected.
Identity spoong is investigated in [133] in unsecured DTNs that employ quota-
based multi-copy routing protocols (e.g. spray-and-wait) where the number of copies
of a message is limited based on some factor. The authors propose a defense mech-
anism that probabilistically maintains the same number of copies of messages in
the network even when attackers falsely claim they are the recipients. Their pro-
posed defense does not detect the spoofers or prevent them from participating in
oppcomms, but nodes assess the level of spoong based on local contacts and adap-
tively increase the number of copies of aected messages based on their assessment
of the spoong level. Spoong assessment is based on mismatches between unique
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secrets called tokens. A node X creates a unique secret called a token, computed
based on its private secret and the address of an encountered peer Y and gives this
token to the peer. A node that claims to be Y needs to produce the same token or
a token mismatch occurs, which indicates that Y 's address is being spoofed. The
number of copies of messages destined to Y are then increased at X depending on
the number of mismatches. This increases routing overhead but also increases the
chances of delivery to the spoofed peer. The authors evaluate their scheme with the
spray-and-wait protocol, and nd that it increases delivery ratios although overhead
is also increased. The proposed scheme is only useful in multi-copy protocols where
the number of copies is limited and is not applicable in ooding-based protocols like
epidemic routing. Furthermore, the scheme cannot identify the attackers, but gives
a peer-based estimate on the level of identity spoong.
A reputation-based trust scheme is proposed in [3] to detect malicious nodes in a
DTN. The authors propose the use of IBS to authenticate messages, and consider
the case of insider attacks where attackers randomly drop packets and try to aect
the trust mechanism by bad-mouthing and ballot-stung. In the proposed scheme,
each node maintains a reputation table that is updated based on: (i) its evaluation
of whether a peer acted maliciously during routing (e.g. by dropping packets), and
(ii) the evaluations of other nodes. Evaluations are performed based on a three-
hop mechanism: assume a sender X encounters peer Y and is yet to produce its
rating of Y . X forwards its packets to Y ; when Y encounters another node Z, Z
keeps track of which packets it received from Y . When X and Z meet, Z sends its
evaluation of Y and a short representation of the packets it received from Y . Using
this information, X calculates a binary metric regarding Y , which indicates whether
it operates according to the rules of the routing protocol. Since attackers can forge
reputation tables and try to aect the reputation building process by giving false
ratings, each node needs multiple evaluations for the same peer when building its
reputation table so it can be sure of its verdict. The long time needed to build
reputation in the proposed scheme aects its usability in DTNs [15]. To support the
proposed trust mechanism, nodes need to maintain additional information, such as
signed encounter timestamps (contact history), a reputation table with an entry for
all encountered peers, and histories of packet transfers. These additional structures
increase memory requirements and communication overhead. The proposed scheme
also requires additional signing operations during contacts (e.g. for timestamps) and
a fairly complex mechanism to maintain and update reputations, meaning increased
computational overhead.
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All of the reviewed works in this section focus on how the presence of malicious
nodes aects routing performance, e.g. message delivery ratio and latency. As we
discuss in Chp. 4, in addition to disrupting communications, malicious nodes may
operate with the aim of aecting application-layer services, such as evacuation sup-
port, built upon the DTN. Our evaluation in Chp. 4 shows that although DTNs are
generally quite robust to routing attacks, attacks on the application logic can be
greatly detrimental.
2.4 Chapter Summary
We reviewed some of the related work in the elds of emergency navigation and
evacuation, opportunistic communications in emergency management, and secu-
rity issues of oppcomms in this chapter. While there has been signicant work
on emergency navigation using distributed computing systems, we observed that
most approaches make use of a wireless sensor network of static nodes for emer-
gency navigation. In these WSNs, sensors are always connected to their neighbors
and end-to-end paths are guaranteed. Other systems assume the availability of ex-
isting communication infrastructure, such as a MANET or a cellular network. Our
approach diers from those reviewed here in that we propose an emergency support
system that utilizes opportunistic communications between mobile devices to oer
navigation services when other means of communication are unavailable. We inves-
tigate the advantages and disadvantages of using a mobile infrastructure to oer
services in an emergency.
Note that while our design of ESS for indoor deployments uses pre-deployed sen-
sors in the building, these sensors are assumed to have very short communication
range and they are not connected with each other, so they do not form a WSN. The
main aim of these sensors is real-time hazard monitoring and indoor localization of
mobile nodes (see Sec. 3.1.2). The use of xed sensors indoors provides the advantage
of potentially using everyday devices (e.g. smartphones) as communication nodes:
although smartphones currently contain many sensors (e.g. accelerometers, light sen-
sors, cameras, etc.), these sensors are insucient to detect many common hazards.
Furthermore, indoor localization of nodes using current satellite-based technologies
such as GPS has proved to be problematic due to signal strength. Therefore, un-
til smartphones are equipped with more suitable sensors and indoor localization
technology, using pre-deployed sensors in buildings is a good compromise to allow
deployment of ESS in buildings using technology available today. This issue is also
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discussed in Sec. 3.1.3.
Another dierence with most previous work on emergency navigation is our eval-
uation method. Many of the previous systems have been evaluated in terms of route
nding in the presence of static obstacles, but they have not been properly evaluated
in realistic evacuation scenarios. For example, many evaluations have not considered
a dynamically spreading hazard or multiple civilians during evacuation and there-
fore have neglected issues of dynamic adaptation and physical congestion. Others
have addressed such issues in their simulations but failed to evaluate the eect of the
hazard on civilian health. We aim for a realistic evaluation of our proposed system
by considering a dynamically spreading hazard that concurrently starts at one or
more locations, simulating physical congestion and the eect of hazard on health.
Our simulation approach is discussed in more detail in Sec. 3.2.2.
Other work has considered the application of oppnets for emergency manage-
ment, but they have investigated how oppnets can provide communication services
in emergencies. Our work goes one step further and considers how communications
provided via oppcomms can be used to build higher level services for emergency
management, specically emergency navigation and evacuation support. Similarly,
previous authors have discussed the security issues of oppnets and have evaluated
the eect of routing attacks on communication performance. However, to the best
of our knowledge, our work presented here is the rst investigation into security of
oppcomms in the context of emergency navigation and evacuation.
We present in the next chapter the design of ESS and how we use oppcomms
to provide emergency evacuation support. The next chapter also presents our sim-
ulation methodology and evaluation of ESS in indoor and outdoor scenarios. We
investigate security issues of oppcomms for emergency navigation in Chp. 4.
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3 Opportunistic Communications for
Emergency Support
Safe and quick evacuation of people in the aected area is a critical component of
emergency and disaster response. People in the emergency area and others that
may be heading to it need to be alerted of the emergency and evacuated along safe
routes to minimize exposure to hazards. While safety of people is paramount, the
evacuation also needs to be fast, especially in case of a spreading hazard, such as re
or radiation. Otherwise, evacuees run the risk of increased exposure and the possi-
bility of more or all of the escape paths being blocked. Finding the best escape path
may be non-trivial due to the dynamic conditions. People may be unfamiliar with
the area and the disaster might have rendered some paths unusable. Furthermore,
best evacuation paths would change as the hazard spreads. Considering the criti-
cal nature of emergency evacuation and its associated challenges, computer-based
evacuation support systems can be very benecial.
Advances in computing technology and economy of scales have allowed communi-
cation and computing devices to be manufactured cheaply and made widely avail-
able to the public. These devices have made their way into our lives and gradually
changed the way we interact with technology and fellow humans. A recent example
is the advent and wide adoption of smartphones. It is easy to see that in addition
to easing and changing our daily lives, such devices provide a ubiquitous comput-
ing platform that can be harnessed to improve emergency response. We can even
imagine in the near future people carrying small, cheap, wearable devices such as
keyfobs for the dedicated purpose of emergency response in buildings and cities.
While new communication technologies such as 4G provide an attractive way to
connect such devices, they should not rely solely on infrastructure networks since
existing infrastructure is usually adversely aected during emergencies and disas-
ters. For example, wireless infrastructure networks in a building would fail in case
of a power failure. Recent disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and
tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and most recently
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the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan and resulting tsunami and nuclear crisis at
the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, have all had signicant impact on telecommuni-
cations infrastructure. In the case of the disaster in Japan, although wired Internet
connectivity and landline communications were not signicantly aected, wireless
and mobile communications were greatly disrupted due to damage to infrastructure,
congestion and the subsequent energy crisis [25, 28,82,137].
We propose the use of opportunistic communications (oppcomms) among pocket
devices carried by people to provide emergency communications and to enable emer-
gency evacuation support when other means of communication have broken down.
We specically consider the evacuation component of emergency response and pro-
pose an emergency support system (ESS) based on oppcomms that provides alerts
and navigation directions for evacuation. This chapter presents the design of ESS
and an evaluation of oppcomms for emergency evacuation support. ESS is mainly
targeted for densely populated urban areas and can be deployed in both indoor and
outdoor environments. Section 3.1.2 provides the design of ESS for indoor deploy-
ment, and design dierences for outdoor deployment are discussed in Sec. 3.1.3. A
brief overview of current wireless communication technologies that can be used for
implementation of oppcomms in ESS is given in Sec. 3.1.4.
We present an evaluation of oppcomms for evacuation support in Sec. 3.2. We have
implemented ESS in the Distributed Building Evacuation Simulator (DBES) [32],
and we consider both indoor and outdoor urban environments in our experiments
and investigate the eect of various parameters, such as communication range and
node density, on evacuation outcome and communication performance. Our results
include a comparative evaluation of ESS with another evacuation system (the DES,
discussed in Sec. 2.1) and a shortest path evacuation strategy. We investigate the
resilience of ESS to node failures in Sec. 3.3 and conclude with a summary of the
chapter in Sec. 3.4.
3.1 Emergency Support System based on Opportunistic
Communications
In this section, we describe the design of our proposed emergency support system
(ESS) that provides evacuation support to civilians in urban emergencies. The pro-
posed system uses opportunistic contacts between wireless communication devices
carried by civilians to gather information regarding the current situation and dis-
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seminate emergency messages in order to guide the evacuees safely to the exits. The
ESS is targeted for densely populated urban areas as node density plays an impor-
tant role in the eectiveness of oppcomms, as we discuss in Sec. 3.2. The ESS can
be deployed both in conned spaces and open areas; its design is slightly dierent
based on the deployment area type. We initially describe ESS as deployed in indoor
urban environments, such as oce buildings and shopping malls. Deployment in
outdoor areas is discussed in Sec. 3.1.3.
3.1.1 Graph representation
We represent the emergency area (e.g. building) as an undirected connected graph
G(V;E), where vertices V are locations where civilians can congregate, such as
rooms, corridors and doorways, and edges E are physical paths that civilians can
use to move in the area. An example graph for a building oor is given in Fig. 3.1.
The length l(i; j) of an edge is the physical distance between vertices i; j 2 V , while
h(i; j) represents the measured hazard intensity along this edge. We dene the
\eective" length L(i; j) of an edge as L(i; j) = l(i; j)  h(i; j). This joint metric
combines distance and hazard intensity to express the ultimate cost of this edge
being traversed by a civilian. When there is no hazard along the edge, L  l and
the eective length is equivalent to the physical length of the edge. As the value
of h increases, the corresponding edge becomes more hazardous to traverse. The
range of h can be dened based on the measured qualities of the hazard, such as
temperature, light intensity, or CO2 level for re. In our simulations where re is
used as the hazard, we use 17 discrete levels (k) to describe the hazard intensity:
h(i; j) =
(
1 k = 0 ( no re on edge (i; j) )
k  500 k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 16g ;8(i; j) 2 E
Each edge (i; j) also has a last-update-time eld t(i; j) that indicates when the
h(i; j) and L(i; j) costs were last updated. We assume that the building (area)
graph is known for the emergency area. We believe this to be a valid assumption
since the topology of the area and physical distances are static and therefore the
graph can be created once and stored for later use.
The graph is used for three purposes in ESS: (i) for localization of people, which
facilitates provisioning of step-by-step navigation directions, (ii) for mapping the
area monitored by a sensor, and (iii) for calculation of least-cost (or shortest) paths.
We will discuss these in detail in the next section. Note that there are multiple
graphs that can represent a given area. For our purposes, any graph is ne as long
as the main spatial characteristics of the area (e.g. the corridors, rooms, intersections,
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Figure 3.1: The oor plan of a building level and its graph representation. Vertices
are locations where civilians can congregate and edges are physical path
segments for civilian movement.
staircases, etc. in a building) are captured in the graph. However, the graph is an
approximation of the emergency area's spatial conguration as accessible to people.
Therefore, when the graph is constructed, care should be taken not to make the
graph too dense or too sparse. A graph denser than required will not provide any
additional information but will need more storage space and computational eort.
A graph sparser than required will fail to adequately capture the spatial properties
of the area and may lead to errors in localization and path calculation due to loose
approximation.
The number of nodes and edges in the area graph naturally depend on the scale
and conguration of the area. Larger areas generally require a higher number of
nodes and edges than smaller areas, and complex areas, such as buildings, may
require a higher number of nodes and edges than simple areas, such as uniform
open spaces. In our evaluation, we consider two dierent types of urban areas and
therefore two dierent graphs. Details on the graph representation of these areas
are given in Sec. 3.2.2.
3.1.2 System description
For indoor deployments, ESS consists of mobile communication nodes (CNs)
carried by people and xed sensor nodes (SNs) pre-deployed in the indoor envi-
ronment (i.e. building). CNs form the backbone of the ESS, although SNs also play
an important role. We describe these devices and how ESS operates next.
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Sensor nodes
We assume that there are sensor nodes (SNs) pre-deployed at xed locations in
the building, where each SN monitors its immediate environment. Each SN is a
self-contained, self-powered, low-cost device with simple sensing and short-range
low-rate wireless communication capability, and has enough memory and compu-
tational power to perform its sensing activities. SNs do not perform complicated
computational tasks on top of their sensing duties. This allows the design of SNs
to be kept very simple and low-cost. SNs are self-powered for a variety of reasons,
including but not limited to: low installation cost, ease of installation and main-
tenance, and resilience to power outages. SNs are designed as \deploy and forget"
devices and they need to operate for a long time (i.e. a couple of years) without
maintenance. Therefore, low power consumption is an important consideration for
SNs. To achieve this, they use low-power, low-rate wireless communication at short
range. Further energy saving is facilitated by operating SNs in a low duty-cycle and
the use of normal and emergency modes, described below.
Operating sensors in a periodic sleep-duty cycle is a common method of lowering
energy use and prolonging sensor lifetime. When an SN sleeps, it turns o its
transceiver and sensing modules, saving considerable energy. During the duty cycle,
an SN puts its transceiver in listening mode and performs its sensing activities. In
normal operation mode, SNs operate in a low duty-cycle, where the sleep duration
Ts is much longer than their duty duration Td; the total period of the operation
cycle is T = Ts + Td. However, when there is an emergency, a low-duty cycle
may prevent SNs from providing timely information. Therefore, when a hazard is
detected in the building, all SNs switch to emergency mode and continuously monitor
the environment and listen for incoming transmissions. SNs do not coordinate their
sleep-duty schedule and they do not communicate with each other. Each SN handles
its own schedule independent of other SNs. When an SN observes a signicant
measurement that indicates there is a hazard in the vicinity, it switches from normal
mode to emergency mode. Other SNs are informed of the emergency by CNs, as
described in the next section.
Each SN has a unique device ID, a local clock and a location tag that corresponds
to its position in the building. The region monitored by an SN is generally in the form
of a circle. This region is approximated in the building graph by one or more edges.
In this discussion, we assume that the sensed area by each SN is approximated by a
single edge. The extension of our discussion to multiple-edge cases is straightforward
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and omitted here. An edge (i; j) monitored by an SN is known to the SN and is
also used as its location in the building1. An SN keeps its latest h(i; j) measurement
and provides this information to CNs in emergencies. CNs require only their latest
measurement from SNs since newer events have priority. It is important to note that
SNs do not form a conventional wireless sensor network and hazard information is
not disseminated among SNs. This is due to the short communication range and
limited energy and physical capabilities of SNs.
Current technology allows the realization of SNs as used in ESS. A multitude
of wireless sensor devices with dierent sensing and communication capabilities are
available from many producers; an example is the TelosB wireless sensor [96], which
is designed mostly for experimentation. Each TelosB device is equipped with a low-
power, low-rate, short-range wireless communication module based on the IEEE
802.15.4 standard, and temperature, humidity and light sensors, which can be used
to monitor the environment for simple hazards, such as re and smoke. A more
generic solution is provided by the MicaZ platform [95], where the basic commu-
nication and computation unit can be coupled with a variety of sensor modules as
needed. In our evaluation of ESS, we use re and its associated eects as the haz-
ard. Sensor modules more specic to re monitoring are available in the form of
smoke detectors [34] and CO/CO2 sensors [103,104] that can be linked with micro-
controllers.
Communication nodes and ESS operation
Communication nodes (CNs) are battery-powered pocket devices carried by people
that have short-range wireless communication capability, some local memory and a
processing unit. CNs form a network in an opportunistic manner as they come into
contact. Opportunistic communications among CNs are used to disseminate emer-
gency messages that contain information on the hazard. As discussed in Sec. 2.2,
oppcomms are characterized by the \store-carry-forward" paradigm [107] where CNs
carry messages on behalf of others in local storage, and then forward them to other
CNs as they come into contact due to human mobility. Thus, a message is delivered
to its destination over multiple hops via successive opportunistic contacts. Because
the network may be disconnected for long periods of time, CNs may store messages
for lengths of time, and the delivery of messages to destinations is not guaranteed.
The ESS design assumes that each CN will (a) store the graph representation of the
1If an SN monitors multiple edges, then its location can be represented by a coordinate system
specic to the building or a graph vertex.
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area as discussed below, and (b) be able to carry out the computations that the ESS
needs, sense other CNs in its vicinity, and carry out short range store-and-forward
packet reception and transmission for oppcomms.
Each CN stores in local memory the area graph, which is obtained and installed
through a trusted source. Updates to the area graph, which may arise due to
rare changes to the layout, can be disseminated to CNs through the same trusted
mechanism. Dynamic edge costs are all set to their default values initially in each
CN. All changes to the graph and edge costs due to the emergency are disseminated
via oppcomms.
An important distinction between CNs and SNs in terms of physical capability is
that we assume CNs are less energy-constrained than SNs because their users can
re-charge them regularly. We also assume that CNs have more memory and com-
putational power than SNs since they need to store more information and perform
calculations for providing evacuation directions. An important advantage of ESS
over dedicated static node based support systems is that consumer devices owned
by the civilians, such as smartphones, can be used as CNs. This decreases deploy-
ment costs and improves the reach of ESS. However, the use of smartphones is not
mandatory and we imagine that in the near future CNs can be in the form of simple,
low cost, small form factor devices smaller than a digital watch; these devices can be
dedicated for emergency response but have the potential to deliver additional ser-
vices. Such small wearable devices can be incorporated into existing accessories such
as ID badges and cardholders and be given to employees and visitors by companies
and other institutions.
CNs participate in oppcomms to disseminate emergency messages (EMs),
which are used to update the local view of the CNs. Each CN, based on its local
view, provides evacuation guidance to its user via audio-visual signals. Hazard in-
formation is generated by SNs in the form of measurement messages (MMs).
When an SN observes a signicant measurement (e.g. existence of smoke or high
temperature) that indicates a hazard, it creates an MM that contains this infor-
mation. As described before, this causes the SN to switch from normal mode to
emergency mode. An MM contains the source ID, location of the SN (e.g. edge
ID or (i; j)), the hazard intensity2 h(i; j) and measurement timestamp t(i; j). Note
that the timestamp contained in the MM is based on the local clock of the SN. The
2In this discussion, we assume that a single value is used to represent the hazard intensity.
When an SN has multiple sensors to measure dierent qualities of the same hazard, it is assumed
that it combines them into a single value in a meaningful manner.
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Sensor node
(SN)
MM
EM
Figure 3.2: Simplied diagram of ESS operation. Hazard measurements are sent to
CNs in range by the SN monitoring the area in the form of MMs. EMs,
which are created in response to MMs, are then disseminated among
CNs using oppcomms. Circles in the gure represent the communication
ranges of CNs and SNs.
latest MM created by an SN is forwarded to any CN that comes in contact with
the SN. When a CN receives an MM, it is used to update the local view of the
CN as described below. The MM is also translated into an EM that contains the
source ID (CN ID) and information from the MM (intensity, edge (i; j), timestamp).
Multiple MMs are combined into a single EM when possible. In contrast to MMs,
which are sent from SNs to CNs via single-hop communications, EMs are sent from
CNs to CNs over multiple hops using oppcomms. Each EM is destined for all CNs.
Figure 3.2 shows a simplied diagram of ESS operations: an SN observes a hazard
in its vicinity and periodically creates an MM with its latest observation. When a
CN comes into contact with the SN, the MM is sent to the CN. The CN creates
an EM based on the MM, and this EM is then disseminated among other CNs via
oppcomms.
The rst MM or EM received by a CN acts as an alarm, indicating that there
is a hazard and the user of the CN should evacuate the building. Each CN stores
the building graph in local storage and received MMs and EMs are used by a CN
to update edge costs on its local graph. The received hazard intensity hr(i; j) for
edge (i; j) is used to update both the stored hazard intensity hs(i; j) and eective
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edge length Ls(i; j). In order to ensure that past observations do not overwrite
newer ones, the update is done only if the stored timestamp is less than the received
timestamp, i.e. ts(i; j) < tr(i; j). An update triggers the calculation of shortest
paths from the current CN location to all exits, and the path with the lowest cost
is used as an evacuation path. Any shortest path (SP) algorithm can potentially be
used; CNs employ Dijkstra's SP algorithm [29]. Since eective edge lengths (L(i; j)
values) are used in SP calculation, the \shortest" path minimizes exposure to the
hazard while also minimizing travel distance.
The current evacuation path calculated by a CN is used to provide step-by-step
navigation directions to its user; these directions are in the form of \turn left/right,
keep straight, turn back, etc." In order to do this, the CN needs to know its location
in the area. Indoor localization is achieved using the xed SNs. Each SN contains a
location tag; we use the edge ID (i; j) monitored by the SN in this implementation
as the SN location tag. Since each SN has a xed position in the building, they
can be used to approximate CN locations on the building graph. Before we discuss
CN localization, we would like to say that like SNs, CNs also operate in two modes:
normal and emergency. In normal mode, CNs are always in the listening state, ready
to receive any incoming transmissions, such as MMs and EMs. A CN switches from
normal to emergency mode with the rst received MM or EM. In emergency mode,
in addition to always listening, CNs send a periodic beacon using local broadcast,
with period Tb, which is used both for localization and to inform SNs that have not
yet observed the hazard. SNs that receive this beacon switch to emergency mode if
they have not already done so, and reply with a localization message (LM) that
contains the SN ID, location tag and timestamp. Using the received LMs from one
or more SNs in the vicinity, a CN can position itself in the building. Very accurate
localization is not required since the location of CNs are approximated by the graph
vertices. The short communication range of CNs and SNs also decreases localization
error. The location of a CN is updated as it moves in the building via LMs, and
at each location update the CN updates the directions given to its user based on
its current location and evacuation path. Note that SNs need to have Td  Tb so
that they do not miss beacons when they are awake in normal mode and SN sleep
period Ts should not be too long for good responsiveness in switching from normal
to emergency mode. In our evaluation, we use Ts = 8 s, Td = 2 s, and Tb = 2 s
for indoor experiments, based on the average distance between SNs and movement
speed of people (see Sec. 3.2.2).
In addition to the mentioned elds, all messages have the following elds: message
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Field Size (bits)
SN ID 16
CN ID 32
Message type 8
Seqnum 16
Vertex: i 2 V 16
Edge: (i; j) 2 E 32
Hazard intensity: h(i; j) 16
Timestamp: t(i; j) 32
Table 3.1: Message eld sizes used in ESS.
type and sequence number. Note that messages used in ESS are very short, and
therefore storing messages uses little memory, and transmitting messages uses less
energy and time. Table 3.1 gives the suggested sizes for message elds; Table 3.2
provides a summary of the messages used in ESS and resulting message sizes without
any protocol headers.
Opportunistic routing protocols generally try to achieve a balance between mes-
sage delivery ratio and protocol overhead (e.g. resource consumption, both for mes-
sage storage and communications), as discussed in Sec. 2.2. The general idea is to
reduce the number of copies of each message and to forward each copy to nodes
that have a better chance of helping the message reach its destination. These DTN
protocols assume that each message has a single destination (one-to-one) or a few
destinations (one-to-few) among all nodes. However, EMs are destined for all CNs
(one-to-all) and therefore most DTN protocols are unsuitable for their dissemination.
Multi-copy ooding-based DTN protocols are more suitable for ESS; we employ (pri-
oritized) epidemic routing [134] for the dissemination of EMs in ESS. Epidemic
routing is a simple ooding-type DTN protocol that reduces communication over-
head by transferring only those messages which are not currently held by a node
during a contact. When two nodes get in contact, they rst exchange a short bit-
vector that represents the messages held in storage by each node. The bit-vector
is a manifest of the stored messages and informs its receiver of the messages cur-
rently stored by its sender. Based on this information, nodes can exchange messages
without redundancy. In the ESS, each EM is uniquely identied by its (source ID,
seqnum) pair, which is used in the bit-vector.
Epidemic routing is known to have high message delivery ratios and low message
latencies at the cost of high communication overhead [122]. However, the commu-
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Message Source/Dest. Hops Size(bytes) Purpose
MM SN to CN Single 15 Provide hazard measurements
EM CN to CN Multiple 17(min),
37(avg)
Disseminate hazard information
LM SN to CN Single 13 Indoor localization of CNs
Beacon CN to SN Single 7 Indoor localization of CNs and
\activation" of SNs
Table 3.2: Summary of messages used in ESS.
nication overhead is not applicable in ESS since each message is targeted for all
CNs, and epidemic routing provides good communication performance, which is de-
sirable for emergency communications. We discuss the communication performance
of epidemic routing in ESS in Sec. 3.2.4.
Because messages exchanged in ESS are very short and each communication be-
tween devices, including bit-vectors, is subject to MAC scheduling, we suggest that
bit-vectors can be omitted when the number and/or total size of messages to be
exchanged is low. The exact threshold for disabling bit-vectors depends on the
scheduling policy of the MAC layer, available channel bitrate, the mean contact
duration and the number of connected nodes in the same sub-network that need to
exchange data. In our implementation of ESS, we assume that bit-vector exchange
is always enabled to decrease protocol complexity.
Timestamp-based priority queues are used to manage message storage in
CNs. All EMs created and received by a CN are stored in a single queue for opp-
comms. Each EM has a \creation timestamp", which is the highest hazard obser-
vation timestamp contained in the EM. EMs are prioritized based on their creation
timestamps and EMs with higher timestamps (i.e. newer EMs) have higher priority.
This is because EMs relating to recent events are generally more important than
those of past events, since old EMs have already had some time to be disseminated
and their data may have become stale. A CN sends its messages in timestamp-
priority order during contacts. Therefore, new EMs have higher probability of being
received than old ones in cases when all of the messages cannot be exchanged, for
example due to short contact duration or high interference. In a similar fashion,
when the queue is full, the oldest messages are dropped rst.
In addition to timestamp-based prioritization, CNs can also implement a queue
management strategy that we call location-based early replacement (LBER).
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CN Id 1001
Edge  (5,6)
h(5,6) 2000
t(5,6)  386
CN Id 1004
Edge  (3,4)
h(3,4) 3000
t(3,4)  300
CN Id 1005
Edge  (7,8)
h(7,8) 1000
t(7,8)  400
CN Id 1003
Edge  (1,3)
h(1,3) 1000
t(1,3)  118
CN Id 1006
Edge  (7,9)
h(7,9) 2000
t(7,9)  395
(a) Queue of CN 1002 during rst contact
CN Id 1001
Edge  (5,6)
h(5,6) 2000
t(5,6)  386
CN Id 1004
Edge  (3,4)
h(3,4) 3000
t(3,4)  300
CN Id 1005
Edge  (7,8)
h(7,8) 1000
t(7,8)  400
CN Id 1003
Edge  (1,3)
h(1,3) 1000
t(1,3)  118
CN Id 1006
Edge  (7,9)
h(7,9) 2000
t(7,9)  395
CN Id 1007
Edge  (3,4)
h(3,4) 1000
t(3,4)  150
CN Id 1008
Edge  (7,9)
h(7,9) 3000
t(7,9)  510
(b) Queue during second contact
CN Id 1001
Edge  (5,6)
h(5,6) 2000
t(5,6)  386
CN Id 1004
Edge  (3,4)
h(3,4) 3000
t(3,4)  300
CN Id 1005
Edge  (7,8)
h(7,8) 1000
t(7,8)  400
CN Id 1003
Edge  (1,3)
h(1,3) 1000
t(1,3)  118
CN Id 1008
Edge  (7,9)
h(7,9) 3000
t(7,9)  510
(c) Queue after second contact
Figure 3.3: Timestamp-priority queuing with location-based early replacement
(LBER). (a) CN 1002 receives two EMs during rst contact. (b) Both
EMs are placed in the queue based on their timestamps. The CN receives
two more EMs during a second contact. (c) This time, the CN has EMs
with matching locations (edges) in its queue for both messages. The EM
from 1007 is dropped since its matching EM has a newer timestamp.
The EM from 1008 replaces the one from 1006 in the queue.
The LBER strategy is in addition to prioritization and decreases the number of
messages stored without aecting evacuation performance. With LBER, old EMs
that contain information for the same location (i.e. edge) are replaced with newer
EMs with more recent information on the same location, even when the queue is
not yet full. Since CNs use the latest hazard measurement when updating their
local edge costs, LBER does not aect the local view of a CN but it decreases
the number of stored EMs. However, a disadvantage of LBER is that since CNs
forget the messages dropped from their buer, LBER may cause more messages
to be transferred during contacts, increasing communication overhead. The use of
timestamp-priority queues and LBER is explained with a simple example in Fig. 3.3.
We evaluate the eect of using LBER on queue size and communication performance
in Sec. 3.2.4.
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In this section, we have described ESS as deployed in indoor environments. For a
clear discussion, we assumed that each SN is responsible for monitoring a single edge,
but noted that ESS operation is unaected when SN sensing region is approximated
by multiple edges instead of a single edge. In a real-life deployment, we expect
SNs located at certain positions to monitor a single edge, and others to monitor
multiple edges. This means that the number of SNs required to cover an area is
lower than the number of edges in the area graph in a realistic scenario. In the
above discussion, we reserved the term communication node, or CN, specically for
the mobile devices carried by people in the area. However, we would like to note
that certain CNs may be placed at xed locations in the building, for example at
staircases, for additional coverage. We discuss the advantages of including a few
static CNs in certain situations in our evaluation of oppcomms in Sec. 3.2. We next
discuss the dierences in ESS design for outdoor deployments.
3.1.3 Dierences in ESS design for outdoor deployment
The design of ESS in indoor spaces consists of mobile communication nodes (CNs)
carried by people, and pre-deployed static sensor nodes (SNs) located in the building.
We explained that SNs are used for real-time environment monitoring and indoor
localization of CNs, but they do not participate in the dissemination of EMs in order
to keep their required specication simple, lower device cost, and decrease energy
use. We believe the requirement of SNs is acceptable in buildings since they can be
installed by the building's operator at little cost. Independent of their installation
or maintenance cost, it may be more dicult to justify the deployment of SNs in
large-scale outdoor areas. The existence of SNs in certain types of outdoor areas,
such as university or company campuses, is reasonable. In such areas, the ESS
would operate as described before. In outdoor areas where SNs are not present, we
suggest two dierent methods for hazard monitoring: manual input from the users,
and sensors embedded in CNs.
For hazards that can be observed by people, such as re, smoke, ooding, land-
slide, earthquake damage, etc., users of the CNs can provide hazard information
through manual input. The input method must be very simple and quick in or-
der to not discourage people from providing information while their life may be in
danger. We believe this input method can be in the form of a single button that,
when pressed, signals the existence of hazard in the vicinity of the user's current
location. Notice that this method cannot distinguish between dierent levels of
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hazard (e.g. some smoke versus a lot of smoke). While this decreases the level of
information available to the system, our evaluations in Sec. 3.2 show that just the
information of hazard existence is very important on its own. If some indication
of hazard intensity is desirable, then simple hazard levels can be introduced in the
input process, such as a star-rating system3. Of course, manual input would not
work with hazards that cannot be directly observed by people, such as radiation or
CO gas. We believe manual input to be a good compromise when consumer devices,
such as smartphones, are used as CNs in ESS.
In the case of dedicated devices as CNs, we believe that embedding sensors in
the CNs is a better approach which does not break the autonomy of ESS. With
this approach, each CN contains its own sensors and produces hazard information
without any need for manual input. While not necessary, manual input can also be
enabled in these devices if desired.
Localization of CNs in the absence of xed anchors with known locations, such as
SNs, is less problematic in outdoor areas, since satellite-based navigation systems
can easily be used for outdoor localization. Note that indoor localization poses a
challenge since satellite navigation systems are virtually unusable indoors due to
poor signal strength. We would like to note that with the use of satellite navigation
for localization and inclusion of sensors in CNs, energy use of CNs would increase.
We believe this not to be an issue in ESS due to the relatively short evacuation times
of outdoor areas (ranging from tens of minutes to a few hours). However, energy
use may need to be addressed if oppcomms is used to carry additional emergency
messages, or if the lifetime of devices is important for emergency support after the
evacuation process. In our discussion, we focus on the use of oppcomms to provide
evacuation support, and leave discussion of further use of oppcomms and any energy
considerations as future work (Sec. 5.3).
We would like to note that due to the mobility of communication devices and the
impact of communications on the movement of people, evacuation with ESS is an
example of two interdependent dynamic systems. Our evaluation of oppcomms and
ESS, presented in Sec. 3.2, provides insight into the eect of mobility on commu-
nications, and in turn the eect of communications on mobility. Before we begin
our evaluation, we briey discuss the currently available wireless communication
technologies that can be used to realize oppcomms as used in ESS.
3Note that the use of human input on hazard intensity brings with it the matter of subjectivity.
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3.1.4 Wireless communication technologies for opportunistic
communications in ESS
In the above section, we described our proposed emergency support system (ESS) in-
dependent of the underlying wireless technology used by the communication devices.
By ignoring details of the physical layer (PHY) and medium access control (MAC),
we provide a generic design for ESS based on fundamental properties of short-range
wireless communications. An implementer can then select the most appropriate
wireless technology available to realize a real-life deployment of ESS. We present an
overview of current technologies that can enable opportunistic communications as
used in ESS below.
Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi, supported by the IEEE 802.11 standards family [69], was initially intended
to enable the wireless counterpart to wired local area networks (LANs). Therefore,
Wi-Fi mainly provides a mechanism for wireless devices to form a wireless local
area network (WLAN), although it has been extended to support mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) as well. Wi-Fi mostly aims to provide wireless communications
characterized by high power devices, high data rate and moderate range (about 30m
indoors and 100m outdoors for IEEE 802.11b,g devices). Although 802.11 has some
power-saving functionality, wireless nodes are generally required to always listen
for other nodes and overhear RTS/CTS4 transmissions. We believe that due to its
high bitrate orientation and high energy requirement, Wi-Fi is not suitable for the
low-rate low-power communications of ESS.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth [8], which is supported by the IEEE 802.15.1 standard [67], is a wire-
less technology standard for exchanging data over short distances between xed
and mobile devices. These devices form a wireless personal area network (WPAN),
characterized by few nodes that communicate in short ranges. Bluetooth was origi-
nally conceived as a wireless replacement of data cables between devices. Therefore,
Bluetooth is mostly oriented towards low power, high data rate wireless commu-
nications over short distances (< 10m). Maximum permitted transmission power
and communication range are dependent on the power class of the Bluetooth device
4RTS/CTS is the Request-to-Send, Clear-to-Send mechanism used in 802.11 protocols to address
the hidden node problem.
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Power class Maximum output power Range (m)
Class 1 100 mW (20 dBm) 100
Class 2 2.5 mW (4 dBm) 10
Class 3 1 mW (0 dBm) 1
Table 3.3: Bluetooth device classes.
as presented in Table 3.3. Bluetooth version 1.2 supports a maximum application
throughput of 0.7 Mbits/sec and version 2.0 with Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) sup-
ports 2.1 Mbits/sec. One problem with Bluetooth for dynamic ad hoc networks is
its master-slave approach. This approach also requires slave nodes to always listen
to the master since they cannot know beforehand when the master will poll them,
signicantly increasing the energy use of active slaves. A master node is usually
limited to seven active slaves. Passive slaves need to contact the master in order to
become an active slave when they need to send data; this may not be possible if the
master already has the maximum supported number of active slaves, limiting con-
nectivity. Two further problems with Bluetooth are the complexity of the standard
and the tight synchronization required between nodes for the fast frequency hopping
operations employed at the PHY layer. This requires better specied hardware and
increases device costs. Our conclusion is that although Bluetooth is not ideal for
ESS, it is still a viable option due to its support of low power, short range com-
munications and its wide availability in consumer devices. This being the case, we
believe that ZigBee, discussed next, is more suitable than Bluetooth for oppcomms
in ESS.
ZigBee
ZigBee [144] is a specication of high-level communication protocols for low-rate,
low-power wireless mesh networking. ZigBee uses the PHY and MAC layer proto-
cols specied in IEEE 802.15.4 [68] and builds upon those layers by dening four
new components to construct low-cost low-power wireless mesh networks: network
layer, application layer, ZigBee device objects, and manufacturer-dened applica-
tion objects that allow for customization and total integration. ZigBee supports
secure communications by building upon the basic security framework provided by
802.15.4. Although both ZigBee and Bluetooth allow the creation of WPANs, Zig-
Bee is intended to be simpler and less expensive than other specications without
sacricing exibility or generality, and it focuses on improving battery life of devices
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by lowering power. The basic framework conceives a 10 meter communication range
with transfer rates between 20{250 kbits/sec using physical radios that transmit
at a power of 0 dBm (1 mW) or less. 802.15.4 supports simple embedded devices
with very low power requirements by dening several physical layers. Other im-
portant features include real-time support by reservation of guaranteed time slots,
medium access through CSMA-CA5 and integrated support for secure communica-
tions. IEEE 802.15.4 devices may also include power management functions. Star,
tree, and generic ad hoc network topologies, and beacon-enabled and non-beacon-
enabled networks6 are supported. We believe that ZigBee is currently the most
suitable wireless technology available for realization of oppcomms as conceived in
ESS due to its emphasis on low-cost, low-rate, low-power communications.
3.2 Experimental Evaluation
We have evaluated our proposed system and the performance of oppcomms for
evacuation support using simulation experiments of two urban scenarios: (i) a small-
scale scenario where evacuation of a large multi-oor oce building in case of a
spreading re is simulated, and (ii) a large-scale scenario where evacuation of a
metropolitan area is considered in case of spreading hazards that start at multiple
locations; these scenarios are described in Sec. 3.2.2. The main purpose of ESS is
safe and quick evacuation of people from the aected area. We therefore rst look at
the evacuation performance of ESS in Sec. 3.2.3. We then discuss the characteristics
of oppcomms and communication performance of ESS in Sec. 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Distributed building evacuation simulator
We have used the Distributed Building Evacuation Simulator (DBES) [32], devel-
oped by our research group in Imperial, for our evaluation. DBES is an agent-based
discrete-event simulation tool designed to support evaluation of emergency systems
and scenarios in urban and conned spaces. It is a distributed platform that enables
the execution of dierent parts of a simulation on multiple networked machines. Dis-
tributing a simulation allows faster simulation of complex or large scenarios. DBES
is based on the Java Agent Development Framework (JADE) [7, 128], which is an
open-source software platform for the development and implementation of multi-
agent systems.
5CSMA-CA: Carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
6Note that non-beacon-enabled networks are more suitable for highly dynamic ad hoc topologies.
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Figure 3.4: Graphical user interface (GUI) of DBES in interactive mode. DBES can
be used in batch mode with a command-line interface, or in interactive
mode as presented here.
DBES, through facilities provided by JADE, supplies a simulation library that
provides basic agent functionalities required for agents to participate in the sim-
ulation. These functionalities include support for agent migration, logging, agent
communications between local and remote machines, ontologies, and searching for
other agents. DBES accepts a graphical representation of the simulated area; using
a graph model allows the area of interest to be divided into sub-areas for distributed
simulation. Parts of the simulated area that are (mostly) independent of each other
can then be distributed to dierent simulators, where each sub-area is represented
and simulated by an area agent with its own simulation engine. Figure 3.4 presents
the user interface of DBES, which shows both the area graph and the main simula-
tion panel for a simulation. Each sub-area is represented with a separate instance
of this interface.
Other work has used DBES to evaluate dierent emergency support systems and
scenarios, such as a distributed evacuation support system (DES) that provides
directions for evacuation of a building [39,45], investigating the eect of group leaders
in evacuation [44] and autonomous robots for emergency communications [92, 93,
129].
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In order to facilitate the evaluation presented in this thesis, we have extended
DBES to support joint simulation of mobility and opportunistic communications.
This involved design and development of new agent models to represent simulation
entities in our scenarios, additions to the simulation ontology to support the new
concepts, entities, actions and messages, customization of core simulator behaviors
to integrate aspects of communications, and modication of existing agent models,
such as the agents that represent the hazard and area (e.g. building oors) to add
new functionality.
3.2.2 Assumptions, simulation model and scenarios
We represent the simulated area as a graph as explained in Sec. 3.1.1. We assume
that people can only occupy locations represented as vertices in the area graph
and they can move between adjacent vertices following graph edges. We therefore
approximate civilian movement with discrete movement events from one vertex to
another. We assume that each civilian is equipped with a communication node
(CN) that participates in opportunistic communications as explained in Sec. 3.1.2.
In indoor areas, we assume that there are sensor nodes (SNs) placed at xed locations
in the building. There are no SNs in outdoor areas. A sensor can potentially monitor
multiple edges in the building graph based on its sensing capabilities and location.
In our simulations, we assume that each SN monitors a single edge. An SN provides
its latest measurement for its edge (i.e. its h(i; j) value).
All communication entities (CNs and SNs) are simulated as IEEE 802.15.4-2006 [68]
compliant devices. 802.15.4 supports both beacon-enabled and non-beacon-enabled
networks, and a non-beacon-enabled implementation is more appropriate for ESS
due to the mobile and ad hoc nature of the oppnet. In 802.15.4, non-beacon-enabled
networks employ CSMA-CA without RTS/CTS at the MAC layer and we assume the
same MAC in our simulations. CN and SN data transfer rate is set to 100 kbits/sec
and 20 kbits/sec, respectively. IEEE 802.15.4-2006 provides raw data rates of 100
and 250 kbits/sec in three PHY frequency bands. However, the actual data rate
for application data will be lower due to protocol overhead and processing delays.
We therefore assume an application data rate much lower than the maximum sup-
ported by 802.15.4-2006 to account for these factors. We do not explicitly simulate
the PHY layer in our simulations, but we do take into account contention for the
wireless medium as accessed through CSMA-CA. We will discuss the implications
of this approach in Chp. 5.
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Epidemic routing with timestamp-priority queues with LBER is employed for op-
portunistic communications in all experiments, unless stated otherwise. In addition
to the area graph and edge costs, each CN can store 100 EMs for opportunistic
communications. Message sizes are assumed to be as given in Table 3.2. With 100
EMs and 37 bytes per EM on average, storage requirements for oppcomms is about
3.7 kB per CN. The space required to store the area graph and edge costs depends
on the size of the area and this is further discussed for each deployment scenario
considered below.
Physical congestion is modeled based on the occupancy and the capacity of graph
vertices. The capacity ci of vertex i 2 V represents the maximum number of people
that can simultaneously move at the vertex. The capacity is therefore a measure
of the \bandwidth" of the vertex. The occupancy qi(t) is the number of people
\residing" on vertex i at time t. Let us illustrate how entities move and how we
model physical congestion using a simple scenario of a person p travelling from i to
j, (i; j) 2 E. Let tai and taj be the arrival times of p at i and j, respectively, and tdi
be the departure time of p from i. The time p waits at i is then wp(i; t
a
i ) = t
d
i   tai ,
which is given by
wp(i; t) =  

qi(t)
ci

;
where  is a constant that represents the time it takes for each civilian to make a
decision on which vertex to go to next. p is counted in qi(t) during t 2 [tai ; tdi ), since
she resides at i in this interval. p starts her travel on (i; j) at tdi , and arrives at j
at taj = t
d
i + l(i; j)=(p), where l(i; j) is the distance between i and j, and (p) is
p's speed. The important thing is that during the interval t 2 [tdi ; taj ], p is counted
in qj(t) and therefore contributes to the congestion at j during her travel on (i; j).
This is because a discrete model is used to represent how entities such as people
move in the area. More specically, people occupy only vertices and do not reside
on edges. We use  = 1 second in our simulations. Values for  and c are given when
we describe our experiment scenarios below. The congestion model is eectively a
single server queue with batch processing and constant service time.
Civilians follow a probabilistic mobility model when they are not evacuating.
The mobility model is designed to simulate practical civilian movement before the
emergency starts. More details on the mobility model are given below when we
describe the simulation scenarios. When a civilian is notied of the emergency, she
follows directions provided by her CN to evacuate when ESS is used. Otherwise,
she follows a shortest path based evacuation model as described later. Note that
62
psychological aspects are not taken into account in these simulations. For example,
we assume that people act rationally and follow directions provided by the ESS.
We also assume that a person starts to evacuate immediately when notied of the
emergency. Each person acts individually and group behaviour or other aspects,
such as helping or notifying others, are not considered.
The hazard we evaluate in our simulations is re and associated eects such as
smoke. The hazard probabilistically spreads in the area along graph edges following
a Bernoulli trial model and aects the health of civilians on adjacent vertices. The
re model and its eects have been inspired by [35, 60]. Each civilian starts with
a health of 100 and her health decreases as she is exposed to eects of the hazard;
exposure duration, distance to the hazardous eects and hazard intensity inuence
the eect of hazard on civilian health. A person with health  0 is assumed to have
perished. In our current model, the health of a person does not aect her movement
speed or ability to follow directions. Evacuee health is currently used as a metric of
evacuation performance as discussed in the following sections.
The agent modelling the re periodically runs the algorithm given in Alg. 1 in
order to calculate how the re spreads in the area. Note thatN(u) = fv j (u; v) 2 Eg
is the set of vertices adjacent to u, ws 2 [0; 1] is the update co-ecient due to the
vertex itself being on re, wn 2 [0; 1] is the update co-ecient due to a neighboring
vertex being on re, M is the maximum re intensity allowed,  2 [1;M ] is the
constant increment value used for updating the re intensity, and I(u) 2 [0;M ] is
the re intensity for vertex u. All vertices are initialized with I(u) = 0. We use
ws = wn = 0:3 for indoor scenarios and ws = wn = 0:05 for outdoor scenarios,
M = 8000,  = 1000 in our simulations.
The graph used for modeling hazard propagation can be dierent from the graph
modeling the area. In that case, locations aected by the hazard have to be mapped
to the area graph. Using a dierent hazard graph would allow modeling of hazard
propagation via paths not usable for civilian movement, such as through walls and
oors. In our simulations, we use the the same graph to model the hazard and the
area. We believe that using the same graph does not introduce any signicant bias
for the considered scenarios. The area graph captures physical obstacles, which are
important factors that aect re propagation in buildings, and we therefore believe
that the area graph can accurately model how the re spreads.
We evaluate oppcomms in two urban settings. The rst setting considers a con-
ned space, more specically a three-oor large oce building. The second scenario
is a large-scale open area on a district scale. We describe these scenarios next.
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Algorithm 1 Fire update algorithm for calculating how the re spreads.
procedure updateFire
for all u 2 V do
avg  1M jN(u)j 
P
v2N(u) I(v)
P  min(1; wsI(u)M + wn  avg)
p random value in [0; 1)
if P > p then
I(u) min(M; I(u) + )
end if
end for
for all (i; j) 2 E do
if I(i) or I(j) has changed then
h(i; j) I(i)+I(j)2
end if
end for
end procedure
Building scenario
The building scenario is used to evaluate ESS as employed in conned spaces, such
as oce buildings, schools, supermarkets, shopping malls, etc. In this scenario, we
use the three-oor oce building given in Fig. 3.5. The building has two exits on the
rst oor. All three oors are connected via staircases, with locations as shown in the
gure. This model is based on the rst three oors of the Department of Electrical
and Electronic Engineering building at Imperial. The rst oor is 24m x 45m, and
other oors are 24m x 60m. This building is represented as a graph consisting of 240
vertices and 375 edges. Each edge (i; j) has the following elds stored with the edge:
distance l(i; j), hazard intensity h(i; j), eective distance L(i; j) and latest update
timestamp t(i; j). Using the data sizes given in Table 3.1, and assuming that the
size for l(i; j) is 2 bytes and for L(i; j) 4 bytes, about 6.5 kB is required to store
the graph for this building in each CN. The storage space required for the graph
can be decreased by storing the dynamic edge costs only for edges that have active
measurements (i.e. edges known to be on re by the CN). Note that in addition to
the graph, a list of vertices consisting of building exits is also stored.
There is an SN that monitors each graph edge; we assume that SNs are located
near the midpoints of edges. The sleep-duty cycle for SNs is set to 8 seconds sleep
(Ts = 8 s), 2 seconds duty (Td = 2 s), and the CN beacon period is set to 2 seconds
(Tb = 2 s). These values are based on the average distance between SNs and move-
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Figure 3.5: Three-oor building used in simulations, depicting the inter-oor con-
nections and building exits.
ment speed of people. The basic 802.15.4 framework conceives a communication
range of 10 meters indoors, so we assume a maximum communication range of 10
meters for CNs in the building scenario. SN communication range is assumed to be
lower at 5 meters, allowing SNs to preserve energy and improving CN localization.
In this scenario, we assume that traditional means of communication have broken
down (e.g. due to the hazard). The civilians rely on the ESS and oppcomms among
their CNs to exchange information and evacuate the building. We assume that CNs
cannot communicate when they are located on dierent oors; this may be due to
physical factors that aect wireless signal strength, such as thickness of the inter-
oor walls. For each simulation run, people initially start at random locations in
the building; each location has the same probability of being assigned as an initial
location. However, a location is assigned only one civilian for a more uniform initial
distribution of civilians. Civilians follow a probabilistic mobility model intended to
simulate the movement of people during working hours. Each civilian is assigned an
oce at random. She goes from her initial location to her oce when the simulation
starts. She spends a period of time there and then selects one of the other oces at
random and moves there following the shortest path between the two rooms. She
then spends some time in the visited room and returns to her oce. This pattern
repeats indenitely until she is notied of an emergency and starts evacuating. The
waiting durations are randomized but are assigned so that a person spends more
65
Figure 3.6: Second oor of the building in an ESS simulation with DBES, showing
the starting location of the re. Notice the disconnected nature of the
opportunistic network and the spreading hazard.
time in her oce than at other rooms. In the building scenario, we have assigned
the waiting times so that a person changes oces every 10 minutes on average.
Civilians move at 1 m/sec (3.6 km/hour) within oors and 0.7 m/sec (2.52 km/hour)
on staircases. As discussed above, simulations take physical congestion into account.
Each vertex is assigned a capacity of one in this scenario (ci = 1;8i 2 V ).
Each data point in the presented results for this scenario is an average (mean) of
50 simulation runs. Each run represents a dierent initial distribution of civilians,
mobility patterns, and hazard spread pattern (i.e. speed and direction). Where
possible, results are presented with their 95% condence intervals. We consider two
starting locations for re: oor 2 and oor 3. In the rst case, the re starts at
the intersection of two corridors on the second oor near the staircases (Fig. 3.6).
This is a critical location since many of the static shortest paths for evacuation pass
through nearby points, meaning many people (both on the second and third oors)
will be aected soon after the hazard starts since it takes a short amount of time to
aect locations close to the starting point. In addition, the hazard will spread to the
rst and third oors via the staircases quickly due to its proximity to the staircases.
The re starts at the intersection of two corridors in the third oor in the second
re scenario (Fig. 3.7). This is a less critical location as a starting point since the
re potentially aects fewer people compared to the rst re scenario. We will see
that the re starting location has a signicant eect on evacuation outcome.
Figure 3.6 shows the second oor of the building during a simulation of ESS.
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Figure 3.7: Third oor of the building in an ESS simulation with DBES, showing
the starting location of the re. In this scenario, the re starts on the
3rd oor.
Maximum CN range, which is 8m in this gure, is represented as the circles around
people. Note that the opportunistic network formed by CNs is disconnected. Also
notice how the re spreads along graph edges and that one of the people (1002003)
is being aected by the re due to her proximity. Her CN will receive an MM from
a nearby sensor (not shown in the gure) and this message will be converted to an
EM and disseminated via oppcomms. Through this message, the person next to her
(1002008) will be informed of the hazard and avoid the hazard by following updated
directions provided by her CN. Figure 3.7 shows the third oor during a simulation
of the second re scenario. Notice that almost all of the people on the oor are
evacuating the building, with the exception of civilian 1003010 who is yet unaware
of the hazard since she is out of communication range (this is a scenario where there
is no central alarm in the building).
We would like to note that a re which starts on the rst oor of the simulated
building may become problematic with certain assumptions. If we assume that
there are no inter-oor communications, there is no central re alarm and people
always follow directions from the ESS, then a re that starts on the rst oor will be
known only by people on that oor. Because of the close placement of the exits in
this building, none of the people that reach the rst oor will go up to other oors
and therefore none of the people on the other oors will be informed of the hazard
unless they visit the rst oor during their usual movement. This will result in poor
evacuation outcome. This scenario indicates that under certain assumptions and for
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certain buildings, there may be hazards which cannot be adequately addressed by
mobile nodes alone. A solution to such situations is the placement of a few static
CNs at critical locations, such as staircases, that act as mailboxes to enable the
dissemination of messages between oors.
In the building scenario, we compare the following evacuation systems:
 ESS without alarm (ESS ): With the ESS  system, we assume that there is
no central alarm in the building (e.g. it has failed due to power failure) and
people use the ESS as both a notication and navigation system and evacuate
by following directions from their CNs.
 ESS with alarm (ESS+): The ESS+ scenario assumes that there is a central
alarm in the building and therefore all building occupants are alerted as soon as
the re starts. People use the ESS as a navigation system and follow directions
given by their CNs to evacuate.
 Shortest path (SP) evacuation with alarm: This system is meant to evaluate
the case when there is no adaptive system in the building to provide directions
for evacuation. In this \no system" case, we assume that the evacuees are
familiar with the building (they know the whole building graph) and are able
to calculate and follow the shortest path that leads to an exit. In this scenario,
all civilians start to evacuate as soon as the re starts (i.e. we assume a central
alarm in the building). If an evacuee encounters a hazard during evacuation,
she updates her knowledge of the hazard (i.e. the graph edge cost(s)) and
re-calculates her SP. While the assumptions for the \no system" scenario are
unrealistic in that they require too much from the people during an emergency,
we believe it provides a valuable benchmark for evacuation performance which
is at least as good as what would normally be observed in a real-life scenario
without any system.
 Distributed evacuation system (DES) with alarm: In this scenario, we assume
that the Distributed Evacuation System (DES) described in Sec. 2.1 is deployed
in the building. We assume that a decision node (DN) is placed at each
graph vertex as shown in Fig. 3.8 and each DN communicates the current best
direction to civilians in the vicinity. People are alerted of the hazard as soon as
the re starts and follow hop-by-hop directions given by the DNs to evacuate.
DNs run their distributed decision algorithm with a period of 100 milliseconds.
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Figure 3.8: The DES as simulated with DBES. This is the 2nd oor of the simulated
building. There is a decision node (DN) located at each graph vertex.
Arrows are the directions suggested by the DNs.
Large-scale open area scenario
The large-scale open area scenario is used to evaluate the performance of oppcomms
and ESS in provisioning of navigation services for evacuation of a district scale urban
area. The Fulham district of London is used as a model for this scenario. Figure 3.9
presents the 2600m by 1800m area (4.68 km2 in total surface area) considered in
our simulations and its associated graph. The graph representation for this area
is sparser than the graph representation of the building given in Fig. 3.5 due to
its larger scale. For example, edge lengths for the building graph vary between
2m and 10m, whereas edge lengths for the Fulham graph vary between 20m and
100m. The graph representation can be made coarser or ner depending on scenario
requirements. The graph representation of the Fulham area has 779 vertices and
1029 edges. Using the data sizes given in the building scenario and Table 3.1, about
16.5 kB is needed to store the area graph.
The four green spaces (parks) within the simulated area are designated as safe
locations and they are used as evacuation points (exits) in our simulations. In con-
trast to the building scenario, there are more exits and they are located at dierent
parts of the area. There are also more paths that lead to any exit due to the scale
of the area and the abundance of roads and connections. We will see that these
characteristics inuence evacuation favorably.
As in the building scenario, we assume that other means of communication have
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Figure 3.9: The Fulham district of London is used as a model for the large-scale
area simulation scenario. This area is 2.6 km x 1.8 km (w x h) and the
four green spaces (parks) within the area are designated safe locations
(exits). Starting locations of the hazard are also shown in the gure.
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broken down and civilians use notication and navigation services provided by ESS
to learn of the emergency and evacuate the area. In contrast to the building scenario,
we assume that there are no SNs in the outdoor area. As explained in Sec. 3.1.2, in
large-scale open areas, hazard information is provided either via sensors embedded
in the CNs, allowing for fully autonomous operation, or via manual input by the
people, which makes ESS a semi-autonomous system. Localization of CNs is done
through GPS-based positioning and locations are approximated by the graph ver-
tices. In our evaluation, we assume that hazard information is provided by sensors
embedded in the CNs. The CN sleep-duty cycle is set to Ts = 9 s, Td = 1 s when
there is no emergency. Communication range of 802.15.4-compliant devices is higher
outdoors than indoors due to higher signal-to-noise ratios for wireless signals. Most
802.15.4-compliant device manufacturers advertise their communication modules to
be capable of communicating up to 100 meters using a transmission power of 0 dBm
when outdoors [95]. We therefore assume considerably higher CN communication
ranges in this scenario than the building scenario.
In our evaluation, a re that simultaneously starts at multiple locations in the
area is simulated; the starting locations are given in Fig. 3.9. The same re model
as in the building scenario is used. People are randomly distributed in the area at
simulation start, with each location having the same probability of being assigned
to a civilian. People are not assigned the same location if possible (i.e. as long as
the number of people in the area is less than the number of graph vertices). Similar
to the building scenario, civilians follow a probabilistic movement model until they
start evacuation. This is intended to simulate normal movement of people in the
area. This random movement model is slightly dierent than the one used in the
building scenario since we do not assign \home nodes" to people in this case. A
person chooses a random location (vertex) to go to within the area and follows the
shortest path in the graph to go there. When the destination is reached, she waits for
a random time and then chooses a new destination, repeating this pattern until she
is notied of an emergency. Note that this model is similar to the random waypoint
mobility model [20], with the dierence that civilians always move according to the
graph instead of moving freely in the area. We assume that civilians move at a speed
of 1.39 m/sec (5 km/hour). Physical congestion is modeled where the capacity of
each vertex is set to 5 (ci = 5;8i 2 V ).
Each data point in the presented results for the large-scale area scenario is an
average (mean) of 10 simulation runs. Each run represents a dierent initial distri-
bution of civilians, movement patterns, and hazard spread pattern. Where possible,
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results are presented with their 95% condence intervals. We compare the following
evacuation systems in the large-scale area scenario:
 ESS: With the ESS system, we assume that civilians in the area are notied
of the emergency via ESS. When they learn of the hazard, civilians start
evacuating the area by following directions provided by their CNs. Therefore,
the ESS acts as both a notication and navigation system. Note that this
case is the same as the ESS  system in the building scenario. We do not
simulate the ESS+ (ESS with central alarm) system in the large-scale area
scenario since we believe that the existence of such a central alarm system in a
large-scale open area is highly unlikely, especially considering our assumption
of disrupted access to communication infrastructure.
 Shortest path evacuation without alarm (SP ): This is the \no system" case,
intended to represent evacuation without any emergency support. For SP
evacuation, we assume that people know the whole area graph and they are
able to calculate and follow the shortest path between two locations (i.e. the
current location and the nearest exit). Since there is no central alarm or
emergency support, people learn of the hazard when they encounter it during
their movements. When a civilian encounters re for the rst time, she learns
that there is an emergency and that she needs to evacuate the area. We assume
that civilians can remember re locations and intensities when they encounter
them. A civilian updates her knowledge of the hazard and recalculates her SP
when she encounters a previously unseen hazard. While the assumptions for
the \no system" scenario may be unrealistic due to high requirements from
the people, we believe that it provides a relevant benchmark for comparison
of evacuation performance.
 Shortest path evacuation with central alarm (SP+): This is the same as the
\no system" scenario above with the additional assumption that each civilian
learns of the hazard as soon as the hazard starts. While we believe that this
assumption is highly unlikely, this scenario serves as a means to understand
the eect of early notication with SP evacuation.
We do not evaluate DES in the large-scale area scenario since we believe that
DES is not suitable for deployment in large outdoor areas due to the requirement of
pre-installed specialized devices (DNs and SNs).
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3.2.3 Evacuation performance
The most important evaluation criterion of evacuation performance is the number
(or ratio) of people who successfully evacuate. The evacuation ratio is the ratio of
the number of people who successfully evacuate the area to the number of all people
who are in the area when the emergency starts. A complementary performance
parameter is average evacuee health, which is the average health of all people who
successfully evacuate. Viewed in combination with the evacuation ratio, evacuee
health helps to distinguish between two outcomes where a similar number of people
evacuate but more people are exposed to the hazard in one case than the other. A
third criterion is how long the evacuation process takes, i.e. evacuation time. The
average evacuation time is the mean of the evacuation times for all successfully
evacuated civilians, and the worst-case evacuation time is the evacuation time of
the last person that leaves the area.
We rst look at how population density aects evacuation outcome. We then
evaluate the eect of communication range of CNs in dierent population densities.
Eect of population density
In this section, we investigate the eect of population density on evacuation outcome
under dierent deployment scenarios (building and large-scale area). We would
normally expect ESS to perform better with more people in the same area since
more CNs means a better connected oppnet and more contact opportunities for
information exchange. We will see that this is generally true, but we will also
observe that since more people need to evacuate, the evacuation will take longer
and eects of physical congestion will become apparent. Another issue with having
denser CNs is increased contention for medium access for wireless communications.
Our investigation of communication characteristics of oppcomms in later sections
will reveal that we do not observe any signicant performance degradation due to
increased contention. We believe this is due to long contact durations between CNs,
which are on the order of seconds, compared to communications, which are on the
order of milliseconds. Small messages mean that CNs can exchange all or most of
the important messages in a short time when they meet. Use of appropriate queues
for oppcomms also improves evacuation performance of ESS by prioritizing more
useful messages at contacts.
73
Scenario: Building with second oor re In these experiments, we set the
CN range to 6m and vary the number of people per oor (pf) from 10 to 40. These
numbers represent a range of plausible densities for the simulated building. The
average density for the simulated building is expected to be around 25{30 pf during
working hours and much lower during o-work hours. The re starts at time 0 (at
simulation start) on the second oor of the simulated building as described above.
This is a critical location and we will see that having an autonomous system that
provides adaptive navigation services will greatly improve evacuation outcome. We
rst look at the evacuation process: Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the percentage of
people evacuated versus evacuation time7 for dierent population densities. Fig-
ures 3.12 and 3.13 are complementary to the evacuation time graphs and show the
percentage of people who have perished versus time7. We will focus on how the
evacuation progresses with these gures and comment on the overall behavior when
we discuss Fig. 3.14.
An initial observation is that ESS  performs worse than SP when the population
density is low (10pf, Fig.s 3.10a and 3.12a). This is a result of two factors: the
alarm in the SP scenario alerts all people in the building as soon as re starts,
and even though they do not know where the re is, because they start evacuation
immediately, many people are able to exit the building. ESS  assumes no alarm
in the building and therefore people are notied by their CNs, which learn of the
hazard via oppcomms. With a low density, many people are disconnected and
therefore receive the initial notication very late (or not at all) and start evacuation
after the hazard has signicantly spread. This means that they are more likely to
be trapped in the building since the hazard aects more exit paths the further it
spreads. Trapped civilians cannot safely exit the building and perish, leading to
a low evacuation ratio. This is further supported by the very long tail of ESS 
in Fig. 3.12a. This long tail indicates that many of the people in the building are
either not notied and they start evacuating when they personally encounter re or
they are notied very late via oppcomms. This leads to many casualties that occur
late in evacuation. In comparison, if these people had started evacuation earlier but
still perished (perhaps due to incorrect routing), then we would expect to see these
deaths at much earlier times. In higher densities (20pf and above), we observe that
ESS  performs better than SP due to better connectivity even though it does not
have an alarm.
Another observation is that although evacuation starts immediately and continues
7Note that these graphs are cumulative over all simulation runs.
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Figure 3.10: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for population densities 10pf
and 20pf, building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 6m.
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for population densities 30pf
and 40pf, building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 6m.
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Figure 3.12: Percentage of casualties versus time for population densities 10pf and
20pf, building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 6m.
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Figure 3.13: Percentage of casualties versus time for population densities 30pf and
40pf, building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 6m.
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at a fairly steady rate in SP, there comes a time, slightly after mid-evacuation, where
evacuation signicantly slows down. These points are especially apparent for 20pf
and above (Fig.s 3.10b, 3.11a, 3.11b). The initial part of the SP evacuation until
this point is mostly people that evacuate without encountering re, and therefore
evacuate using a single shortest path without having to change their path. The latter
part is due to people that encounter re during evacuation and have to change their
paths and backtrack. This change increases their evacuation time, and the longer
they take to evacuate, the further the re spreads and aects more paths. Therefore,
few people evacuate in the latter stage and evacuation is slower. This problem can
also be clearly observed in Fig.s 3.12b, 3.13a, 3.13b. SP evacuation shows a very
similar trend in these gures, where a few deaths occur in the early evacuation
stages, followed by almost no deaths for some time, and then a signicant increase
in casualties in the later stages. The initial deaths are due to people that are near the
re when it starts. The later deaths, as indicated in the gures, are due to trapped
civilians that had to change course during evacuation. In contrast to SP evacuation,
DES has a fairly steady and smooth evacuation curve in all densities. We observe
that casualties with DES start to resemble those for SP evacuation with increasing
density. The smooth curve of DES in all densities indicates the independent nature
of communication and path calculation in DES to population density and mobility.
The resemblance of casualty times with DES to SP evacuation in high densities
indicates the greater eect of density and resulting congestion on DES than on ESS.
SP and ESS+ show similar patterns in evacuated civilians (Fig.s 3.10 and 3.11)
until the point where SP evacuation slows; the dierence increases with increasing
density. The initial similarity is due to the central alarm assumed in both scenarios.
However, their patterns for civilian deaths (Fig.s 3.12 and 3.13) are quite dierent,
with ESS+ having a markedly lower casualty rate. This shows the benet of hazard
information disseminated via oppcomms that allow the selection of better paths. We
notice that while DES has the best evacuation performance (in terms of evacuation
ratio) for low-to-medium densities (10 and 20 pf), ESS surpasses DES when popu-
lation density is high (30 and 40 pf). Although ESS  does not have an alarm and
therefore evacuation starts later than ESS+ and SP, this dierence decreases with
increasing density. This is due to better connectivity and more frequent contact
opportunities as density increases, which means more people are alerted earlier of
the re. The performance of ESS+ and ESS  get more similar as density increases,
both in evacuee and casualty patterns. This indicates that the value of an alarm
diminishes as density increases and CNs have more contact opportunities.
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Figure 3.14: Evacuation ratio versus population density, building scenario with 2nd
oor re, CN range 6m.
The long but low tails for ESS+ and ESS  in Fig.s 3.12b, 3.13a and 3.13b indicate
that many of the people successfully evacuate and most of the deaths occur due to
trapped civilians. In the case of ESS , the tail is especially longer due to the few
people that are out of communication range and therefore do not start evacuation
until fairly late. As a nal remark, we would like to note that the very long but
almost at tail for ESS  in Fig. 3.11b is due to a few simulation runs in which
people take very long to evacuate. This lengthens and attens the tail at the end
since results from dierent simulation runs are joined (not averaged) in Fig.s 3.10{
3.13. This is supported by the average behaviour of ESS  as presented in Fig. 3.16b.
After looking at the evacuation process, we now discuss the general (average)
evacuation behaviour of ESS. Figure 3.14 presents the evacuation ratio versus popu-
lation density for the four scenarios. We have already discussed most of the results in
Fig. 3.14 when we looked at Fig.s 3.10{3.13, but we will repeat the most important
points here. The performance of ESS depends on the connectivity of the network
and therefore on population density. As density increases, the oppnet becomes bet-
ter connected and evacuation ratio is improved. This is especially apparent for ESS 
since ESS provides both notication and navigation in this scenario. The eect of
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density is less pronounced for ESS+ due to the alarm.
As mentioned before, for 10pf, ESS  has a lower evacuation ratio than SP, but for
all other densities, ESS  performs better than SP. SP performance decreases with
increasing density. Because people do not know where the re is in this scenario,
they initially follow the shortest path (shortest in physical distance). As the number
of people in the building increases, more people are aected by the re since many
of the shortest paths pass through hazardous areas. When ESS is in use, most of
the people are guided away from the re by their CNs based on information received
via oppcomms. This means that compared with the SP case, signicantly fewer
people are aected by the hazard. We will also see that this has an observable
eect on evacuee health when we look at Fig. 3.15. As observed before, DES has
the best evacuation ratios for low densities (10 and 20 pf) while both ESS+ and
ESS  perform better than DES at higher densities (30 and 40 pf). This indicates
that DES is greatly aected by physical congestion. In contrast, ESS is less aected
by congestion. For high densities (30pf and 40pf for ESS+ and 40pf for ESS ), we
observe slightly lower evacuation ratios, suggesting that people are evacuating slower
and therefore more people are aected by the hazard. This is conrmed when we
look at evacuation times in Fig. 3.16.
From this evaluation, we can deduce that the ESS is not suited for very sparse
populations. We can address the disconnected nature of the oppnet in sparse popu-
lations by increasing the CN communication range. As we will see when we look at
the eect of communication range, increasing the range will increase contact oppor-
tunities and evacuation performance. However, there is a limit to communication
range due to physical conditions and energy limitations. We therefore believe that
while ESS is suitable for densely populated areas, a more traditional approach that
is based on infrastructure wireless networks or a static node system such as DES
could be used in sparser areas. We also see that ESS can tolerate alarm failure,
especially in medium-to-highly populated areas.
Figure 3.15 shows average evacuee health versus population density. We observe
that evacuee health is generally quite high, even for SP evacuation. This indicates
that most of the people who successfully evacuated were not signicantly exposed to
the re. In SP evacuation, this is mostly because the people who are exposed to re
have to backtrack, get trapped in the building and become casualties. Therefore they
do not count in the average evacuee metric, keeping the evacuee health high. This
is supported by the fact that although evacuation ratio decreases, average evacuee
health does not change much as population density changes in SP evacuation.
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Figure 3.15: Average evacuee health versus population density, building scenario
with 2nd oor re, CN range 6m.
We see that ESS+ and ESS  both perform better than SP in terms of evacuee
health. This is as expected since the ESS guides civilians to minimize exposure
to the hazard. For ESS , as density increases, evacuee health increases in gen-
eral due to better connectivity. This eect cannot be seen for ESS+ due to the
counter-balancing eect of physical congestion. Congestion also aects ESS  in
high population densities (40pf). Because people start to evacuate at the same time
in ESS+ due to the central alarm, congestion at critical locations, such as staircases,
is increased. The notication of people at dierent times in ESS  provides a sort
of natural congestion avoidance since people do not start to evacuate at the same
time. Of course, as density increases, so does network connectivity and more people
start evacuating at the same time, increasing congestion as observed in the 40pf
case for ESS . DES shows the best performance in evacuee health since evacuees
are never guided through re with DES. When all paths are blocked by re, DES
directs people to safe areas in the building to increase their chances of survival until
emergency responders arrive. In contrast, when all paths are blocked by re, ESS
will continue to direct people towards exists along the safest paths, i.e. paths that
have the least hazard exposure. This behavior can potentially increase the number
82
of evacuated civilians at the cost of evacuee health. We observe that the dierence
between ESS+ and ESS  decreases with increasing density. We would like to note
that even though the dierence in evacuee health between SP and ESS is not that
great, when viewed together with evacuation ratio, it is apparent that ESS improves
evacuation outcome by providing intelligent and adaptive navigation services.
Our nal evaluation criterion is evacuation time. This criterion is not as critical
as evacuation ratio or evacuee health but provides an idea on how fast people are
evacuated in dierent scenarios. As we discussed previously, a faster evacuation
is generally preferable since the longer the evacuation takes, the more the re will
spread and become more likely to aect civilians. Figure 3.16 shows the average and
worst-case evacuation time versus population density. Note that casualties do not
contribute to these metrics. In terms of average evacuation time (Fig. 3.16a), we see
that SP is generally fastest, but this is mostly due to its low evacuation ratio. What
happens is that the people that do not encounter re evacuate faster than others
that have to change their paths in SP evacuation. Since many of the people that
need to backtrack eventually become casualties in SP, the eect of their long travel
time is not observed in average evacuation time. Evacuation (death) times for such
casualties can be seen his in Fig.s 3.12 and 3.13.
Although people start to evacuate immediately in ESS+ and SP scenarios, evac-
uation takes on average longer in ESS+ because civilians are guided along longer
but safer paths with ESS compared to SP. In addition, more people are successfully
evacuated in ESS+ than SP, which also increases average evacuation time. ESS  has
the longest average evacuation times since people do not start to evacuate as soon as
re starts. Increasing density (and number of people) increases average evacuation
time in all scenarios since evacuating more people takes longer. We also observe that
the dierence between ESS+ and ESS  decreases with increasing density due to the
diminished eect of alarm with better oppcomms connectivity. Another observation
is that increasing density does not aect average evacuation time in SP as much as
it aects ESS, and this can be attributed to dierences in evacuation ratio. We see
that DES has average evacuation times that are comparable to ESS+ although DES
is slightly faster.
When we look at worst-case evacuation time, we see a dierent picture compared
to average evacuation time. For example, SP is generally worse than ESS in terms of
worst-case evacuation time. This is explained by the uninformed path selection and
eventual backtracking involved in SP evacuation. Most of the people that take a long
time during SP evacuation do so because they have to change their path one or more
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Figure 3.16: Average and worst-case evacuation time versus population density,
building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 6m.
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times due to lack of information on the hazard. Many of them become trapped in the
building and die, and do not contribute to average evacuation time. The few ones
that do evacuate late do not signicantly contribute to average evacuation time due
to their low number and the smoothing eect of averaging. However, such evacuees
do contribute very signicantly to worst-case evacuation time since it is the time
the last evacuee leaves the building. We therefore observe much higher worst-case
evacuation times for SP compared to average evacuation time.
As is the case for average evacuation time, increasing density increases worst-case
evacuation time for all scenarios. We see that ESS  and ESS+ show similar worst-
case evacuation time performance except for the 40pf case where ESS  takes longer.
ESS+ is more aected by physical congestion since people start to evacuate at the
same time. On the other hand, ESS  is not aected by congestion until high densities
since people start to evacuate at slightly dierent times. The increased eect of
congestion at high density (40pf) for ESS  is also apparent in other evacuation
metrics, such as evacuation ratio (Fig. 3.14), average evacuee health (Fig. 3.15) and
average evacuation time (Fig. 3.16a). We see that congestion has the greatest eect
on DES; DES has the best worst-case evacuation times except for the 40pf case and
worst-case evacuation time increases faster with density for DES than other systems.
In the current discussion, we assumed that CN communication range is set to 6m;
this is a realistic but somewhat conservative assumption based on expected real-life
communication performance of IEEE 802.15.4-2006 compliant devices operating in-
doors. A longer CN range would improve evacuation performance of ESS, especially
at low densities. We will discuss the eects of communication range later in detail.
We would like to note that results on the eect of population density when CN range
is set to 10m in this building and re scenario is given in the appendix (Sec. 6.1.1).
Scenario summary: In this section we evaluated the eect of population density
(i.e. number of people and CNs in the same building) on evacuation performance of
ESS in a multi-oor building, where re starts at a critical location on the second
oor and spreads. We observed that population density greatly inuences evac-
uation performance for all systems. In general, ESS performance improves with
increasing density, especially when we assume that ESS is used as both a notica-
tion and navigation system as in the ESS  scenario. This improvement is due to
more contact opportunities and better connectivity of the oppnet when the number
of CNs deployed in the same area increases. We observed that SP evacuation per-
forms worse with increasing density because more people are aected of the re as
the number of people increases. This is due to lack of information on the hazard in
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the SP scenario. DES shows the best performance for low-to-medium densities but
is greatly aected by physical congestion; ESS surpasses DES at medium-to-high
densities. The advantage of an alarm diminishes as density increases for ESS, as can
be observed by the close performance of ESS  to ESS+ with increasing density. Fi-
nally, we observe that ESS performs better than SP evacuation for medium-to-high
densities (20pf and above). This shows that ESS can greatly improve evacuation
outcome in densely populated buildings by providing intelligent navigation services
based on oppcomms.
Scenario: Building with third oor re The location and spreading pattern of
the hazard has a strong inuence on evacuation outcome. In the above scenario, we
looked at a re that starts on the second oor with dierent spreading patterns (re
has a dierent spreading pattern as determined by its probabilistic model for each
simulation run). We observed that due to its critical location, this hazard has the
potential to cause a high number of casualties. We now look at a dierent re that
starts on the third oor of the building (see Fig. 3.7). We observe that this is a less
critical starting location since the hazard aects fewer people and therefore we have
better evacuation performance, especially for SP evacuation. In these experiments,
we set the CN range to 6m and vary the number of people per oor (pf) from 10 to
40. The re starts at time 0 (at simulation start) on the third oor of the simulated
building as described before.
Figure 3.17 shows the evacuation ratio versus population density for dierent
systems in the 3rd oor re scenario. Our initial observation is that evacuation
ratios are generally very high for SP evacuation. This is mainly due to the early
notication of people via the alarm and the re blocking fewer shortest paths in this
scenario. Since the re starts on the third oor, it will initially aect some of the
people on the third oor that choose to use the central stairs to evacuate. People
on the third oor that choose to use the staircases on either end of the corridors
will not be aected by the re. Since people start to evacuate as soon as the re
starts (due to the alarm), many of the people on the third and second oors would
have evacuated their oors by the time the re spreads within the third oor and
down to the second oor. The location of the re therefore has a strong inuence
on SP evacuation as can be expected. Since people do not know the re location
in SP evacuation, if the re starts at a location that does not aect many initial
shortest paths, SP evacuation ratio will be high as in this scenario. If, on the other
hand, the re starts at a location that aects many initial paths, SP evacuation
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ratio will be low, as in the second oor re scenario. We observe that ESS is not
as aected by re location since CNs disseminate information about where the re
is via oppcomms and therefore can route people via safer paths independent of the
re location.
As was observed before, increasing density decreases SP and DES performance due
to more people being aected. However, this decrease is less than what is observed
for the second oor re scenario due to more evacuation paths being available.
A related observation is that we do not see a great eect of congestion on ESS
in this scenario due to more paths being available. With more available paths,
building occupants are naturally divided into groups that take dierent paths when
evacuating, with some people using the left and right staircases and others using the
central one. This decreases congestion on bottlenecks.
ESS  shows worse performance than SP for 10pf and 20pf at 6m CN range.
This is mainly due to the lack of an alarm in ESS . In these cases, due to the
low densities and CN range, some people are disconnected from the oppnet; for
example, the people located at the far edges of rooms cannot communicate with
the ones in the corridors. This disconnectivity causes them to start evacuation late
and become trapped. We observe that this problem is avoided at higher population
densities. Dierent than the second oor re scenario, we see that ESS+ has the
best evacuation ratio performance. DES has comparable performance at 10pf but
the dierence increases with increasing density. ESS  performs better than DES at
30 and 40 pf.
Figure 3.18 shows average evacuee health versus population density in the 3rd
oor re scenario. Compared to the 2nd oor re scenario, we see that average
evacuee health is slightly higher. In the case of SP evacuation, this is because
fewer people encounter the re since it blocks fewer evacuation paths. Although
the dierences in average health are not that great, we see that DES still has the
highest evacuee healths and ESS always produces higher evacuee health than SP due
to safer routing of people. As population density increases, we see that health for SP
evacuation slightly decreases due to more people on the third oor encountering re.
Evacuee health is unaected by population density with DES. ESS performance for
evacuee health improves with increasing density, but this improvement diminishes
as density gets higher. The improvement is due to better connectivity of the oppnet
that allows a wider dissemination of EMs. The diminishing returns with increasing
density indicates that there is a limit, which is lower than the perfect health of 100,
to the highest evacuee health in this scenario. This is expected since a few of the
87
 86
 88
 90
 92
 94
 96
 98
 100
10 20 30 40
E
v
a
c
u
a
te
d
 c
iv
ili
a
n
s
 (
%
)
Civilians per floor
Evacuation ratio vs. population density
SP
ESS, no alarm
ESS, with alarm
DES
Figure 3.17: Evacuation ratio versus population density, building scenario with 3rd
oor re, CN range 6m.
evacuees must be in the vicinity of the re for short durations in order to receive
MMs from SNs. The health of such evacuees will be aected by the hazard and
lower the average evacuee health metric.
Figure 3.19 shows average and worst-case evacuation time for the 3rd oor re
scenario. SP evacuation, DES and ESS+ have very similar average evacuation times;
this is due to the alarm assumed in these systems and similar evacuation paths
followed. This is in contrast to their performance in the second oor re scenario
where ESS+ has higher average evacuation time than SP. In the third oor re
scenario, more paths are available for use since the re aects fewer evacuation
paths (at least initially). Therefore, ESS+ can direct evacuees via safer paths which
are not much longer than paths used in SP evacuation. Worst-case evacuation time
presents a dierent picture, with ESS+ performing better than SP due to more
informed routing of people, which decreases backtracking observed in SP evacuation
and therefore reduces worst-case evacuation time.
As observed in the previous scenario, increasing density increases average and
worst-case evacuation times, except for the case of average (all densities) and worst-
case (40pf) evacuation time for ESS . Average evacuation time for ESS  does not
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Figure 3.18: Average evacuee health versus population density, building scenario
with 3rd oor re, CN range 6m.
show a great dependence on density due to people being notied at dierent times,
which helps ease congestion at higher densities. ESS+, DES and SP suer more from
congestion since all people start evacuation at the same time. However, because they
start evacuation as soon as re starts, average evacuation times for ESS+, DES and
SP are lower than those for ESS . Similar to the previous scenario, population
density has the greatest eect on DES.
We would like to note that further results for this scenario are given in the ap-
pendix: cumulative plots of evacuated civilians and casualties versus time when CN
range is 6m, and results when CN range is 10m are given in Sec. 6.1.1.
Scenario summary: In this section we evaluated the eect of population density on
evacuation performance in a multi-oor building, where re starts at a less critical
location on the third oor. In addition to our general observations on the eect
of population density, we observed that hazard location has a signicant eect on
SP evacuation due to the uninformed path selection process. If the re starts at a
location that does not aect many initial shortest paths, then SP evacuation has
better performance than when re starts at a more critical location. Although hazard
location aects ESS performance, this eect is more insignicant compared to SP
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evacuation. This is because of real-time monitoring and dissemination of hazard
information, which enable CNs to dynamically calculate more appropriate (safer
and faster) evacuation paths no matter where the re starts and how it spreads.
The relative independence of ESS from hazard location is an important property
since this allows the eective use of ESS in critical and non-critical emergencies
alike. Compared to SP evacuation, the benet of ESS is more apparent in critical
emergencies.
Scenario: Large-scale open area In this section, we evaluate the evacuation
performance of ESS with dierent number of people in the large-scale scenario de-
scribed in Sec. 3.2.2. In these simulations, we vary the total number of people in the
area from 180 to 720 and set the CN communication range to 50m or 100m. The
re starts at time 0 (at simulation start) at multiple locations in the area, which are
given in Fig. 3.9. Figures 3.20 and 3.21 present the evacuation ratio and average
evacuee health versus total number of people in the area. We see that population
density does not have any signicant eect on evacuation ratio or health for SP
evacuation, with or without an alarm. This indicates that the ratio of the number
of people that encounter the hazard during evacuation to the number of total people
in the area does not change as density changes in the given range. We suspect this
is due to two reasons: the comparatively low density of people and the topology of
the area. We will discuss these issues shortly.
As expected, SP without alarm (also refered to as SP ) has the worst evacuation
ratio (73%) and health (77%) due to the absence of hazard information and early
notication. When we assume a central alarm that informs everyone of the hazard as
soon as the re starts (SP with alarm, or SP+), evacuation ratio and health increase
signicantly to 90% and 95%, respectively. Although the existence of such a central
alarm system is unrealistic, these results show the advantage of early notication.
We see that SP+ has very good evacuation ratio and has the best evacuee health,
indicating that even without dissemination of hazard information, an early alarm,
joined with information of the area (i.e. area graph) and ability to calculate shortest
(in distance) paths, is eective at improving evacuation.
As observed before in the building scenario, a higher population density improves
both evacuation ratio and health with ESS due to improved connectivity. We see
that ESS always performs better than SP , by signicant margins. This is due to
dissemination of hazard information, which provides both notication and improved
situational awareness to civilians. Considering evacuation ratio, ESS with CN range
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Figure 3.20: Evacuation ratio versus number of people, large-scale scenario.
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
 180  360  540  720
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
v
a
c
u
e
e
 h
e
a
lt
h
 (
%
)
Number of people
Evacuee health vs. number of people
SP, no alarm
SP, with alarm
ESS, no alarm, 50m
ESS, no alarm, 100m
Figure 3.21: Average evacuee health versus number of people, large-scale scenario.
92
of 50m performs worse than SP+ when density is very low (180 people), but provides
evacuation ratios comparable to or better than SP+ for higher densities due to im-
proved connectivity. ESS with CN range of 100m has evacuation ratios comparable
to or better than SP+ at all densities.
Figure 3.22a gives the average evacuation times versus number of people in the
large-scale scenario. As was observed for evacuation ratio and health, our results
show that population density does not aect average evacuation time for SP evacua-
tion, with or without alarm. SP+ has the best average evacuation time performance,
followed by ESS with CN range of 100m and 50m, and SP . SP+ has the short-
est average evacuation times due to its central alarm that starts evacuation for all
people in the area as soon as re starts. ESS has longer average evacuation times
due to the absence of such a central notication system. However, people evacuate
faster on average with ESS than SP  due to notication of people via oppcomms
in ESS. Increasing density decreases average evacuation time for ESS due to better
notication of people via improved connectivity.
We see that worst-case evacuation times, given in Fig. 3.22b, generally present
similar overall characteristics of average evacuation times. In contrast to average
evacuation time, population density does not seem to have a signicant eect on
worst-case evacuation time for ESS. Results also seem to indicate slightly increasing
worst-case evacuation times for SP+ and SP  with increasing density, but these
changes are statistically insignicant.
Compared with the building scenario, average and worst-case evacuation times
are remarkably higher in the large-scale area scenario. This is expected due to the
scale of the emergency area being much larger in this scenario. The large-scale
area scenario is also characterized by the existence of multiple exits situated at
dierent parts of the area. In addition, people have more escape routes since there
are many roads and connections. As mentioned at the beginning of this section,
these topological properties, together with the relatively low population densities,
make evacuation metrics mostly independent of density for SP evacuation. Due
to existence of many routes and wider spaces for movement (as modeled via higher
graph node capacities in our simulations), physical congestion is not observed. These
properties are in contrast to the building scenario. Due to the layout of the building,
there are a few important connections between various areas, for example staircases
between oors and intersections of corridors, and these \critical" connections act
as bottlenecks, limiting the number of available escape routes. These bottlenecks
condense the people in the building to few escape routes, increasing congestion.
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Figure 3.22: Average and worst-case evacuation time versus number of people, large-
scale scenario.
94
Furthermore, when the hazard reaches these bottlenecks, escape routes of many
people are greatly aected. Therefore, information on the hazard is very important
to calculate the best evacuation path in the building scenario and ESS can notably
improve evacuation compared with SP+ evacuation in conned spaces.
Dissemination of hazard information is still valuable in areas with many exits and
escape routes, as in this large-scale scenario, and the better performance of ESS
compared to SP  demonstrates this. Furthermore, we can appreciate ESS more
if we analyze SP+ evacuation a little closer. The central alarm assumed in SP+
eects early evacuation and people evacuate the area before the hazard signicantly
spreads and blocks many paths. However, lack of information on the hazard can
still lead to a high number of fatalities. Despite this, average evacuee health is high
because many people who eventually encounter re are not able to leave the area
and therefore are not counted in the health metric. So, even though they start
evacuation early, they perish since they do not have adequate information on the
hazard. By disseminating information on the hazard, oppcomms enable CNs to
calculate paths not only based on their own observations and local information, but
also on what other CNs have observed at remote locations within the area, allowing
them to make better decisions regarding which paths to follow. So, even without a
central alarm, ESS provides very good evacuation performance, with comparable or
higher evacuation ratio than SP+, at the cost of average evacuee health.
Figure 3.23 presents percentage of evacuated people and fatalities versus evac-
uation time, for the 540 people case. These results clearly show that although
evacuation starts later and proceeds slower in ESS compared to SP+, eventually a
higher number of people are evacuated with ESS. SP , due to lack of hazard infor-
mation and notication, has the slowest and worst evacuation. In comparison with
the building scenario, we see that the favorable properties of the large-scale area
improve evacuation outcome with all systems.
Plots of evacuated people and fatalities versus evacuation time for all population
densities are given in the appendix, Sec. 6.1.1.
Eect of communication range
In this section, we investigate the eect of CN communication range on evacuation
outcome under dierent scenarios. As communication range increases, we expect
ESS to perform better due to better connectivity. As we will see in this section,
CNs do not require a long range when population density is high, since with more
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CNs in the area, there are many contact opportunities to disseminate EMs at shorter
ranges and lower transmission power. However, CN range is important when node
density is low.
Scenario: Building with 2nd oor re, ESS  In these simulations, we look
at evacuation performance of ESS  (ESS without central alarm) with dierent CN
ranges and number of people in the building. We vary the communication range
from 4 to 10 meters and the number of people from 10 to 40 people per oor. The
re starts at time 0 on the second oor of the simulated building (see Fig. 3.6). We
have commented on the eect of population density on evacuation performance in
the previous section. Therefore, we will focus on the eect of communication range
in this section and will not extensively discuss issues of population density.
Figure 3.24 presents evacuation ratio versus communication range. We see that
increasing range increases evacuation ratio in all densities. This is due to wider and
faster dissemination of EMs with longer ranges. The eect of range on evacuation
ratio is most evident at low densities (10 and 20 pf) and CN range has less eect
at higher densities (30 and 40 pf). With many CNs in the building, the number
of contact opportunities to disseminate EMs is high, even when CN range is low
(e.g. 4m). Therefore, communication range has less of an eect in these cases. The
opposite thing happens at low densities and increasing range in these cases has a
greater eect on evacuation ratio. Using a longer range at low densities also addresses
the problem of people located at far edges of the building being disconnected and
notied late of the hazard, and therefore improves evacuation ratio.
We observe a similar eect of communication range on average evacuee health in
Fig. 3.25. Longer range produces better average health for all densities. However,
the eect of range on evacuee health is less signicant than its eect on evacuation
ratio. This indicates that while increasing range has a positive eect on evacuee
health by allowing wider and faster dissemination of EMs and enabling CNs to react
faster to changing conditions, its greater eect is early notication of more people.
We will see that our results with the ESS+ scenario, presented in the next section,
support this.
How communication range aects average and worst-case evacuation times in
the ESS  scenario can be seen in Fig. 3.26. Increasing range decreases average
and worst-case evacuation times due to better connectivity that allows superior
information sharing among CNs and early notication of more people in the building.
As was discussed in the previous section, higher population densities have longer
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evacuation times for all ranges.
Scenario: Building with 2nd oor re, ESS+ In the previous section we
looked at the eect of communication range on evacuation performance for ESS 
(ESS without alarm). This section considers the ESS+ (ESS with alarm) scenario
to see how important communication range is when everyone in the building starts
evacuation early (as soon as re starts). Our results indicate that although us-
ing longer communication ranges improves evacuation performance for ESS+, the
improvement is not very signicant and therefore CNs can use shorter ranges and
correspondingly lower transmission power when there is an external system (i.e. an
alarm) that noties building occupants of the hazard.
Simulations of this scenario have the same conguration as the ones for the pre-
vious scenario, with the exception that we assume a central alarm that noties all
people in the building when the re starts. Figure 3.27 presents evacuation ratio
versus communication range for ESS+. We observe that although increasing range
improves evacuation ratio, the improvement is very little. The same trend is ob-
served for average evacuee health in Fig. 3.28. We see that both evacuation ratio
and evacuee health are quite high for all cases due to the combined eect of an early
alert and intelligent navigation provided by ESS. We are guaranteed that these re-
sults are due in part to intelligent navigation of the evacuees and not just due to the
alarm since we have already looked at SP evacuation, which also assumes a central
alarm but does not provide informed routing, and have observed that SP evacuation
has low evacuation ratios, especially at high densities (Fig. 3.14) and evacuee health
with SP evacuation is lower than that for ESS  and ESS+ (Fig. 3.15).
We see that communication range does not have a signicant eect on average
evacuation time (Fig. 3.29a), but this is mostly due to the smoothing eect of av-
eraging since we observe that increasing CN range decreases worst-case evacuation
time (Fig. 3.29b). Improvements in evacuation time at longer ranges is due to wider
and faster dissemination of EMs that improves situational awareness of CNs and
reduces large changes in evacuation paths (e.g. backtracking).
Scenario: Large-scale area In this section, we investigate the eect of CN com-
munication range on evacuation performance of ESS in the large-scale open area
scenario. We vary the CN communication range from 25 to 100 meters and the
number of people from 180 to 720. The re starts at time 0 at multiple locations
given in Fig. 3.9. Since we have previously discussed the eect of population density
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re, ESS .
100
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
4 6 8 10
E
v
a
c
u
a
te
d
 c
iv
ili
a
n
s
 (
%
)
Communication range (m)
Evacuation ratio vs. CN range (with alarm)
10pf 20pf 30pf 40pf
Figure 3.27: Evacuation ratio versus communication range, building scenario with
2nd oor re, ESS+.
 80
 82
 84
 86
 88
 90
 92
 94
 96
 98
 100
4 6 8 10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
v
a
c
u
e
e
 h
e
a
lt
h
 (
%
)
Communication range (m)
Evacuee health vs. CN range (with alarm)
10pf 20pf 30pf 40pf
Figure 3.28: Average evacuee health versus communication range, building scenario
with 2nd oor re, ESS+.
101
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
 105
 110
 115
 4  6  8  10
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
v
a
c
u
a
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
s
e
c
)
Communication range (m)
Evacuation time vs. CN range (with alarm)
10pf 20pf 30pf 40pf
(a) Average evacuation time
 180
 190
 200
 210
 220
 230
 240
 250
 260
 4  6  8  10
W
o
rs
t-
c
a
s
e
 e
v
a
c
u
a
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
s
e
c
)
Communication range (m)
Evacuation time vs. CN range (with alarm)
10pf 20pf 30pf 40pf
(b) Worst-case evacuation time
Figure 3.29: Average and worst-case evacuation time versus communication range,
building scenario with 2nd oor re, ESS+.
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Figure 3.30: Evacuation ratio versus communication range, large-scale scenario.
on evacuation performance, we will focus on the eect of communication range in
this section.
As expected, increasing CN range improves evacuation ratio (Fig. 3.30) and aver-
age evacuee health (Fig. 3.31) at all population densities due to better connectivity.
We observe that the improvement in the number of evacuated people and evacuee
health with increasing range is similar across all densities. This is in contrast to the
building scenario, where increasing range generally has more impact on evacuation
metrics when density is low, and vice versa. We believe this dierence to be due to
the number of people being comparatively low in this scenario considering the scale
of the area.
Increasing CN range notably decreases average evacuation time (Fig. 3.32a); the
decrease is especially signicant compared to the building scenario. The improve-
ment in average evacuation time arises largely due to more people being alerted
earlier of the hazard with longer range. Evacuation time is also improved by al-
lowing CNs to calculate better paths with improved connectivity at longer ranges;
better paths mean people have a lower probability of encountering the hazard during
evacuation and therefore lead to faster evacuation since changing of paths is reduced.
We note that communication range seems to decrease worst-case evacuation time as
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Figure 3.31: Average evacuee health versus communication range, large-scale
scenario.
well (Fig. 3.32b), especially with number of people  360, but this trend is uncertain
due to the condence intervals of our results. We would like to note that a high
variance in worst-case evacuation times is expected in this scenario due to its scale
and the resulting high diversity of congurations.
3.2.4 Communication performance
In the previous section, we evaluated evacuation performance of ESS and compared
it with a static node based system (DES) and shortest path (SP) evacuation under
dierent number of people and communication ranges. In this section, we look at
communication performance and characteristics of oppcomms in emergencies. The
metrics we use are message delivery ratio, delay, hop count, CN queue length and
number of created and received EMs.
The number of created messages (C) is the total number of EMs created by CNs
for oppcomms during the emergency. The number of received messages (R) is the
total number of EMs received by CNs; this metric includes duplicate packets which
may be received multiple times by CNs due to buer overows. Two CNs that are in
contact determine which messages to forward to each other based on the messages
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Figure 3.32: Average and worst-case evacuation time versus communication range,
large-scale scenario.
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they already have. If the message buer of a CN overows due to receiving many
messages, then the CN will forget that it has received the dropped messages and
therefore may receive these messages again at a later time. Such duplicate receptions
cannot be identied by the CN and therefore are counted in the R metric. Message
delivery ratio (%) is calculated as 100R=(C n), where n is the number of CNs, since
each EM is destined for all CNs. Note that calculating the delivery ratio in this way
tends to understate the actual delivery ratio since as people evacuate the area, the
number of potential destination nodes decreases. Average message delay (latency)
is the mean of one-way (from source to destination) delivery delays of all received
EMs. Average hop count is the mean of number of hops taken by all received EMs.
Average CN queue length is the mean of maximum queue length (in packets) of all
CNs. The maximum queue length (in packets) of a CN is the maximum number
of packets that were held by a CN for oppcomms purposes and is indicative of the
storage requirements of oppcomms and communication overhead.
Scenario: Building with 2nd oor re, ESS 
In these simulations, we change the CN range from 4 meters to 10 meters and vary
the number of people per oor from 10 to 40 in the building scenario. The re starts
at time 0 on the second oor of the simulated building as described before. We look
at communication characteristics for ESS  (ESS without alarm). Epidemic routing
with timestamp-priority queuing is employed for oppcomms; LBER is not used in
these simulations. We will investigate the eect of using the LBER method towards
the end of this section.
Figure 3.34 shows the number of created and received messages versus commu-
nication range for dierent population densities. The number of created EMs (C)
is directly related to how many MMs are received from SNs since each new MM is
converted to an EM by the receiving CN. Therefore, when there are more people
(CNs) in the building, C increases as more people receive MMs from the SNs. It
is interesting to note that C decreases with range. This is because a longer range
allows for EMs to be disseminated more widely and reach more people, decreasing
the number of CNs that create EMs in response to direct communication with SNs.
An example situation is depicted in Fig. 3.33. In this example, two CNs (CN1 and
CN2) are heading towards the same area along dierent routes. CN1 receives an
MM from the SN monitoring the area and adjusts its course recommendation based
on the new information received. This information, however, does not reach CN2
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Figure 3.33: An example scenario where longer CN range decreases the number of
created EMs.
via oppcomms since it is out of range when CN range is low. Therefore, CN2 also
receives an MM from the SN and creates another EM in response, in addition to cal-
culating a new path. When CN range is long, CN2 receives the EM created by CN1,
which removes the need for CN2 to reach the SN to receive the same information.
A similar situation can occur along multiple hops.
The number of received EMs (R), given in log scale in Fig. 3.34, increases with
range even though the number of created messages decreases with range. This
indicates that each created EM reaches more CNs with longer range due to better
connectivity. More signicant than the eect of range is the eect of number of CNs
on R. We observe that increasing the number of people in the building signicantly
increases R, and this is not just due to an increase in C. Increasing the number
of people increases R because more people mean: (i) more contact opportunities to
deliver EMs, and (ii) more CNs and therefore more destinations (receivers) for EMs.
We see that the increase in contact opportunities plays a more signicant role when
we look at message delivery ratio in Fig. 3.35. We also observe that there is a great
dierence between C and R, especially when population density is high, which is
due to each EM being destined to all CNs in the area.
Our calculation of delivery ratio reects that each EM is disseminated network-
wide. Figure 3.35 shows message delivery ratio versus communication range for
dierent number of people. We see that delivery ratio ranges from a low of 9%
(4m, 10pf) to a high of 83% (10m, 30pf). Our initial observation is that delivery
ratio increases with range and population density. When a low range is combined
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Figure 3.34: Number of created (C) and received (R) messages versus communica-
tion range, building scenario with 2nd oor re, ESS , no LBER.
with a low population density, delivery ratio is very low and this is reected in poor
evacuation performance of ESS. On the other hand, when density is high, a long
range is not required to reach high delivery ratios, and vice versa. It is not surprising
that increasing CN range improves delivery ratio, but the case for density is not so
obvious since increasing the number of CNs increases contact opportunities, but it
also increases the destinations for EMs and therefore has the potential to decrease
delivery ratio. However, we see that this is not the case and delivery ratio improves
with density, indicating that the growth in contact opportunities is greater than the
increase in number of destinations. Improvements in delivery ratio are not seen when
density and range are both high (10m and 30pf and above), indicating a saturation
point of around 82% for delivery ratio in this scenario. 100% delivery ratio is not
reached partly because CNs that leave the area cannot receive EMs created after
they have left the building.
We can see a correspondence between message delivery ratio and evacuation per-
formance, especially with respect to evacuation ratio. This is expected as higher
delivery ratios generally indicate better dissemination of EMs and improved situa-
tional awareness for CNs. However, it is interesting to note that very high delivery
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ratios are not needed for good evacuation performance. We see that delivery ratios 
30% correspond to evacuation ratios  90% in this scenario (see Fig. 3.24 for evacu-
ation ratio). This indicates a potential redundancy in the content of EMs and shows
that CNs do not need to receive all created EMs in order to successfully navigate
their users. While a higher message delivery ratio potentially indicates improved
situational awareness, we believe that (i) early notication of people of the start of
an evacuation via timely reception of their rst EM (when there is no central alarm),
(ii) the delivery of messages relating to more recent events (as opposed to messages
with stale timestamps), and (iii) reception of messages with content dissimilar to
what is already known by a CN (e.g. information about a new hazard location as
opposed to an update on hazard intensity for an already known location) are more
critical for good evacuation performance and our results on message delivery and
evacuation ratios support this. This observation motivates our timestamp-based pri-
ority queuing and LBER approaches for CN storage management and prioritization
of message exchange.
Message delay is another important metric in communications. Figure 3.36 shows
the average message delivery delay for oppcomms with dierent CN ranges and
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re, ESS , no LBER.
number of CNs. An important observation is that delay is quite high compared to
traditional wireless networks such as MANETs and WSNs. Delay would normally
be in the order of milliseconds in these networks, but we see that delay is in the
order of seconds due to intermittent connectivity with oppcomms in the building
scenario. This is a characteristic of DTNs and it is not unusual for delay to reach
minutes in larger areas; we will discuss delay of oppcomms in larger areas in the
next section.
Although the ESS can tolerate long delays, low delay is still preferable since hazard
measurements are received by the CNs sooner when message delay is low and CNs
can then base their navigation decisions on more recent information. However, low
delay on its own does not guarantee good evacuation performance and a high enough
(30% or more in this scenario) delivery ratio is also required for successful navigation
of people. This can be observed when CN range is 4m: message delays for the 10
and 20 pf cases are lower than the ones for 30 and 40 pf, but since message delivery
ratio is very low in the low density cases with 4m range (Fig. 3.35), evacuation ratio
is poor compared to the high density cases (Fig. 3.24). Therefore, delay should
be considered together with delivery ratio to better understand how evacuation is
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aected by these communication metrics.
Our evaluation indicates that oppcomms can enable essential services in emergen-
cies although it has higher delay compared to other types of wireless communication.
Performance of oppcomms improves with high population density or longer commu-
nication range. For the case of delay, we see that density does not play an important
role and it is CN range that has a signicant impact on delay. As expected, we see
that message delay decreases with increasing range. This eect is most signicant
for high density cases (30 and 40 pf) with 4m and 6m range. Population density
does not have a signicant eect on delay, but we see that higher densities gener-
ally exhibit lower delay; this trend is especially apparent when range is high. The
discrepancy observed for 10pf with 4m and 6m range, and for 20pf with 4m range,
can be explained by the low delivery ratios for these cases.
When we look at average message hop counts given in Fig. 3.37, we observe that
range aects hop count dierently based on population density. For low densities
(10 and 20 pf), increasing range increases hop count, although the increase is not
much. For high densities (30 and 40 pf), increasing range has the opposite eect of
decreasing hop count. The dierence is most signicant between CN ranges of 4m
and 6m, and the decrease in hop count gradually declines after 6m. The gradual
declines in changes in hop count in all densities indicate that average hop count
reaches a steady value as we increase range and this value is based on density.
Higher densities have higher average hop counts as expected since when there are
more CNs, messages can visit (hop over) more nodes during dissemination.
The reason for the dierent behaviour of hop count versus range with dierent
densities is that with low densities, increasing range increases contact opportunities
and connected subnetwork size, but does not greatly aect neighborhood size, i.e. the
number of nodes in the neighborhood of another node. Therefore, an EM travels over
more or less the same number of hops on average with increasing range. However, the
increased contact opportunities and connected network size increase delivery ratio
and decrease delay. With high densities, increasing range increases neighborhood
size and this decreases hop count and delay, and increases delivery ratio.
We observe an interesting relationship between hop count and delay: in oppnets,
hop count and delay are not as closely related as in more conventional networks, such
as wired networks and MANETs. We would normally expect hop count and delay to
be positively correlated (e.g. as hop count increases, so does delay). But we see that
this does not always hold in oppnets. This unique feature is caused by the dominance
of \storage delay" over transmission and propagation delays (jointly refered to as
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Figure 3.37: Message hop count versus communication range, building scenario with
2nd oor re, ESS , no LBER.
transfer delay in the rest of the discussion) in oppnets. A much longer time is
spent carrying a message waiting for a contact opportunity (on the order of seconds,
depending on node mobility rates) than actually transfering the message between
two nodes (on the order of milliseconds). Because of this dierence of magnitude
in the components of end-to-end delay, a higher hop count does not always mean
a higher delay (and vice versa) since the message may have taken many hops but
spent relatively few time in storage. An example would be a message sent over many
hops in a connected subnetwork.
In the case of increasing range in low CN densities, neighborhood size is small
and is not aected much by range. Each time a node sends an EM, few nodes (ones
that are in its current neighborhood) receive the message. The message is then
propagated by the receivers and this process continues over multiple hops. Since
each transmission is received by few nodes, a message travels over many hops, but
due to more frequent contacts between nodes and larger connected subnetworks
with increasing range, overall storage delay decreases while transfer delay increases.
Since storage delay has a higher order of magnitude than transfer delay, the de-
crease in storage delay dominates and we observe a decreased total message delay.
112
For high densities, neighborhood size starts small but increases with range. When
neighborhood size is large, each EM is received by many nodes, and the message is
propagated over fewer hops. This decreases hop count and delay since both storage
and transfer delay decrease.
Our nal results relate to resource consumption for oppcomms: Figure 3.38
presents the average maximum queue length (in number of messages) used for storing
and routing messages by CNs under dierent parameters. We would like to remind
the reader that in these simulations, we are using timestamp-priority queues without
LBER, so messages are dropped only if the queue is full. We note that increasing
density or range increases queue length; CN density seems to have a bigger impact
on queue length than range. As range increases, queue length slightly increases but
seems to reach steady values as we get to the high end of the range, indicating a
possible saturation point for memory consumption of oppcomms in this scenario.
As density increases, queue length increases since with more nodes, there are more
destinations for EMs. We note that memory consumption is closely related to the
number of received messages in the network (Fig. 3.34); more received messages ex-
pectedly result in higher memory consumption. Even without LBER, memory use
for oppcomms is not very high; the highest number of messages stored (on average)
is below 35 in this scenario.
Eect of LBER policy We now look at the eect of using LBER policy in stor-
age management. Simulations for this section have the same parameters as the ones
above, with the exception of using LBER. The aim of LBER is to lower memory use
without aecting evacuation performance. Looking at the average maximum queue
length (in number of messages) when LBER is used (Fig. 3.39), we see that storage
space used by oppcomms is greatly reduced. In the most signicant case, a reduc-
tion from an average of 31.6 messages to 8.9 messages (6m, 40pf) is observed, which
corresponds to a decrease of 72%. These results indicate that LBER can eectively
reduce the already low memory requirements of oppcomms in ESS. These low mem-
ory requirements also indicate that epidemic routing is an appropriate choice for the
dissemination of EMs in terms of resource use for indoor scenarios. An interesting
observation is that when LBER is used, the eect of CN density on queue length is
reduced, which suggests that the LBER storage management strategy can improve
scalability of ESS in denser populations.
Because LBER replaces old messages with newer ones relating to the same area, it
also aects other communication metrics. Figure 3.40 shows the number of created
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Figure 3.38: CN queue length versus communication range, building scenario with
2nd oor re, ESS , no LBER.
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Figure 3.39: CN queue length versus communication range, building scenario with
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tion range, building scenario with 2nd oor re, ESS , with LBER.
and received messages when LBER is active; Table 3.4 gives the number of received
messages (R) with and without LBER for easier comparison. We see that LBER
practically has no eect on the number of created messages since this metric depends
only on the hazard and movement of people in the building. However, the number
of received messages is much lower with LBER compared to without LBER. This
is due to the dropping of some messages with LBER; these dropped messages are
\removed from circulation" and therefore lower R.
The eect of dropped messages can also be observed in the delivery ratio, given in
Fig. 3.41. We see that delivery ratio is lower with LBER, since fewer messages are
Without LBER With LBER
10pf 20pf 30pf 40pf 10pf 20pf 30pf 40pf
4 m 118.02 692.98 1831.74 3582.42 90.88 422.10 989.36 1950.94
6 m 191.20 1002.34 2088.54 3828.56 141.82 696.96 1435.52 2640.24
8 m 239.00 1107.46 2159.10 3765.90 184.06 812.12 1615.48 2987.18
10 m 283.26 1124.12 2072.82 3653.30 221.32 846.14 1721.22 3143.12
Table 3.4: Number of received messages with and without LBER, building scenario
with 2nd oor re, ESS .
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Figure 3.41: Message delivery ratio versus communication range, building scenario
with 2nd oor re, ESS , with LBER.
disseminated. However, this decrease in delivery ratio is just a \cosmetic" change
and does not aect evacuation performance since LBER only replaces messages that
relate to similar areas. Results on evacuation performance with LBER are practically
the same as without LBER and therefore have been omitted.
We observe that dropping old messages when appropriate serves to decrease av-
erage message delay as presented in Fig. 3.42. This is expected since old messages
originate from an earlier time and therefore their further dissemination increases
accumulated delay without providing any useful information. Replacing them with
more up-to-date messages decreases observed delay without aecting evacuation
performance.
Figure 3.43 presents average message hop count with LBER. The trend for hop
count with LBER is very similar to without LBER, but the values are lower, es-
pecially for higher densities. This result is again due to the early replacement of
messages with LBER, which prevents old messages from being widely disseminated
and accumulating higher hop counts, and therefore decreases measured average hop
count.
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Scenario: Large-scale area
In the simulations of the large-scale open area scenario, we vary the CN range
from 25 to 100 meters and the number of people from 180 to 720. The re starts
at simulation start at multiple locations (see Fig. 3.9) and we assume there is no
central alarm. Epidemic routing with timestamp-priority queuing without LBER is
used.
Figure 3.44 shows the number of created and received messages versus CN range
with dierent number of people. As observed in the building scenario, the number of
created messages (C) increases with number of people since more people encounter
the hazard during movement and therefore more EMs are created. Compared to the
building scenario, we see that C is considerably higher due to the higher number of
people and the extent of the hazard (since re starts at multiple locations in this
scenario). C is lower at higher CN ranges since EMs are disseminated wider and
this allows more CNs to avoid hazardous areas. Therefore, the number of messages
created in response to direct hazard observations is lowered. Compared to the
building scenario, range has less eect on C: although the absolute dierences are
higher, the relative dierences are lower. We believe this is because although range
is considerably higher when outdoors, the scale of the open area is much greater
than the increase in range, and this decreases the eect of range on C.
Compared with the building scenario, we observe that the number of people
and communication range have similar eects on the number of received messages
(Fig. 3.44, given in log scale). R increases with population density and range, and
the eect of density is higher than that of range. R is considerably higher than in
the building scenario, due to more created messages and more nodes (destinations).
Although R is much higher in the large-scale area scenario than the building sce-
nario, average message delivery ratios, given in Fig. 3.45, are remarkably lower. This
is due to how delivery ratio is calculated, based on that each EM is destined for all
CNs. We observe that delivery ratio increases with increasing communication range
and number of people, as observed before in the building scenario. The low delivery
ratios in this scenario indicate that although the number of received messages is
quite high, compared to the number of potential receivers (CNs) in the area, it is
still lower than the gures in the building scenario. This is expected due to the scale
of the area and more diversity in paths taken by civilians during evacuation, result-
ing in fewer contacts among people that start evacuation at signicantly dierent
(e.g. opposite) parts of the area. This means that messages created within a sector
118
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Figure 3.44: Number of created (C) and received (R) messages versus communica-
tion range, large-scale scenario, no LBER.
do not necessarily reach many CNs that are in far-away sectors.
We see that the segregation in sharing of information among distant sectors in
the large-scale area is acceptable, as demonstrated by good evacuation performance
of ESS with low delivery ratios. This is largely due to the spatial characteristics of
the emergency area. In the building scenario, there are few disjoint escape paths
due to the spatial conguration of the building, and the dimensions of the building
are small. Therefore, information from any part of the building is highly important
for path calculation. In the large-scale area scenario, the number of escape paths is
higher, there are more exit points in distant parts of the area, and the dimensions
of the area are large. Therefore, information from its local area is generally enough
for a CN to successfully calculate an evacuation path in this scenario.
Looking at average message delay, given in Fig. 3.46, we observe the familiar
eect of CN range on delay: increasing range (generally) decreases delay, except
for the 180 people case. The eect of population density on delay is inconclusive.
Message delays are considerably higher than the building scenario; this is no surprise
since delivery delay is dominated by \storage delay" in oppcomms and the long
travel distances in this scenario mean messages spend longer in the \carry" phase
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Figure 3.45: Message delivery ratio versus communication range, large-scale sce-
nario, no LBER.
of the \store-carry-forward" cycle of oppcomms compared to the building scenario.
Our results show that message delays range between 262 to 392 seconds, roughly
around 412 and 6
1
2 minutes. Despite the high delivery delays, we see that oppcomms
improve evacuation outcome, especially the number of evacuated people, compared
to uninformed SP evacuation.
Figure 3.47 presents average message hop count versus communication range with
dierent number of people in the large-scale open area. As the number of people
increases, so does hop count, since messages visit more nodes due to increased con-
tacts and higher number of message destinations. Hop count also increases with
increasing range. We observe that the eect of range on hop count does not change
based on node density as was observed in the building scenario (Fig. 3.37), but
we do see that its eect increases as density increases. These results indicate that
with the scale of the area, number of people and communication range used in the
experiments, increasing range does not aect node neighborhood size very much,
but it increases hop count due to more contact opportunities and bigger connected
subnetworks.
In this scenario, delay and hop count seem to be inversely related to each other
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Figure 3.48: CN queue length versus communication range, large-scale scenario, no
LBER.
when we consider the eect of range on hop count and delay. However, no clear
relationship is present when we look at the eect of density on hop count and delay.
We therefore conclude that as observed in the building scenario, the relationship
between delay and hop count is variegated due to the complex factors aecting
delay in oppnets.
Our results on storage requirements of oppcomms, given in Fig. 3.48, show that
queue length increases when range or node density is increased, as seen before in the
building scenario. In this scenario, storage requirements seem to be roughly twice
that of the building scenario (compare with Fig. 3.38) as can be expected due to
the signicantly higher number of created and received messages. Nevertheless, we
observe that memory requirements are not very demanding, especially considering
the small size of messages. These gures indicate that most CNs do not reach their
maximum allotted queue size even when LBER is disabled.
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3.3 Resilience of Opportunistic Communications to
Node Failures
The reliability and availability of emergency support services are important, espe-
cially considering their critical nature. In the previous section, we evaluated the
performance of oppcomms for emergency evacuation support under normal condi-
tions, i.e. when all components of ESS operate reliably and correctly. In this section,
we investigate the resilience of oppcomms for emergency support and evaluate the
performance of oppcomms under node failures.
The ESS is designed to be as independent of external systems as possible. Due
to the use of self-powered components, ESS can continue to operate when external
power has failed. ESS does not rely upon infrastructure-based communication net-
works, such as WLANs or wireless telephony, and therefore failures or congestion
of these systems do not aect performance of ESS. In fact, we specically proposed
ESS to address the failure of such systems and to enable emergency services when
more traditional communication and support systems have failed. Even so, ESS is
still susceptible to failures of its components, i.e. SNs and CNs, and other conditions
that may aect correct and continued operation. In this section, we look at how
CN failures aect ESS and oppcomms. In Sec. 3.3.4, we discuss how other types of
failures may aect ESS and propose some mitigation methods.
We expect ESS to be resilient to failures due to the disruption tolerant nature of
opportunistic communications. ESS does not require availability of end-to-end paths
for successful dissemination of emergency information and can tolerate intermittent
connectivity, frequent disruptions to communications and long message delays by
adopting an opportunistic approach. However, our evaluation of oppcomms in the
previous section has revealed that ESS does not perform well if connectivity is crit-
ically low, such as when node density and communication range are low. Although
ESS can tolerate long delays, evacuation performance is improved by decreasing
message delay. Therefore, although we expect that failures will have less eect on
oppnets compared to other networks (e.g. MANETs), we believe that performance
will nevertheless be aected by CN failures. With our evaluation here, we aim to
learn if and when failures become signicant for the overall system, and hope to
propose remedies by identifying any existing trends.
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3.3.1 Conguration of experiments
CNs may cease to operate or participate in oppcomms due to failures in hardware
or software, or most likely due to their battery running out. In our evaluation, we
assume hard failure of CNs, i.e. that a failed CN cannot participate in any commu-
nications. We evaluate the resilience of oppcomms to CN failures using simulations
conducted with the DBES. We use the building scenario where re starts on the
second oor; this scenario is described in Sec. 3.2.2. Communication parameters for
CNs and SNs, and other assumptions are as stated in Sec. 3.2.2, with the follow-
ing exceptions. We assume that epidemic routing with timestamp-priority queues
without LBER is used in these simulations, and that some of the CNs in the build-
ing have failed prior to the start of the emergency. Civilians move at 1.39 m/sec
(5 km/hr) within oors and 0.7 m/sec (2.52 km/hr) at staircases. Each vertex in the
building graph is assigned a capacity of two in these simulations (ci = 2;8i 2 V ).
The following results are for the ESS  system where we assume that we do not have
a central alarm. Results for ESS+, where a central alarm is assumed, are given in
the appendix in Sec. 6.2.
We look at four dierent cases in our evaluation: 20 and 40 people per oor (pf)
with CN ranges of 6m and 10m. These cases allow us to evaluate the eect of CN
failures in dierent population densities (medium and high) and with dierent CN
ranges. Simulation results are an average of 50 simulation runs for each data point,
and 95% condence intervals are provided where possible. Each simulation run has
dierent initial locations for people, a dierent spreading pattern for the hazard, and
dierent CNs chosen as the failed nodes. CNs that have failed are chosen randomly
among all CNs in the simulation. Node failure ratio is the ratio of the number of
CNs that have failed to the number of all CNs in the building.
The failure of CNs raises the question of what happens to users of failed CNs
during the emergency. We can assume that users with failed CNs follow a (semi-
)xed evacuation strategy, such as SP routing as described in Sec. 3.2.2, or that
they follow people with functioning CNs. In order to isolate the eect of what
evacuation strategy is adopted by users of failed CNs and to focus on how people
with functioning CNs are aected by the failures, we ignore users of failed CNs in
our results, i.e. we present our results where data relating to these users have been
removed. We rst look at how evacuation is aected by CN failures in Sec. 3.3.2.
Communication performance of oppcomms under failures is discussed in Sec. 3.3.3.
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Figure 3.49: Evacuation ratio versus CN failure ratio, building scenario with 2nd
oor re, ESS .
3.3.2 Evacuation performance with failures
In this section, we look at how CN failures aect evacuation performance of ESS. We
evaluate evacuation using the metrics of evacuation ratio, average evacuee health,
and average and worst-case evacuation time as dened in Sec. 3.2.3. We see that
evacuation ratio (Fig. 3.49) is aected less from failures when nodes have more
frequent contact opportunities and when connected subnetwork sizes are larger,
i.e. when population density and/or communication range is high. For example, with
40pf and 10m range, evacuation ratio is practically unaected by failures. Eect of
failures on evacuation ratio increases as population density and/or communication
range decreases. With more failures in the system, evacuation ratio decreases in
general. We see that ESS is fairly resilient to node failures in terms of evacuation
ratio and that failure ratios of up to 20% are well-tolerated. An important obser-
vation is that range has a greater eect on the resilience of ESS than population
density. Average evacuee health (Fig. 3.50) is generally quite high despite the fail-
ures. A general trend of decreasing health is observed as failures increase but the
dierences in average health are small. We again observe that networks with better
connectivity (higher density or range) are more resilient and less aected by failures.
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Figure 3.50: Average evacuee health versus CN failure ratio, building scenario with
2nd oor re, ESS .
Figure 3.51 presents average and worst-case evacuation times versus node failure
ratio. Our results show that evacuation times gradually increase as failure ratio
increases, except for the 20pf with 10m range case, which shows decreasing average
evacuation time until 10% failure ratio. The eect of failures on evacuation time
comes from two factors: (i) with more failures, people are alerted later of the re
and therefore start to evacuate later, and (ii) more people need to change paths dur-
ing evacuation because of incomplete or outdated information, which both increase
evacuation time.
3.3.3 Communication performance with failures
We now evaluate the eect of node failures on communication performance in ESS.
We look at the number of created and received messages, message delivery ratio,
and average delay, hop count and maximum queue length, which are dened in
Sec. 3.2.4. Figure 3.52 presents the number of created and received messages ver-
sus node failure ratio. Looking at the number of created messages, we see that it
decreases very slightly with increasing failures. With fewer functioning CNs in the
building, there are fewer CNs that receive SN measurements and therefore fewer
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Figure 3.52: Number of created and received messages versus CN failure ratio, build-
ing scenario with 2nd oor re, ESS .
of the sensor observations are converted to new EMs. However, most of the CNs
do not receive information about the hazard directly from SNs but indirectly from
other CNs, and therefore the eect of failures on created EMs is not very signicant.
In contrast, the number of received EMs (given in log scale in Fig. 3.52) is greatly
aected by failures. We see that the number of received messages considerably de-
creases with increasing failure ratio due to the combined eect of fewer receivers
(message destinations) and fewer contact opportunities.
Figure 3.53 presents message delivery ratio versus node failure ratio. We see that
even though the number of received messages decreases signicantly, delivery ratio is
less aected by failures, indicating that the decrease in the number of receivers is the
major component of the decrease in the number of received messages in Fig. 3.52.
Delivery ratio decreases as failures increase due to fewer contact opportunities. As
observed before, we see that oppcomms is resilient to node failures and message de-
livery ratio is not aected much up to a node failure ratio of 10%. After this point,
delivery ratio decreases more signicantly except for the 20pf and 40pf with 10m
cases. We observe that communication range is more eective at maintaining high
delivery ratio in the face of node failures than density. Similar behavior is observed
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Figure 3.53: Message delivery ratio versus CN failure ratio, building scenario with
2nd oor re, ESS .
for average message delivery delay in Fig. 3.54. We observe that average message
delay does not signicantly increase with failure ratio, especially when communica-
tion range is long (i.e. 10m). The increase in delay is more noticeable for the high
density, medium range (40pf, 6m) scenario than others.
Both average message hop count (given in Fig. 3.55) and average maximum queue
length (given in Fig. 3.56) show similar trends with increasing node failures for dif-
ferent cases. For both metrics, we see that results are grouped based on population
density and that range has less eect than density as opposed to our observations
with other metrics above. We observe apparent decreases in both hop count and
queue length as failures increase. In Sec. 3.2.4, we discussed that hop count and mes-
sage delay are loosely related in oppnets due to the \store-carry-forward" message
dissemination paradigm. A low hop count does not always mean a low delay since
end-to-end delivery delay can be dominated by storage delay. The same behavior is
observed here as well: although increasing failures noticeably decreases hop count,
delay is either unaected or increases. Hop count decreases as the number of failed
nodes increases, mostly because there are fewer CNs to relay and receive messages.
This naturally decreases hop count since each message visits fewer nodes on aver-
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Figure 3.54: Message delay versus CN failure ratio, building scenario with 2nd oor
re, ESS .
age. The decrease in number of received messages and delivery ratio, as well as the
decrease in hop count, help us understand why queue length decreases with failures.
As the number of functional nodes decreases, there are fewer nodes to relay messages
and fewer contact opportunities. This means that messages are not distributed to
the extent possible with a higher density of CNs and therefore average queue length
decreases.
3.3.4 Other types of failures
In this section, we investigated how failures in the ESS aect evacuation and oppor-
tunistic communications by specically looking at CN failures. There are other types
of failures that can potentially aect the quality of navigation services provided by
ESS. These failures include the failure of SNs, intermittent failures of nodes or links,
and incorrect operation of system components. Intermittent link failures are pos-
sible due to uctuations in interference, changing physical conditions, and mobility
as CNs move in the area. Opportunistic communications are employed by ESS to
inherently handle intermittent connectivity and we have seen in our evaluations that
oppcomms can eectively enable an adaptive navigation service for evacuation in a
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wide range of scenarios. Intermittent failures of CNs or SNs do not introduce any
additional challenges compared to complete (hard) failures, and intermittent failure
cases are a subset of complete failures. We therefore believe that our evaluation of
complete failures of CNs and our discussion of SN failures below adequately address
intermittent failure cases as well.
An important type of failure we have not yet considered is the failure of sensors
in the building. We will argue that the most possible cases of SN failures are not as
critical to the operation of ESS as they may seem. SN failures can happen due to
a variety of reasons, including failures due to the hazard and low battery. Failures
due to the hazard can occur as the hazard spreads in the building and adversely
aects sensors in the vicinity. In such cases, the failure pattern of SNs will closely
follow the spreading pattern of the hazard. We argue that SNs can normally detect a
change in the environment before the detected event causes SN failure. For example,
a sensor monitoring temperature can detect a signicant temperature increase and
trigger the creation of an MM long before the re reaches the sensor and destroys
it. Therefore, any CNs in the vicinity of the sensor will be informed of the re
directly via the SN and this information will further be disseminated to other CNs
via oppcomms. Since CNs avoid hazardous areas, most CNs would head away from
the area of the SN. Therefore the failure of an SN after it has relayed at least some
of its measurements is not very signicant.
Another argument for the relatively low signicance of SN failures due to hazard
is the intelligence of the CN users. Even if a CN directs its user towards the hazard
due to lack of information and the sensors near the hazard have failed and cannot
automatically inform the CN as its user moves towards the hazard, the user can
manually check whether her CN is directing her towards the hazard because there are
no other alternatives or because the CN does not know of the hazard. In the former
case, the CN has chosen this path since it is the least dangerous of all alternatives
(as known to the CN) and the user should follow her CN's directions if she wants
to leave the building. In the latter case, the user can interact with her CN to
manually input the existence of hazard at the current location and trigger a path
update. Although manual intervention of the user voids full autonomy of ESS, it is
a plausible and eective approach to deal with unknown failures when CNs do not
have information on where SNs are located in the building. We will discuss the case
of a hazard which cannot be directly observed by a person later in this section.
A second solution to handling SN failures is the inclusion of (approximate) loca-
tions of sensors in the building graph stored by the CNs. This can easily be achieved
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without signicantly increasing the storage space required for the graph, especially
if the location of SNs follow a regular pattern (e.g. each SN located on or near each
edge). In this case, since a CN would expect an MM or an LM from each nearby SN,
if it does not receive any such message, it can detect an SN failure. This opens up
two possibilities: the CN can assume that the SN has failed due to the hazard and
update its world view accordingly, or it can inform the user that a nearby SN has
failed and therefore current information may not be accurate (e.g. user location and
given direction). The rst option has the advantage of automatically responding to
an SN failure but can cause incorrect navigation if SNs fail due to reasons other
than the hazard. The second option is safer and has the advantage of automatically
informing the user of any uncertainty in the given directions, but requires the user
to take appropriate action (e.g. to evaluate whether current directions are correct
or not by observing the immediate environment) and aects the autonomy of the
system. We believe the second option to be more appropriate considering that safety
is paramount in emergencies and that SNs can fail due to reasons other than the
hazard, such as empty batteries.
The second option implicitly assumes that the hazard can be directly observed
by a person, as in the case of re and smoke. Hazards which cannot be directly
observed, such as CO/CO2 levels or radiation, are more dicult to deal with. We
leave the investigation of SN failures in such cases as future work.
Another reason for SN failures can be random failures or failures due to low
battery8. Such failures can be handled as proposed above: by combining automatic
notication of the user of a detected SN failure and manual input by the user. We
would like to note that such failures do not have a signicant eect on evacuation
since these sensors do not relay any hazard information to the CNs. Their greater
eect is on the accuracy of indoor localization of CNs. As presented in Sec. 3.1, CNs
use messages from the SNs to locate where they are in the building. The failure of
SNs can potentially decrease the location accuracy of nearby CNs, but we believe this
would not greatly aect ESS operation due to several reasons. First, CNs normally
use messages from several nearby SNs to locate themselves in the building and
the loss of information from one SN would not aect location calculation. Second,
CNs can use additional methods like dead reckoning to approximate their locations.
Third, CN location is already approximated based on the building graph so CNs
do not require high accuracy localization. All these factors indicate that random
failures of a few SNs would cause relatively small loss in CN localization accuracy
8We assume that SN failures due to low battery follow a random pattern among all SNs.
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and not aect evacuation performance. Of course, if the number of failed SNs is
high, then evacuation would be aected both due to lack of information on the
hazard and localization errors.
We would like to note that failure of sensors are not as critical in ESS compared to
other evacuation/navigation systems based on WSNs. In such systems, sensor nodes
are used to monitor the environment, communicate with neighbors to disseminate
information and to calculate evacuation paths based on received and observed infor-
mation. Since SNs are used both as a monitoring and communication infrastructure
in WSN-based systems, failures of sensors can be more signicant since they may
disrupt communications by creating \gaps" in the network and therefore aect cor-
rect operation of the whole system. ESS is more resilient to SN failures due to the
use of oppcomms and mobile nodes.
On a closing note, outdoor deployments of ESS do not have any of the problems
associated with SN failures since static sensors are not used. In such cases, we expect
the eect of CN failures to be similar to the building scenario.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we discussed how we can use opportunistic communications to en-
able emergency evacuation support when other means of communication have bro-
ken down. We presented the design of an emergency support system that employs
oppcomms between communication nodes (CNs) carried by civilians to provide nav-
igation directions. In ESS, the emergency area (e.g. the building) is represented as
a graph that approximates the area layout. Each CN has a local copy of the graph
that is updated using emergency information disseminated via oppcomms. Using
the graph and received updates, the CN executes a shortest path algorithm to nd
the safest and shortest evacuation path from its current location to the nearest exit.
The CN then provides step-by-step navigation directions to its user as she moves
inside the area following directions. As oppcomms oer best-eort message delivery,
each CN has a partial view of the current emergency conditions.
ESS can be deployed in both indoor and outdoor urban areas. In indoor areas,
CNs are supported by xed sensor nodes (SNs) in the building that monitor the
environment. Measurements of SNs are passed on to nearby CNs, which then dis-
seminate this information via oppcomms using epidemic routing. SNs are also used
for indoor localization of CNs based on their known locations in the building. We
assume that SNs are not available in outdoor areas and CNs therefore rely on either
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measurements from embedded sensors or manual input by their users for environ-
ment monitoring. Outdoor localization is achieved via conventional satellite-based
systems (e.g. GPS).
We evaluated whether oppcomms can eectively enable evacuation support using
simulation-based experiments conducted with the distributed building evacuation
simulator (DBES). We considered a small-scale emergency scenario inside a building
and a large-scale outdoor emergency scenario, and evaluated the eect of parameters
such as node density and communication range on oppcomms and evacuation out-
come. We also compared ESS with a shortest path evacuation strategy that does not
disseminate information on the emergency and a recent proposal for a distributed
evacuation support system based on xed nodes. Our main conclusion from these
evaluations is that oppcomms can eectively enable emergency evacuation support
when the number of nodes (i.e. number of people) in the area is not very low. In
cases with low node density, oppcomms performs poorly due to few contact op-
portunities. Therefore, systems such as ESS are most suited for relatively densely
populated urban areas.
We also investigated the resilience of oppcomms for evacuation support under node
failures. Due to the inherent disruption tolerant nature of oppcomms, we observed
that ESS is highly resilient to node failures. In spite of the inherent resilience of
ESS, more deliberate forms of disruptions such as network attacks may signicantly
aect oppcomms and evacuation outcome. We investigate the resilience and security
of oppcomms against network attacks in the next chapter.
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4 Security of Opportunistic
Communications for Emergency
Support
The reliability and availability of emergency support services are important for fast
emergency response and safe evacuation of people. Opportunistic communications
oer a means of communication for providing emergency support in the absence
or failure of existing communication infrastructure. In the previous chapter, we
presented the design of an emergency support system (ESS) based on oppcomms that
provides emergency navigation to civilians for evacuation purposes. Our evaluations
showed that oppcomms can oer a signicant improvement in evacuation outcome
when other means of communication have broken down (Sec. 3.2) and that ESS is
quite resilient to disruptions due to node and link failures that would render more
traditional networks inoperable (Sec. 3.3).
However, other forms of disruptions, specically attacks on the network and mis-
behaviour of nodes, may still have a considerable adverse eect on communica-
tion [15, 26] and on evacuation. Considering the critical nature of emergency nav-
igation, evaluating the eect of network attacks and studying potential protection
mechanisms are important. We therefore investigate the resilience and security of
ESS under certain types of network attacks. We consider that some of the com-
munication nodes (CNs) have been compromised, either as a result of malware or
deliberate tampering by their users. Compromised nodes misbehave and adversely
aect system operation. We consider three types of misbehaviour as discussed in
Sec. 4.1. These attacks have been chosen since they are relatively easy to imple-
ment by an attacker, but are either dicult to defend or have a considerable eect
on evacuation and/or communication. We identify a network attack with signi-
cant eect on evacuation outcome and propose a collaborative defense mechanism
against it that combines identity-based cryptography [116] with content-based mes-
sage verication. We evaluate the eect of network attacks on communication and
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evacuation performance, and show the degree of improvement oered by the defense
mechanism.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss the attack model and
our proposed defense mechanism in Sec.s 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. We evaluate the
eect of network attacks and the defense mechanism on evacuation and communica-
tion performance in Sec. 4.3. We conclude the chapter in Sec. 4.4 with a summary
of our ndings.
4.1 Attack Model
Attacks on the emergency network can be deliberate, as in the case of terrorist
attacks where the perpetrators target emergency services in an eort to multiply
the eectiveness of their physical attack. A cheap and inconspicuous method of
supplementing their attack is disseminating malware which is activated during the
emergency. The system is particularly susceptible to malware when popular con-
sumer devices such as smartphones are used as CNs. Another interesting case is
when such attackers are present in the area to observe and coordinate their physical
attack, and maliciously participate in the emergency response process as civilians.
Other cyber attacks or selsh behaviour by the nodes may not target the emergency
process directly, but may nevertheless have an adverse impact. For example, a node
can selshly receive all messages destined for itself but may otherwise fail to par-
ticipate in their propagation. Other selsh behaviour may arise when a node does
not comply with the rules of the MAC protocol in an eort to get an unfair share of
access to the shared medium. The disconnected nature of oppnets introduce addi-
tional challenges to the application of traditional security mechanisms as discussed in
Sec. 2.3. Although authentication of nodes may be used as a rst step in network se-
curity, such mechanisms fail to prevent or detect authorized nodes acting maliciously,
i.e. insider attacks. Thus we consider that a portion of CNs have been compromised,
either as a result of malware or deliberate tampering by their users. Compromised
nodes misbehave in certain ways that aect communication and evacuation. We
investigate the eect of three types of misbehaviour in this chapter. We would like
to note that this is not an exhaustive investigation into security of oppcomms for
emergency support, and that it is certainly possible to construct a dierent set of
assumptions regarding the attack models. The misbehaviours considered in this pa-
per are used as representatives of a wider range of similar misbehaviour; they are
simple to implement but either hard to defend against at the network layer or have
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a considerable eect on evacuation outcome.
We assume that there are one or more misbehaving nodes, interchangeably called
malicious nodes or attackers, participating in the ESS. All non-malicious (normal)
nodes operate correctly. When a defense mechanism is not employed, normal nodes
trust all CNs and assume that all emergency messages (EMs) contain correct infor-
mation. We assume that each malicious node knows the identities of all malicious
nodes, but attackers do not use a collaborative attack strategy. This assumption
allows us to ignore the eects of malicious messages on the attackers since an at-
tacker would be able to identify any malicious message. We consider three types of
misbehaviour: (i) drop-all, (ii) radio frequency (RF) jamming, and (iii) false
info.
Drop-all behaviour is the simplest form of attack where malicious nodes drop all
received messages. In the RF jamming attack, we assume that malicious nodes
generate random noise on the radio channel with enough power to disrupt commu-
nications by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. Any nodes within range of an RF
jammer cannot receive messages; depending on the MAC protocol used, they may
also be unable to send messages. In our evaluation, we assume that CNs are IEEE
802.15.4 compliant and therefore use CSMA-CA1 at the MAC layer. This means
that CNs in range of RF jammers will not be able to send messages due to the
carrier sensing mechanism. False info behaviour is a more elaborate attack which
combines drop-all behaviour with injection of malicious packets into the network.
With this attack, malicious nodes drop all legitimate messages, but keep and forward
malicious packets. Additionally, they generate malicious messages with false infor-
mation, which is a combined network- and application-layer attack. The injection of
these messages aects oppcomms performance and their content misguides CNs to
provide incorrect evacuation directions. The rate of malicious message generation is
controlled by the message generation probability pmsg: a malicious node produces a
malicious message every time it changes its location with probability pmsg.
We assume that malicious nodes can spoof any message eld in an EM and that
they can modify legitimate messages they receive from other nodes. Our proposed
defense mechanism, presented in the next section, allows CNs to easily detect when
attackers spoof their IDs and modify messages of others. We assume that attackers
know when the defense mechanism is active, and in that case they do not spoof their
IDs and do not modify EMs of others to avoid quick detection. We also assume
that malicious nodes can identify received malicious packets and therefore do not
1CSMA-CA: Carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
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use these packets for guidance. Malicious nodes start to misbehave when they are
notied of an emergency. With drop-all and false info attacks, malicious nodes guide
their users normally based on received EMs. With RF jamming, malicious nodes
are assumed to be unable to receive EMs once the jamming is active, and therefore
guide their users without updates from EMs.
4.2 Defense Mechanism
Our evaluation in Sec. 4.3 shows that oppcomms are highly resilient to the drop-all
attack and that evacuation is not signicantly aected by it. Furthermore, although
misbehaving nodes in this attack can be detected by listening to whether they re-
broadcast messages of others or via a three-hop verication mechanism similar to [3]
(see Sec. 2.3), not much can be done to defend against it other than not sending
EMs to malicious nodes during contacts, which would save some bandwidth and
time during contacts. Considering these two factors, we leave further investigation
of defense against the drop-all attack as future work. Although the RF jamming
attack is easy to detect, it is dicult to defend against it without modifying the
physical and link layer technologies. The false info attack, on the other hand, has a
considerable adverse eect on evacuation but we can defend against it at the network
and application layers since it is a joint attack on these layers: through injection of
bogus messages into the network and dropping of legitimate messages, dissemination
of normal messages are aected at the network layer. Incorrect message content
causes unsuspecting CNs to misguide their users and therefore has a direct eect on
the application logic used by CNs for giving evacuation directions.
Our proposed defense mechanism uses identity-based signatures (IBS) [116] for
authentication of message senders and verication of message integrity. IBS is based
on identity-based cryptography, which is an asymmetric cryptosystem that uses a
well-known unique identier, such as the network address, of each communication
node to generate its public key. The corresponding private key is generated by the
private key generator (PKG) and known only to the node with the given ID and
the PKG. This scheme allows any CN to generate the public key of an entity based
on its ID. We assume that the system responsible for providing the area graph to
CNs acts as the PKG and assures one-to-one correspondence between a CN and its
ID. The uniqueness of IDs, together with IBS, prevents node replication attacks [18]
and Sybil attacks [33]. However, IBS cannot prevent insider attacks where nodes
are compromised after the initial set-up. Since the set-up operation is done oine
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before the emergency starts, communication with the PKG is not required during
the emergency.
In the defense mechanism, each EM is signed by its source CN with its private
key using IBS. A receiver veries the integrity of the message and the authenticity
of its sender using the public key for the message source, which is generated by the
receiver using the source ID contained in the message. Any message that fails veri-
cation is dropped and ignored. IBS enables message verication with intermittent
connectivity since CNs do not need to contact a key server or certicate authority as
in public-key infrastructures to obtain the public key of a node or for verication of
signatures. Diculties in key management and distribution are also alleviated with
IBS since the public key of a node can be generated by anyone based on its ID.
Although IBS allows CNs to detect spoofed IDs and messages that have been
modied in transit, an additional scheme is required to detect malicious messages
with incorrect content. Therefore, CNs employ collaborative content-based message
verication in addition to IBS to detect malicious messages. In this scheme, a CN
uses the measurement messages (MMs) and EMs it has received to verify the content
of each received EM. The information contained in all received messages need to be
consistent with each other and with the nature of the hazard. For example, in the
absence of reghters, hazard intensity is expected to monotonically increase at a
location in the case of a re. Messages with information found to be inconsistent are
agged as suspicious. If an EM contradicts with an MM, i.e. a direct observation
received from a sensor node (SN), then the CN can conclude that the EM, and
therefore its sender2, is malicious. In the case where an inconsistency is detected
between EMs, CNs use the fact that malicious nodes usually generate more messages
than non-malicious nodes in order to identify the malicious message, and thus the
attacker. Based on the EMs it has received and stored in its message queue, the CN
identies the source with a greater number of generated messages as the attacker.
The level of evidence required before identication in this case can be controlled by
checking that the ratio of the number of EMs generated by each source is higher than
a threshold T , which can be adjusted as necessary. A higher threshold increases the
level of evidence required before a decision can be made and therefore increases the
certainty of the decision. In our evaluation, we assume that CNs use the threshold
in the following manner: let rkij be the relative dierence of the number of messages
created by nodes i and j stored by some node k, given below as
2A message is undeniably tied to its source since IBS guarantees message authenticity and
integrity.
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Algorithm 2 Identication of a malicious node based on the number of generated
messages
procedure CheckMessage(k, i, j, T )
if nki + n
k
j  4 then
if rkij > T then
return i . i is identied as malicious
else if rkji > T then
return j . j is identied as malicious
end if
end if
return null . no identication can be made
end procedure
rkij =
2(nki nkj )
nki+n
k
j
;
where nki is the number of messages that originate from node i stored by node k.
The malicious node is then given by the simple rule in Alg. 23.
The (nki +n
k
j  4) check in Alg. 2 is used to prevent false positives due to low num-
ber of messages. In our evaluation, we assume T = 0:4, which was chosen based on
preliminary experiments. We would like to note that the detection mechanism pre-
sented here does not guarantee that all malicious messages or nodes will be correctly
identied since nodes need some time to gather the evidence required. Detection
can also produce false negatives where a normal node is mistakenly identied as
malicious. We present simulation results on these detection metrics in Sec. 4.3.
Note that although malicious nodes may try to prevent detection by decreasing
the number of malicious messages they generate, e.g. by decreasing pmsg, our eval-
uations (see Sec. 6.3.3) have shown that using a low pmsg (e.g. pmsg = 0:1) is not a
good strategy since while detection ratio decreases a little with decreasing pmsg, the
eect of the attack on evacuation performance decreases much more signicantly.
Therefore, normal nodes are still better o when attackers generate less messages
even though the defense mechanism may be able to identify fewer of the malicious
messages.
CNs use blacklists in order to inform each other of detected attackers. Each CN
maintains a local blacklist containing the IDs of nodes known to be malicious by the
CN. When a new malicious node is identied via the detection mechanism discussed
above, it is added to the local blacklist and a new blacklist message (BM) is
3This rule is only applied when CN k has identied that there is an inconsistency between two
EMs generated by nodes i and j.
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generated to inform other CNs. Each BM contains the proof of identication in the
form of the original messages used for the detection and the number of messages
generated by each source. Inclusion of this proof in BMs allows receivers to decide for
themselves whether the detection is valid and enables the detection of false BMs that
may be generated by attackers. BMs are signed by their sources and disseminated
among CNs via oppcomms with higher priority than EMs to allow for their quick
dissemination. In order to reduce the number of message exchanges during a contact,
a BM is exchanged as part of a packet bundle that contains EMs. If the source of
the BM does not have any EMs to send at the time, then the BM is sent on its
own. The blacklist contained in a BM is used by the receiving CNs to update their
local blacklists. When a CN adds a new node to its blacklist, any previous messages
originating from the attacker are removed from the message queue and updates
resulting from these messages are revoked. During oppcomms, messages originating
from nodes identied as malicious are dropped and ignored by CNs.
Our proposed defense mechanism expectedly adds some overhead: communication
and storage overheads result from blacklists, BMs, and message signatures, whereas
the signing and verication of each message and the extra steps required for content-
based verication of EMs increase the computational load of CNs. Our results in the
next section provide an insight into the communication and storage overheads due to
the defense mechanism. We believe that the overheads associated with the defense
mechanism are justied by the improvement in evacuation outcome as discussed in
the next section. Current consumer devices, e.g. smartphones, would certainly be
able to handle the additional computational load, but specialized low-cost devices
may struggle with the extra load. Although using simpler cryptographic methods
such as symmetric cryptography is possible to decrease the computational load,
they introduce other challenges which may be more dicult to address, such as
key distribution, maintenance and storage. For example, if a single symmetric key
shared among all nodes is used, then our proposed defense mechanism would not be
able to provide authentication or integrity since malicious nodes would have access
to the same key used by everyone. If dierent symmetric keys are used for each
node, then a node needs to store the keys for all other nodes since it can potentially
receive a message from anyone and it cannot contact a key server to request an
unknown key under intermittent connectivity4. These problems are not conned to
4Note that although oppcomms may provide access to a key server under intermittent con-
nectivity, the best-eort nature of oppcomms and the long delays would render such an option
undesirable. Furthermore, the key server itself may come under a denial-of-service attack or other-
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symmetric cryptosystems either as some asymmetric cryptosystems such as those
based on public-key infrastructures also exhibit similar problems with intermittent
connectivity. The challenges of using conventional security methods in DTNs and
oppnets are discussed in more detail in Sec. 2.3.
4.3 Evaluation of Network Attacks and Defense
We evaluate the eect of the network attacks described in Sec. 4.1 on communication
and evacuation performance of oppcomms, and the improvement oered by the
defense mechanism described in Sec. 4.2, using simulation experiments conducted
with DBES. The simulation setup is very similar to the conguration used in the
experiments with the building scenario, which was described in Sec. 3.2.2. The
minor changes to the setup and main parameters of interest are presented below;
note that some of the points already described in Sec. 3.2.2 are repeated here for
completeness sake.
We simulate a re that starts at the intersection of two corridors on the second
oor and probabilistically spreads in the building. We assume that all conventional
means of communication have broken down in the building and that the central
alarm has failed; these failures can, for example, be due to a central power failure.
The ESS noties building occupants of the emergency and navigates them to the
exits. For each simulation run, people initially start at random locations in the
building following a uniform distribution on vertices. Civilians follow a probabilistic
mobility model intended to simulate the movement of people during working hours
when they are not evacuating. When a civilian is notied of the emergency, she
follows directions provided by her CN to evacuate. Civilians move at 1.39 m/sec
(5 km/hr) within oors and 0.7 m/sec (2.52 km/hr) at staircases. Simulations take
physical congestion into account during civilian movement. Each vertex is assigned
a capacity of two in these simulations (ci = 2;8i 2 V ); please refer to Sec. 3.2.2
for information on vertex capacities and how congestion is simulated. We do not
simulate psychological aspects; for example, we assume that people act rationally
and correctly follow directions provided by the ESS. We also assume that a person
starts to evacuate immediately when notied of the emergency. Each person acts
individually and group behaviour or aspects like helping others are not considered.
We assume that CNs cannot communicate when they are located on dierent
oors; this may be due to physical factors that aect wireless signal strength, such
wise be unavailable, e.g. due to power or network failure.
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as thickness of the inter-oor walls. All communication entities (CNs and SNs) are
simulated as IEEE 802.15.4-2006 compliant devices. Maximum CN and SN data
transfer rate is set to 100 kbits/sec and 20 kbits/sec, respectively. We do not ex-
plicitly simulate the PHY layer in our simulations, but we do take into account
contention for the wireless medium as accessed through CSMA-CA. CN communi-
cation range is assumed to be between 4m and 10m; SN communication range is
5m. These ranges have been chosen based on expected indoor communication range
of 802.15.4 devices that transmit at 0 dB or less. In addition to the area graph
and edge costs, each CN can store 100 messages (EMs and BMs) for oppcomms.
Messages used by ESS are very short: localization messages (LMs) and MMs are
16 bytes on average, and average EM and BM sizes are 40 bytes and 100 bytes
respectively without signatures. We assume that 128-bit signatures are used, which
adds 16 bytes to each signed message.
Some of the CNs in the building are assumed to have been compromised before
the emergency starts. Compromised nodes are chosen at random among all CNs in
the building, and when a compromised node learns of the emergency, either via an
MM or EM, it starts to misbehave. For the false info attack, we assume pmsg = 0:8;
results for dierent pmsg values are presented in the appendix (Sec. 6.3.3). Each data
point is presented with its 95% condence interval and is a mean of 50 simulation
runs. Each simulation run has dierent initial locations for people, mobility patterns,
hazard spread pattern, and CNs randomly chosen as malicious nodes.
As in Sec. 3.2, we initially look at evacuation performance; we then present results
on the eect of network attacks on communication performance and have a closer
look at the performance of the defense mechanism. In each section, we consider how
the number of malicious nodes, population density and communication range aect
the metrics of interest.
4.3.1 Evacuation performance
We use the metrics of evacuation ratio and average evacuee health to evaluate evacu-
ation performance; results on average and worst-case evacuation times are provided
in the appendix (Sec. 6.3.2). We slightly change the denition of the evacuation
metrics as follows to include non-malicious users only. Evacuation ratio is the ratio
of the number of successfully evacuated non-malicious (normal) users to the number
of all non-malicious users. Average evacuee health is a complementary evacuation
metric, and it is the mean health of all successfully evacuated normal users (out of
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100).
Number of malicious nodes Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the eect of number
of malicious nodes (Nm) on evacuation outcome; in these experiments, we set CN
communication range to 6m and the number of people in the building5 (N) to 120,
initially distributed evenly across all oors, i.e. 40 civilians per oor (pf). The same
experimental setup is used when we look at the eect of Nm on communication and
defense performance, i.e. for Figs. 4.7{4.11 and Figs. 4.22{4.25. Note that results
for the N = 60 scenario are presented in the appendix (Sec. 6.3.1).
Looking at evacuation ratio given in Fig. 4.1, we observe that the drop-all be-
haviour (DA) has insignicant eect, even when the number of attackers is high
(e.g. Nm = 20). This shows that oppcomms and ESS are highly resilient to DA
attack in terms of evacuation performance, conrming our previous results on the
resilience of oppcomms to node failures presented in Sec. 3.3. We also observe that
the RF jamming (RF) behaviour has negligible eect until Nm = 8, after which its
eect becomes more noticeable. These results show that oppcomms and ESS are
resilient to RF attack in terms of evacuation performance, even though RF attack
has the most signicant eect on communication performance as we discuss in the
next section.
False info behaviour represents the most signicant attack on evacuation due to
its direct eect on evacuation directions given by CNs. Even with a small number
of attackers (e.g. Nm = 1), evacuation ratio is greatly aected and it signicantly
deteriorates as the number of attackers increases, with a notable drop at Nm = 4.
The defense mechanism considerably improves evacuation ratio, especially when the
number of attackers is low (e.g. until Nm = 4 in this scenario), although no-attack
evacuation performance cannot be attained even with defense. This is because only
some of the malicious nodes and messages can be correctly identied by the defense
mechanism as discussed in more detail in Sec. 4.3.3. Evacuation ratio decreases
as the number of malicious nodes increases in all attack models, with false info
behaviour with and without defense (FI+ and FI , respectively) showing the most
signicant decrease due to the potency of the attack on evacuation.
We see that average evacuee health, presented in Fig. 4.2, shows similar behaviour
with evacuation ratio, indicating that the eect of network attacks on evacuation
ratio and evacuee health are more or less similar. Two relatively minor dierences
5The number of malicious and non-malicious nodes, Nm and Nn respectively, add up to the
total number of people in the building, i.e. Nm +Nn = N .
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Figure 4.1: Evacuation ratio versus number of malicious nodes, 40pf
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Figure 4.2: Average evacuee health versus number of malicious nodes, 40pf
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can be seen with a closer look: rst, the dierence between evacuee health in the no-
attack and FI  scenarios is smaller compared to the dierence in evacuation ratio,
which can be explained by the fact that the false info attack causes most of the
people in the building to perish rather than evacuate with major injuries. Second,
the improvement in health due to defense is smaller compared to the improvement
in evacuation ratio, indicating that the defense mechanism increases the number
of people that successfully evacuate the building, but many of the evacuees are
nevertheless exposed to the hazard due to misdirection caused by malicious messages.
Population density Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show how network attacks aect evac-
uation performance as population density changes; in these experiments, we vary
the number of people in the building from 30 to 120 (i.e. from 10pf to 40pf) and
CN range is assumed to be 6m. The number of malicious nodes is set to 10% of
the total number of people, i.e. Nm = 0:1N . The same experimental setup is used
when we look at the eect of population density on communication and defense
performance, i.e. for Figs. 4.12{4.16 and Figs. 4.26{4.29. Our results show that
evacuation ratio (Fig. 4.3) and average evacuee health (Fig. 4.4) are aected dif-
ferently with increasing population density according to attack type; both metrics
increase as population density increases with misbehaviours that aect only rout-
ing performance (DA and RF), whereas they decrease with FI misbehaviour (with
and without defense). The improvement in the no-attack, DA and RF attack sce-
narios is due to better connectivity: we see that although the ratio of attackers in
the population stays the same at 10%, dissemination of emergency messages among
non-malicious users is nevertheless improved when there are more nodes and there-
fore more contact opportunities (see Sec. 4.3.2). However, improved connectivity
works against the evacuation system with FI attack, causing wider dissemination
of malicious messages and decreased detection performance due to a higher number
of attackers (see Sec. 4.3.3). Although evacuation performance is greatly improved
by the defense mechanism, the same pattern is observed with increasing density.
Similar to the behaviour observed in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, evacuation ratio is aected
more by population density than evacuee health.
Communication range The eect of communication range on evacuation per-
formance is given in Figs. 4.5 and 4.6; in these experiments, we vary the CN commu-
nication range from 4m to 10m and set the number of people and malicious nodes
in the building to 60 and 6, respectively. The same experimental setup is used
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Figure 4.3: Evacuation ratio versus population density under network attacks
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Figure 4.4: Average evacuee health versus population density under network attacks
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Figure 4.5: Evacuation ratio versus communication range under network attacks
when we look at the eect of range on communication and defense performance,
i.e. for Figs. 4.17{4.21 and Figs. 4.30{4.33. As observed above, a distinction based
on attack type is seen as range changes. When communication range is increased,
connectivity and dissemination of emergency messages is improved (see Sec. 4.3.2);
this naturally improves evacuation performance6 with no-attack, DA and RF mis-
behaviour scenarios where no malicious messages are generated. However, with FI 
and FI+ scenarios, the better dissemination of normal messages is oset by the wider
dissemination of malicious messages and a decrease in detection performance (see
Sec. 4.3.3), which causes evacuation ratio to remain the same even though range,
and therefore connectivity, increases7. This result indicates that although dynamic
range control in CNs can improve evacuation performance at the cost of energy un-
der normal conditions, increasing range may not be an eective strategy when the
system is subject to malicious behaviour, depending on the type of misbehaviour.
6In these cases, evacuation ratio is signicantly improved, while evacuee health is slightly im-
proved when range is increased.
7Although average evacuee health seems to slightly decrease with range, we cannot decisively
infer a signicant pattern due to the condence intervals.
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Figure 4.6: Average evacuee health versus communication range under network
attacks
4.3.2 Communication performance
While the primary evaluation criteria of ESS is evacuation performance, understand-
ing the eect of network attacks on communication performance is important in order
to discover the relationships between oppcomms and evacuation. In this section, we
look at how network attacks aect dissemination of non-malicious messages (EMs
and BMs) using the metrics of number of created and received messages, average
message delivery ratio, average hop count and average CN queue length. The deni-
tion of these metrics are slightly changed to focus on non-malicious communications.
The number of received messages includes duplicate packets which may be received
due to buer overows8. Message delivery ratio is calculated9 as Rn=(CnNn), where
Rn is the total number of non-malicious messages received by normal nodes, Cn
is the total number of non-malicious messages created by normal nodes and Nn is
the number of normal CNs. Note that calculating the delivery ratio in this way
8With epidemic routing, bit-vectors that summarize the messages already held by nodes are
used in order to prevent exchanging duplicate messages and reduce communication overhead. If the
message buer of a CN overows, then it will forget some of the messages it has received and may
therefore receive these messages again.
9Delivery ratio is calculated in this manner since each EM and BM is destined for all CNs.
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Figure 4.7: Number of created and received normal messages versus number of ma-
licious nodes, 40pf
tends to understate the actual delivery ratio since as people evacuate the area, the
number of potential destination nodes decreases. Average message delay (latency)
and average hop count is the mean of one-way (from source to destination) delivery
delays and the mean of number of hops taken by non-malicious messages received
by normal nodes, respectively. Average CN queue length is the mean of maximum
queue lengths (in packets) of all normal CNs. The maximum queue length of a
CN is the maximum number of packets that it held for oppcomms purposes and is
indicative of the storage requirements of oppcomms and communication overhead.
Note that contrary to the previous metrics, this metric includes malicious messages
held by nodes since this reects a more appropriate assessment of the storage used
in CNs due to oppcomms.
Number of malicious nodes Figures 4.7{4.11 show the eect of number of ma-
licious nodes on communication performance. The most obvious result from the
number of created and received non-malicious messages, given in Fig. 4.7, is the
overhead due to the defense mechanism. We see that the false info attack causes the
number of created non-malicious messages to increase since more people are erro-
neously directed to hazardous areas due to the attack, which results in the reception
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Figure 4.9: Average message delay versus number of malicious nodes, 40pf
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Figure 4.11: Average maximum queue usage versus number of malicious nodes, 40pf
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of more MMs by CNs that are then converted to new EMs. It is interesting to note
that Cn reaches its peak at Nm = 4 in the FI
  scenario, and after this point, the
number of attackers does not signicantly aect Cn. When the defense mechanism
is active, Cn is higher than both the no-attack and FI
  scenarios, and signicantly
increases with Nm as more nodes encounter malicious messages (see Sec. 4.3.3); the
higher Cn in the FI
+ scenario is due to the blacklist messages employed in the defense
mechanism. With the RF attack, Cn is slightly higher than the no-attack case and it
gradually increases with Nm as disruptions to oppcomms increase. The increase in
Cn in this scenario is due to the disruption to the dissemination of EMs among CNs
as can be seen from decreased message delivery ratio in Fig. 4.8, and this increases
the tendency of CNs to receive information from SNs (via MMs) rather than from
other CNs (via EMs), resulting in the generation of more EMs. We observe that DA
misbehaviour does not have a signicant eect on Cn.
Looking at the number of received non-malicious messages in Fig. 4.7, we observe
that Rn is lower than the no-attack case with DA and RF attacks, and the eect
of the RF attack on Rn is higher as can be expected. In both misbehaviours, Rn
decreases with Nm as disruptions to oppcomms increase with Nm (see Fig. 4.8).
Contrary to the DA and RF attacks, Rn is higher in the FI
  and FI+ scenarios than
the no-attack scenario, which is primarily due to more messages being generated as
reected in Cn. In the FI
  scenario, Nm does not have a signicant eect on either
Cn or Rn, but both Cn and Rn increase with Nm in FI
+ due to more BMs generated
by the defense mechanism. However, the increase in Rn is not sucient to meet
the increase in Cn in these scenarios since we observe a decrease in message delivery
ratio, given in Fig. 4.8. Among the misbehaviours considered, RF jamming has the
most signicant eect on communication performance. Delivery ratio is signicantly
aected by the RF attack, while DA attack does not show any signicant eect (de-
livery ratio is hardly decreased compared to the no-attack case). The dierence
between these two attacks can be explained by considering the average message hop
count (Fig. 4.10). We see that dropping messages slightly decreases delivery ratio
and hop count, but oppcomms are quite resilient to this type of attack. However,
when attackers use RF jamming, they not only do not participate in oppcomms,
but also prevent others in range from participating. This causes the number of dis-
connected sub-networks to increase, essentially forming \information islands" where
the information available to a set of nodes in one island never reaches nodes in other
islands due to the malicious nodes, and this eect increases as Nm increases. This
result is supported by the signicant decreases in delivery ratio and hop count with
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Nm in RF jamming; the considerable decrease in hop count indicates the formation
of disconnected groups in the oppnet, which results in decreased delivery ratio.
Delivery ratio decreases with increasing number of malicious nodes until Nm = 8
in FI  and FI+ scenarios, after which it is not signicantly aected by Nm. We
observe that delivery ratio is higher with defense than without, and we suspect this
to be mainly due to BMs rather than better dissemination of EMs since the defense
mechanism cannot prevent malicious nodes from dropping packets. All attacks cause
message delay (Fig. 4.9) to slightly increase with Nm and RF attack again has the
most signicant eect. Average message hop count, given in Fig. 4.10, shows that all
attacks other than RF jamming have similar eect on the \topology" of the oppnet,
and that although hop count is somewhat decreased compared to the no-attack
scenario with these attacks, it pales in comparison to the eect of RF jamming.
Average CN queue length is given in Fig. 4.11; note that contrary to the previous
metrics, this metric includes malicious messages held by nodes since this reects
a more appropriate assessment of the storage used in CNs due to oppcomms. In
misbehaviours where no malicious messages are generated, queue length is lower than
the no-attack case and decreases with Nm, subtly with DA and noticeably with RF,
as the delivery of messages is aected more and more. A fairly dierent portrait
is painted by the FI attack due to the generation of malicious messages, which
cause queue lengths to be higher than the no-attack case and cause them to greatly
increase with Nm as the number of created and received malicious messages increase
(see Sec. 4.3.3). More space is used on average when the defense mechanism is active
due to BM overhead although queue use due to malicious messages is decreased.
These results show that RF jamming has the most signicant eect on commu-
nication performance, especially delivery ratio and hop count. However, although
communication is greatly hindered due to the RF attack, evacuation is less signi-
cantly aected as we discussed in the previous section. Our results indicate that a
well-devised attack that targets the operational logic of the evacuation system, in
conjunction with disruptions to oppcomms, can greatly outperform a routing-only
attack on the basis of eect on evacuation outcome. Although our proposed defense
mechanism increases communication and memory overhead, we believe the overhead
is acceptable considering the improvement in evacuation.
Population density We consider the eect of population density on communica-
tion performance in Figs. 4.12{4.16. We observe that increasing the number of nodes
while keeping the ratio of malicious nodes to all nodes at 10% increases Cn and Rn
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Figure 4.12: Number of created and received normal messages versus population
density under network attacks
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Figure 4.13: Average message delivery ratio versus population density under network
attacks
156
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 10  20  30  40
O
n
e
-w
a
y
 d
e
liv
e
ry
 d
e
la
y
 (
s
e
c
)
Civilians per floor
Average normal message delivery delay
normal
drop-all
RF jam
false info
false info + defense
Figure 4.14: Average message delay versus population density under network attacks
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Figure 4.15: Average hop count versus population density under network attacks
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Figure 4.16: Average maximum queue usage versus population density under net-
work attacks
in all scenarios (Fig. 4.12), but the increases are more signicant for FI+ because of
the overhead of the defense mechanism due to BMs. The change with population
density in Figs. 4.13, 4.15 and 4.16 are very similar, showing that increasing density
improves delivery ratio and hop count considerably in the no-attack and DA attack
scenarios and less signicantly in RF, FI  and FI+ scenarios, which cause an in-
crease in queue usage as nodes receive and carry more messages (EMs and BMs). We
consider the increase in hop count as an improvement since delay either decreases or
stays the same with density (Fig. 4.14), and therefore a higher hop count indicates
that the size of connected sub-networks in the oppnet are increasing. Looking at
delay in Fig. 4.14, we see that increasing density tends to decrease delay and this
eect is most apparent for the FI  scenario.
The improvement in communication performance is due to better connectivity
and more contact opportunities as the number of nodes in the area increases. How-
ever, as we discussed in the previous section, better connectivity does not always
work in favor of evacuation. When nodes do not or cannot discriminate between
malicious and non-malicious messages, as in the FI  scenario, better connectivity
improves the dissemination of all messages, which may lead to a decrease in evacu-
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Figure 4.17: Number of created and received normal messages versus communication
range under network attacks
ation performance as the inuence of malicious nodes widens. We observe the same
phenomenon when we look at the eect of communication range in the next section.
Communication range Figures 4.17{4.21 show the eect of CN range on com-
munication performance under network attacks. We see that while Cn decreases with
range, Rn stays the same or slightly increases with range under all attack scenarios;
Cn and Rn increase more signicantly in FI
+ due to the defense mechanism. While
hop count is not signicantly aected by range (Fig. 4.20), delivery ratio (Fig. 4.18)
and delay (Fig. 4.19) are notably improved. Improvement in delivery ratio is quite
signicant in the no-attack and DA scenarios, while the improvement in delay is
most noticeable for the FI  scenario. Queue length increases slightly with range in
the no-attack, DA and RF scenarios, but the increase is more signicant in the FI 
and FI+ scenarios due to the overhead of malicious messages and BMs, respectively.
Better communication performance with range improves evacuation performance for
all routing-only attacks, while evacuation is unable to benet from improved range
and delivery ratio when malicious messages are present (see Sec. 4.3.1).
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Figure 4.18: Average message delivery ratio versus communication range under net-
work attacks
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
 4  6  8  10
O
n
e
-w
a
y
 d
e
liv
e
ry
 d
e
la
y
 (
s
e
c
)
Comm. range (m)
Average normal message delivery delay
normal
drop-all
RF jam
false info
false info + defense
Figure 4.19: Average message delay versus communication range under network
attacks
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Figure 4.20: Average hop count versus communication range under network attacks
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Figure 4.21: Average maximum queue usage versus communication range under net-
work attacks
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4.3.3 Defense performance
The improvement our defense mechanism oers in evacuation outcome was discussed
in Sec. 4.3.1. In this section, we take a closer look at the performance of the defense
mechanism in the identication of malicious nodes and messages with FI misbe-
haviour, using the following metrics: the number of created (Cm) and received (Rm)
malicious messages, ratio of created and received malicious messages to all messages
(i.e. qCm = Cm=(Cm + Cn) and qRm = Rm=(Rm + Rn)), detection ratio and false
positive rate. Detection ratio is the ratio of the number of malicious messages cor-
rectly identied to the number of malicious messages received (i.e. dm = Im=Rm),
labeled \detected pkts" in the gures. We also consider how many of the correctly
identied malicious messages were detected before they were able to infect the evac-
uation logic of CNs (i.e. dr = Ir=Im), labeled \dropped on receive" in the gures.
False positive rate () is the ratio of the number of messages (nodes) which were
incorrectly identied as malicious to the number of all messages (nodes) identied
as malicious, labeled \pkt detection" (\node detection") in the gures. We use a
positive (negative) superscript when we specically refer to a metric with the defense
mechanism activated (deactivated), respectively.
Number of malicious nodes Figures 4.22{4.25 present detection performance
versus number of malicious nodes. Our defense mechanism does not (cannot) pre-
vent malicious nodes from generating malicious messages and therefore the defense
mechanism has no eect on Cm as observed in Fig. 4.22. Cm naturally increases as
the number of malicious nodes increases, and both q Cm and q
+
Cm
increase with Nm,
indicating that malicious message generation increases faster than non-malicious
message generation as the number of attackers increases in a population of xed
size. However, q+Cm is lower than q
 
Cm
and their dierence increases with Nm as the
number of non-malicious messages generated signicantly increases when the defense
mechanism is active, mostly due to the use of BMs (see Fig. 4.7).
Although defending against malicious nodes does not aect the number of gener-
ated malicious messages, it signicantly decreases their dissemination among CNs,
as shown in Fig. 4.23. R m and R+m both increase with Nm but the number of mali-
cious messages received by CNs is signicantly lower with defense, and the dierence
between R m and R+m increases with Nm. The same observation holds for q
 
Rm
and
q+Rm since CNs receive less malicious messages and more non-malicious messages
(mostly BMs) with defense (see Fig. 4.7). Figure 4.24 shows that malicious message
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Figure 4.22: Number of created malicious messages versus number of malicious
nodes, 40pf
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Figure 4.23: Number of received malicious messages versus number of malicious
nodes, 40pf
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Figure 4.24: Malicious message detection rate versus number of malicious nodes,
40pf
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Figure 4.25: False positive rate versus number of malicious nodes, 40pf
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Figure 4.26: Number of created malicious messages versus population density
detection ratio (dm) is high (around 65% to 70%), but there is certainly room for
improvement. Nm does not seem to have a signicant eect on dm. The good news
is that most of the detected messages (between 82% and 89%) are correctly iden-
tied as malicious before they are used to update the CNs (dr) and therefore have
no direct eect on evacuation. dr shows a noticeable drop from Nm = 2 to Nm = 4,
but is otherwise unaected by Nm. Our false positive rate (Fig. 4.25) is quite low,
below 1% in most cases, and below 3% in all cases, although data variance is high
for some data points. No signicant eect of Nm on  is observed.
Population density The eect of population density on detection performance is
given in Figs. 4.26{4.29; the ratio of malicious nodes to all nodes is kept constant at
0.1. Cm increases with density since Nm = 0:1N increases as N increases, causing
more malicious messages to be generated. q+Cm is less than q
 
Cm
and their dierence
increases with density since the defense mechanism causes more BMs to be created as
the number of attackers and normal nodes increase. This also results in a decreasing
trend for q+Cm with density as C
+
n increases faster than C
+
m. We observe that q
 
Cm
is
not consistently aected by density, signifying that the rates of increase for C m and
C n are similar as density increases. The defense mechanism considerably decreases
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Figure 4.27: Number of received malicious messages versus population density
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Figure 4.28: Malicious message detection rate versus population density
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Figure 4.29: False positive rate versus population density
Rm and qRm , and the dierence between R
 
m and R
+
m signicantly increases with
density. It is interesting to note that both q Rm and q
+
Rm
gradually decrease with
density, indicating that Rn increases slightly faster than Rm (with and without
defense).
We see that detection ratio decreases from 73% to 63% as population density
increases from 10pf to 40pf, with a notable drop between 20pf and 30pf as shown
in Fig. 4.28. This result suggests that although dissemination of normal messages
improves with density, so do the dissemination of malicious messages, and the de-
fense mechanism \lags" behind the malicious behaviour due to the requirement of
collection of evidence for successful detection of malicious messages. This view is
supported by the results provided in Fig. 4.32, which shows that dm decreases (from
75% to 64%) with communication range although connectivity improves with range.
Figure 4.28 also shows that dr gradually increases with density from 79% to 83%,
indicating that as population density and therefore the number of normal nodes in-
crease in the area, BMs allow more CNs to learn of malicious nodes before they have
been directly exposed to malicious messages. This improvement seems to be a result
of the higher number of nodes rather than a general result of better connectivity as
a similar improvement is not observed with increasing range as shown in Fig. 4.32.
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Figure 4.30: Number of created malicious messages versus communication range
Figure 4.29 reveals that node density does not have a signicant eect on , which
is less than 4% in all cases.
Communication range Figures 4.30{4.33 show how defense metrics change with
communication range in a population of xed size with Nm = 6; N = 60. Range
has no eect on Cm since Cm depends on Nm and evacuation time. However,
q Cm increases with range while q
+
Cm
shows no signicant change; these results are
consistent with our observations on Cn in Fig. 4.17. Figure 4.31 shows that R
 
m and
R+m both increase with range but the increase in R
 
m is much faster than R
+
m, and
R+m is always signicantly lower than R
 
m. Although both R
 
m and R
+
m increase with
range, q Rm and q
+
Rm
show no signicant change, indicating that increasing range
improves the dissemination of all messages, malicious or non-malicious, more or less
equally. We see that q+Rm is much lower than q
 
Rm
as the defense mechanism decreases
the number of malicious messages CNs receive, while also increasing the number of
normal messages received. Figure 4.33 does not show a consistent eect of range on
, and false positive rate is less than 3% at all ranges except 8m.
Our results on the performance of the defense mechanism indicate that although
it is able to signicantly decrease the number of malicious messages received by
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Figure 4.31: Number of received malicious messages versus communication range
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Figure 4.32: Malicious message detection rate versus communication range
169
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
4 6 8 10
F
a
ls
e
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 r
a
te
 (
%
)
Comm. range (m)
False positive rates vs. CN range
Node detection
Pkt detection
Figure 4.33: False positive rate versus communication range
CNs, a small number of undetected malicious messages can cause great harm during
evacuation as discussed in Sec. 4.3.1. Although our defense mechanism is able to
identify a high portion of the malicious messages (around 65% to 75%) and BMs
enable many CNs to learn of malicious nodes before they have been directly aected
(as reected in the high dr values), it cannot detect all of the malicious messages
in time and cannot prevent some CNs to be misguided by the attackers due to the
diculties presented by intermittent connectivity and relatively short timeframe of
the evacuation process. The short duration of the evacuation excludes the use of
advanced trust-building mechanisms, which require some time and enough contacts
to build up a sucient repository of trusted nodes. The application of such mech-
anisms prior to the emergency may not work since malicious nodes may start to
misbehave only in case of emergency.
Another notable observation is that better connectivity, for example due to longer
range, improves the dissemination of all messages including malicious ones, which
causes a degradation in detection and evacuation performance. This suggests that
dynamic range adjustment based on observed conditions can improve performance
under both attack and normal scenarios. A long range is not required when node
density is high (Sec. 3.2.4), and therefore CNs can dynamically reduce their trans-
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mission power to preserve energy and to improve communications by reducing col-
lisions and interference. The same approach can be applied when the network is
under attack; when CNs determine that an attack with deliberate use of malicious
messages is under way, they can reduce their range to restrict the dissemination of
malicious messages and improve evacuation. How to correctly adjust range in such
cases requires further research.
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the resilience and security of opportunistic com-
munications for emergency navigation under network attacks. We looked at insider
attacks where nodes participating in ESS have been compromised and start to mis-
behave when ESS is activated in an emergency. We considered three types of node
misbehaviour: (i) a drop-all attack where malicious nodes drop all received messages,
(ii) an RF jamming attack where malicious nodes prevent communications within
a radius by generating noise, and (iii) a combined attack on the routing and appli-
cation layers called false info attack where malicious nodes drop all non-malicious
messages they receive and in addition generate malicious messages with incorrect
information in an attempt to aect both routing performance of normal messages
and directly aect correct navigation of users. Our evaluations showed that opp-
comms are very resilient to drop-all type of attacks and that neither evacuation nor
communication performance is signicantly aected. Among the misbehaviours con-
sidered, RF jamming attack had the greatest eect on communication performance
by creating many \information islands" in the oppnet. However, false info attack
showed the most considerable eect on evacuation due to its direct attack on navi-
gation. Our results support the ndings in [26] that when attackers have knowledge
of the internal workings of the system (e.g. either the details of the routing protocol
or how oppcomms are used to enable higher-level services such as navigation), they
can devise more devastating attacks.
Considering the notable eect of the false info attack, we proposed a defense mech-
anism that combines identity-based signatures with collective malicious node detec-
tion. IBS assures the authenticity of message sources so attackers cannot spoof their
IDs and also prevents attackers from modifying EMs in transit without detection.
Building upon these security primitives, CNs use a content checking mechanism by
comparing each received message with previously received messages and their direct
observations, i.e. messages directly received from SNs. Any inconsistencies cause the
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messages involved (and therefore their sources) to be agged as suspicious. Nodes
use either their direct observations or failing that, the fact that malicious nodes
generate more messages than normal nodes, to make a decision on which of the
oending messages, and therefore its source, is malicious. When a new malicious
node is detected, the detecting node informs others using collective blacklists via op-
pcomms. CNs do not accept any new messages from identied malicious nodes and
any previous information received from them are removed from their data stores.
Our results show that the defense mechanism is able to detect a considerable number
of malicious messages under intermittent connectivity and that although no-attack
performance cannot be attained, it signicantly improves evacuation outcome at the
expense of some communication and storage overhead.
In our evaluation, we focused on attack types that we believe are more likely
to occur due to their ease of implementation and their eect, and thus have not
considered more elaborate attacks that can be launched as a result of collaboration
among attackers or attacks on node localization through message replication attacks.
We leave consideration of such attacks as future work.
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5 Conclusion
In emergencies and disasters, civilians in aected areas need to be quickly informed
of the situation and evacuated safely out of the area. Evacuation needs to commence
as quickly as possible when there is a dynamic hazard involved since conditions may
deteriorate with time and more escape paths may be blocked, preventing civilians
from exiting the area without harm. Emergency support systems, enabled by ubiq-
uitous computing and mobile telephony, can be greatly benecial by informing the
public and providing up-to-date guidance on evacuation and other aspects of emer-
gency response. Unfortunately, the communication infrastructure that such systems
are dependent upon is generally adversely aected by the emergency. For example,
in small-scale emergencies, wired networks are of no use to civilians who are mobile
while wireless infrastructure networks, e.g. WLANs, may be unavailable due to a
power failure or network congestion. In large-scale disasters, parts of the communi-
cation infrastructure may be destroyed, or they may otherwise fail due to dependen-
cies on other aected infrastructure (e.g. power). The remaining infrastructure may
be disconnected or unavailable due to prioritization of non-civilian trac or due to
network overload.
Thus we considered the problem of providing emergency support when existing
communication infrastructure is unavailable, focusing on the evacuation compo-
nent of emergency response. We proposed the use of opportunistic communications
among pocket devices carried by people to provide emergency alert and naviga-
tion services for evacuation. With oppcomms, devices exchange messages at a close
range of a few meters (indoors) to tens of meters (outdoors) with limited or no in-
frastructure, and messages are carried over multiple hops in a \store-carry-forward"
manner by exploiting human mobility. Intermittent connectivity, frequent topology
changes due to short communication range and mobility, and non-existence of instan-
taneous end-to-end paths provide interesting challenges for routing in opportunistic
networks and for building higher level services, such as navigation, upon oppnets.
We evaluated whether oppcomms can eectively enable evacuation support and the
improvement oered by oppcomms using simulation experiments. Our results show
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that through oppcomms, we can provide resilient emergency evacuation support
in both small and large scale emergencies, but the improvement is dependent on
population density. We provide a more comprehensive summary of our results and
contributions in the next sections.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
5.1.1 ESS design and implementation
We designed an emergency support system (ESS) based on oppcomms to provide
navigation directions to civilians for evacuation purposes. In ESS, the area of interest
is represented as a (undirected) graph. Each civilian is equipped with a communi-
cation node (CN) which has a local copy of the graph that is updated based on
observations and information on the hazard contained in emergency messages dis-
seminated via oppcomms. Using the graph as a base, CNs execute a shortest path
algorithm to nd the most appropriate (i.e. safest and shortest) evacuation paths for
their users and provide step-by-step navigation directions. Since oppcomms do not
guarantee delivery of messages, each CN may not have the same view and evacuation
paths are based on partial knowledge.
Our design considers practical issues such as energy conservation during non-
emergency operation and activation of nodes when an emergency is detected, and
is based on currently available communication technology. We provided a brief
overview of relevant wireless communication technologies for oppcomms as used in
ESS, and recommended that technologies based on IEEE 802.15.4, such as ZigBee,
are the most suitable. Based on this comparison, we assume that IEEE 802.15.4-
compliant devices are used in our simulations. ESS can be deployed in indoor and
outdoor urban areas; in indoor areas such as buildings, CNs are supported by xed
sensor nodes (SNs) that monitor the environment for hazards and allow approximate
indoor localization of CNs. In outdoor areas, xed sensors are not used; information
on the hazard is provided either by the users (semi-autonomous operation) or by
sensors embedded in the communication nodes (autonomous operation). Outdoor
localization is achieved via satellite-based localization systems (e.g. GPS).
We designed and developed an implementation of ESS in the distributed build-
ing evacuation simulator (DBES) that provides a distributed multi-agent simula-
tion platform for evaluating emergency systems and scenarios. Our implementation
does not simulate the PHY layer, but MAC layer primitives such as medium ac-
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cess via CSMA-CA are simulated. The implementation treats each communication
component (CN and SN) in the ESS as an independent agent; SNs are xed in
the environment whereas CNs are coupled with agents representing civilians, each
having their own mobility and health model. We designed and implemented the
necessary agent behaviours and inter-agent communication protocols to co-simulate
oppcomms and evacuation with ESS. We strived to base our simulation models on
realistic assumptions and to simulate all relevant aspects of evacuation. For exam-
ple, our simulations take into account physical congestion during evacuation, and
the eect of a dynamically spreading hazard on civilian health is simulated.
5.1.2 Performance evaluation of ESS in indoor and outdoor
emergency scenarios
Using DBES, we conducted simulation experiments of ESS under dierent emer-
gency scenarios in order to evaluate whether oppcomms can enable evacuation sup-
port and to quantify the improvement oered by oppcomms. We investigated ESS
in small-scale emergencies in indoor areas by looking at evacuation of a three-oor
large oce building modeled on the EEE building at Imperial, and evaluated the
eect of parameters such as node density (or, equivalently, number of nodes) and
communication range on evacuation outcome and also on the characteristics of op-
pcomms. Our main result from these evaluations is that oppcomms can eectively
enable evacuation support in urban emergencies, given that the number of nodes
in the area, i.e. node density, is not very low. Although increasing communication
range (by increasing transmission power up to the limits allowed by the hardware)
improves connectivity and evacuation when node density is low, when there are too
few nodes in the area, increasing range may not be enough to achieve good evac-
uation performance. As a result, we conclude that oppcomms for evacuation is an
option only in urban areas where there are relatively many civilians. The exact num-
ber naturally depends on factors such as area layout, area size and communication
range.
We also investigated communication performance of oppcomms as used in ESS,
and observed that very good connectivity, e.g. high delivery ratio or low delay, is
not required for good evacuation performance, although improving communication
performance generally has a positive eect on evacuation. This indicates that nodes
do not require all updates on the situation for eective evacuation; alerting users
quickly after the emergency starts, i.e. starting evacuation as quickly as possible, and
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having a general idea on recent conditions, e.g. hazard locations, are more important
than getting full information. Our evaluation of the eect of a central alarm supports
this observation: the alarm enables all civilians to start evacuation as soon as the
emergency starts independent of the connectivity of ESS, and when combined with
ESS, this produces better evacuation performance compared with a no-alarm ESS
scenario when oppnet connectivity is low. But as connectivity improves, either due
to more nodes or longer range, the improvement due to the alarm becomes negligible
and no-alarm ESS performance catches up with the performance of ESS with alarm.
We compared the evacuation performance of ESS with an alarm-augmented short-
est path (SP) evacuation strategy that does not disseminate information about the
emergency and a recent distributed evacuation support system (DES) [39] that is
based on xed communication components, in the building scenario. Our results
show that ESS always performs better than SP evacuation, even without an alarm
in ESS, given that there are enough nodes in the area. This result shows the im-
portance of having emergency information, such as the locations of dangerous areas,
for evacuation and that oppcomms can provide an eective means of disseminating
such information. DES has the advantage of being independent of the number or
mobility of civilians and therefore performs better than ESS when connectivity is
low. However, as ESS connectivity improves, ESS surpasses DES. These simulations
have also revealed that while physical congestion can become a signicant problem
with systems like DES where everybody starts to evacuate at the same time and the
system uses global information, ESS is less susceptible to this problem since people
start to evacuate at dierent times and also follow dierent paths due to partial
information. This can alternatively be viewed as ESS trading evacuation time for
evacuation ratio.
In addition to our evaluation of ESS in the building scenario, we have simulated
large-scale evacuation of an outdoor area modeled on the Fulham district of London.
We have observed similar behaviour of oppcomms in this scenario compared to the
building scenario. However, the outdoor scenario shows the importance of the area
layout for evacuation in general. The building scenario captures the general structure
of a wide class of indoor areas identied by having a few commonly used escape
pathways, e.g. corridors and staircases, that cause many civilians to use the same
(sub-)paths during evacuation. This naturally leads to congestion and increases
the importance of knowing the dangerous areas since the hazard can block many
escape paths if it reaches some of these common pathways. The outdoor scenario, in
contrast, captures a dierent class of area structures, i.e. road networks, that present
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more escape options due to the abundance of roads and connections. In these areas,
congestion is only observed when population density is very high or when people are
distributed very unevenly in the area, e.g. in case of evacuation of a stadium. Our
evaluations show that due to these characteristics, it is comparatively less important
to know the hazardous areas during evacuation of such outdoor areas, although early
alerting of civilians is still critical.
5.1.3 Performance evaluation of ESS under node failures
Evacuation is a major component of emergency response and the availability and
reliability of ESS are important for successful evacuation of people. We thus inves-
tigated the resilience of oppcomms to failures, specically to CN failures in ESS,
and looked at how evacuation and communication performance are aected as a
result. Our evaluation has shown that oppcomms are highly resilient to disruptions
to communications in the form of node failures, and that failure ratios up to 20%
are well-tolerated. We have also observed that communication range has more po-
tential to improve resilience than node density, which is fortunate considering that
while node density usually cannot be controlled as it is dependent on the number
of civilians in the area, nodes can dynamically adjust their transmission power and
therefore their range to improve resilience. We discuss dynamic range control in
more detail in Sec. 5.3. Our results also show that oppnets with better connectivity
(higher density or range) are more resilient and less aected by failures, as expected.
5.1.4 Performance evaluation of ESS under network attacks
Network attacks present another source of disruptions to communications and con-
sidering the critical nature of emergency navigation, investigating the resilience and
security of oppcomms to such attacks is important. We have therefore evaluated
the eect of certain network attacks on evacuation and communication performance
of ESS. We consider insider attacks where nodes participating in ESS have been
compromised before the emergency, and start to misbehave during the emergency
in order to adversely aect communications and evacuation. We have looked at two
types of routing-only attacks, drop-all (DA) attack and RF jamming attack, and
one hybrid attack (false info attack) that aects both routing and navigation. In
the false info attack, nodes generate malicious messages with incorrect emergency
information in an eort to directly aect navigation, combining this with the drop-
all attack. Routing is aected due to the injection of malicious messages into the
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network, similar to a denial-of-service type attack, and due to the dropping of all
legitimate messages by malicious nodes. These attacks have been chosen due to their
ease of implementation (which increases their likelihood) and/or expected eect on
evacuation and communication.
Our evaluations have shown that oppcomms is quite resilient to drop-all type of
attacks. This is not surprising since the eect of this attack closely resembles the
eect of node failures. Under the DA attack, neither communication nor evacua-
tion is signicantly aected. In contrast, the RF jamming attack causes signicant
degradation in communication performance, especially as the number of malicious
nodes increases, since it creates \information islands" in the oppnet, preventing mes-
sages from travelling from one island to another. However, the signicant impact of
RF attack on communication does not translate to an equal amount of impact on
evacuation, echoing our previous observation on the relationship between the dis-
semination of emergency information and evacuation performance (i.e. delivery of
full information to all nodes is not required for acceptable evacuation performance).
Among the misbehaviours we have evaluated, false info behaviour shows the most
signicant eect on evacuation due to its manipulation of navigation, fooling CNs
to misguide their users and leading to poor evacuation outcome. These results are
similar to the ndings in [26] that more devastating attacks can be launched by
attackers if they know the internal system mechanism, in this case how navigation
services are provided by ESS based on oppcomms.
An interesting observation is that improving connectivity in the routing-only at-
tacks usually improves both communication and evacuation performance, whereas
in the false info attack evacuation does not improve although communication per-
formance increases. This indicates that when nodes cannot distinguish between
malicious and normal messages, improved connectivity causes better dissemination
of all messages, including malicious ones, which further degrades evacuation per-
formance. This observation suggests that deliberately decreasing connectivity by
decreasing communication range can be a viable strategy to deal with such attacks.
How to correctly adjust range in such cases is left as future work as discussed in
Sec. 5.3.
5.1.5 Improving the security of oppcomms for evacuation support
Considering the signicant eect of the false info attack on evacuation, we proposed
a defense mechanism that combines identity-based signatures (IBS) [116] with col-
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lective malicious node detection. IBS is based on identity-based cryptography, which
addresses some of the issues of public key schemes under intermittent connectivity
by basing the public key of a node on its well-known unique identier, e.g. its net-
work address. IBS assures the authenticity of message sources, preventing attackers
from spoong their IDs without escaping detection. Similarly, messages of others
are protected from tampering by malicious nodes during transit. Building upon
these security primitives, CNs employ a content-based message verication mech-
anism where they compare each received message with their direct observations,
e.g. messages received from sensor nodes, and with previously received messages. If
an inconsistency is detected between a self-observation and a received message, the
CN concludes that the message source is malicious since IBS assures authenticity. If
an inconsistency occurs between two received messages, then the nature of the false
info attack is used against the attackers by assuming that any CN that generates
an excessive number of messages is malicious. The proposed detection mechanism is
not infallible since it may lead to false positives due to this assumption, and requires
the collection of enough evidence against malicious messages for their detection. In-
formation on identied malicious nodes are disseminated via oppcomms among CNs
using collective blacklists so other nodes are informed. The defense mechanism ad-
dresses attackers poisoning the blacklists by protecting the blacklist messages (BMs)
using IBS and including the signed messages used in the decision process in the BM
so receivers can check for themselves whether the detection is valid. When a new
malicious node is detected (either directly or via blacklists), no new messages from
her are accepted and any previous information received from her is removed from
network queues and local graphs. The detection mechanism has some memory, com-
putation and communication overhead due to the checking of each received message,
inclusion of message signatures, keeping blacklists and dissemination of BMs. Our
evaluation of the defense mechanism shows that it is able to detect a considerable
number of malicious messages (between 63% to 75%) and that although no-attack
performance cannot be attained, it signicantly improves evacuation performance
at the expense of some overhead. Its false positive rate is also quite low, reaching
at most 6% in our evaluations.
5.2 Summary of Results
The major ndings of this research are the following:
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 Oppcomms can eectively enable emergency evacuation support when other
means of communication are unavailable. Compared to shortest path evacua-
tion, ESS improves the evacuation outcome by up to 31% and 14% in outdoor
and indoor emergencies, respectively, and by up to 9% compared to DES in
indoor emergencies.
 The improvement oered by oppcomms is dependent on the connectivity of the
oppnet, which is heavily aected by the population density, i.e. the number of
nodes. When the population density is very low, oppcomms do not provide a
signicant advantage over static shortest-path evacuation. Therefore, densely
populated areas would benet the most from the use of oppcomms and ESS.
 Oppcomms are highly tolerant to disruptions in the form of link and node
failures, and node failure ratios up to 20% are well-tolerated by ESS.
 Simple network attacks do not have a signicant eect on the evacuation out-
come with oppcomms. However, more targeted attacks on the application
logic, for example data falsication, have a great impact on the evacuation
outcome. Injection of malicious packets with false information decreases the
evacuation ratio by up to 54%.
 Combining identity-based signatures and content-based message verication,
in which nodes compare received and previous information based on expected
hazard behaviour, can provide eective detection of false information with
intermittent connectivity. Using our proposed defense mechanism, nodes can
detect a considerable number of the malicious messages (between 63% and
75%), although 100% detection rate cannot be attained due to limitations of
oppcomms. The false positive rate of detection is low, reaching at most 6%.
The proposed defense mechanism improves evacuation performance by up to
50% in the presence of attacks.
5.3 Open Issues and Future Work
There are several areas where the research presented in this thesis can be extended.
In this section we discuss open issues and suggest possible directions for future work.
In our simulation-based evaluation of oppcomms for emergency evacuation support,
we simulated basics of contention for the wireless medium and multiple access (with
CSMA-CA as used in IEEE 802.15.4), but we did not simulate the physical (PHY)
layer and therefore our simulations are not able to capture certain physical aspects
of wireless communications. We believe that our current simulation model provides
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a close approximation for the network scenarios considered in this thesis, but eects
of the PHY layer may become signicant under dierent conditions. We think that
issues of signal interference may become important under node densities much higher
than considered here, for example in evacuation of heavily crowded places such as
stadiums. Increasing transmission power to improve range may also prove counter-
productive after a certain level as interference increases and signal-to-noise ratio
decreases. Evaluation of such conditions would require more accurate simulation of
the PHY layer.
Our evaluations of oppcomms showed that when node density is high, a long com-
munication range does not notably improve evacuation performance and therefore
nodes can decrease their range and transmission power while achieving the same
level of evacuation performance. Decreasing power would also decrease contention
and interference, and increase node lifetime. On the other hand, when node density
is low, a long range is critical for good evacuation performance. We therefore suggest
that CNs can dynamically adjust their range by controlling power based on their
observations of the network. In such a scheme, a node would start with a default
power and monitor its neighborhood (e.g. how many nodes it has in its neighborhood
on average) and its contact frequency, and decrease power when local connectivity
is good and vice versa. Design and implementation of a suitable dynamic range
control mechanism and how to set parameters of interest based on observed network
conditions require further research.
In our investigation of the eect of network attacks, we observed that better con-
nectivity (e.g. due to longer range) improves evacuation performance in attacks that
do not disseminate malicious information. However, when attackers generate mali-
cious messages that misguide either the routing mechanism or higher-level services,
i.e. navigation, better connectivity works against the system by allowing malicious
messages to be disseminated wider. Therefore, dynamic range control can be used as
part of a defense mechanism to mitigate the eect of the attack, by either decreasing
or increasing range based on the observed attack. How to correctly detect the attack
type and choose an appropriate range require further work.
While we have considered certain aspects of evacuation in our evaluations, such
as physical congestion and the eect of hazard on civilian health, we have neglected
other aspects such as psychological factors, group dynamics, and eect of civilian
health on their movement speed and ability to correctly follow directions. The last
point suggests that service dierentiation according to changing user requirements
and emergency conditions could be an interesting extension to ESS. Among the
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additional evacuation-related services that ESS can oer are nding a safe location
for trapped civilians and directing emergency responders to critical areas and to
trapped evacuees. In its current implementation, ESS always directs users out of
the emergency area regardless of whether all paths are blocked by the hazard. This
approach can be appropriate for people who are healthy and move fast, if the hazard
blocking the paths is not severe. Other civilians who are heavily injured or otherwise
have diculty moving may instead be guided to safe locations inside the area. When
the hazard blocking the escape paths is impenetrable, then all people trapped in the
building need to be guided to the safest locations as quickly as possible. In addition
to this service, ESS can be extended to direct emergency responders that arrive at
the scene to critical locations and to trapped or injured civilians in the area.
Other types of emergency services that can be enabled by oppcomms include
alerting the public, dissemination of \help" messages from civilians to responders,
asynchronous two-way communications between friends, and search queries for phys-
ical services. Most of these support services are especially benecial in large-scale
post-disaster management and there has been some work in this area as we discussed
in Sec. 2.2. We have evaluated the performance of oppcomms for large-scale evacu-
ation support, but there certainly are issues that we have not been able to address.
For example, we focused on pedestrian oppnets in our evaluations, and we think
that evaluation of oppcomms for large-scale evacuation that involves both pedestri-
ans and vehicles could be interesting. Another interesting subject is the exploitation
of surviving parts of the communication infrastructure, which may be disconnected
or available intermittently, together with oppcomms to provide emergency services
and more specically evacuation support.
We have observed that physical congestion during evacuation can be signicant,
especially in indoor spaces. While ESS is less aected by congestion compared to
WSN-based evacuation systems due to side eects of oppcomms, introducing a con-
gestion metric in path calculation to explicitly address congestion could be a good
idea, especially for evacuation of crowded spaces. The number of people passing
through an area could be counted (based on wireless contacts and localization mes-
sages) by sensor nodes in indoor areas, or it can be approximated using CN-to-CN
contacts. Oppcomms can then be used to disseminate this information, which is then
incorporated into a congestion-aware path calculation algorithm. However, there are
certain issues that need to be addressed for an eective evacuation strategy with con-
gestion avoidance. For example, the system should have similar performance at low
population densities with and without congestion avoidance. This may require the
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system to correctly decide when to turn on congestion avoidance. Path oscillations
that may arise as a result of incorrect decisions due to partial or out-of-date in-
formation or as a result of independent decisions due to the congestion avoidance
mechanism itself also need to be considered. The use of oppcomms for disseminating
congestion-related information also introduces the challenge of accurately predicting
congested paths based on partial and/or old information due to best-eort message
delivery and high delays of oppcomms.
Although our design of ESS addresses energy conservation of nodes by operating
them in a low duty cycle before the emergency, we have not explicitly evaluated
energy use of oppcomms as used in ESS or considered other energy related issues due
to our focus on the evacuation component of emergency response and its relatively
short duration. We believe it is important to investigate such energy issues and
network attacks that aim to deplete the limited energy resources in an oppnet as we
look at uses of oppcomms for large-scale evacuation and in emergency management
beyond evacuation. In our evaluation of the security and resilience of oppcomms
to network attacks, we focused on attack types that we believe are more likely
to occur due to their ease of implementation and their eect, and thus have not
considered more elaborate attacks that can be launched as a result of collaboration
among attackers or attacks on node localization through message replication attacks.
We think that investigation of more sophisticated attacks on oppcomms and on
emergency navigation could prove interesting.
Furthermore in future work we would consider issues of system oversight and data
interpretation from incomplete information [52,53] as a way to evaluate the health of
the system, as well as the use of classically used analytical techniques for performance
evaluation [48] to consider both the eect of managing old and new information
that is gathered via oppcomms, and to evaluate the performance of the system as a
whole. An advantage of such approaches is that they can provide computationally
fast mathematical prediction, much faster than the simulation methods described
in this thesis, so that the outcome of a large number of simulations can be replaced
by the solution of a probability model. We think that such methods are worth
investigating in view of the increasing importance of emergency management and
more generally for the study of human based cyber-technical systems.
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6 Appendix
Additional simulation results from our evaluation of opportunistic communications
to provide emergency evacuation support are presented in this appendix. The re-
sults provided here are not explicitly discussed in the main text and are therefore
complementary to the main discussion.
6.1 Evaluation of Opportunistic Communications:
Evacuation Performance
This section presents additional results from simulation experiments on the evac-
uation performance of ESS and oppcomms under normal conditions (i.e. no node
failures or attacks). Following the organization in Chp. 3, we rst present results on
the eect of population density on evacuation metrics and then results on the eect
of CN communication range.
6.1.1 Eect of population density
Scenario: Building with 2nd oor re, CN range 10m
These results are from the building scenario where re starts on the second oor.
The CN range is set to 10 meters and the number of people per oor (pf) varies
from 10 to 40, in increments of 10. The re starts at simulation start (at time 0)
and each data point is the mean of 50 simulation runs, except for Fig.s 6.1 and 6.2
which are cumulative plots. Results are shown with their 95% condence intervals
where possible.
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Figure 6.1: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for population densities 10pf{
40pf, building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 10m.
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Figure 6.2: Percentage of casualties versus time for population densities 10pf{40pf,
building scenario with 2nd oor re, CN range 10m.
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Figure 6.3: Evacuation performance versus population density, building scenario
with 2nd oor re, CN range 10m.
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Scenario: Building with 3rd oor re, CN range 6m
These results are from the building scenario where re starts on the third oor. The
CN range is set to 6 meters and the number of people per oor (pf) varies from 10
to 40, in increments of 10. The re starts at simulation start (at time 0) and plots
are cumulative of 50 simulation runs.
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for population densities 10pf{
40pf, building scenario with 3rd oor re, CN range 6m.
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Figure 6.5: Percentage of casualties versus time for population densities 10pf{40pf,
building scenario with 3rd oor re, CN range 6m.
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Scenario: Building with 3rd oor re, CN range 10m
These results are from the building scenario where re starts on the third oor. The
CN range is set to 10 meters and the number of people per oor (pf) varies from
10 to 40, in increments of 10. The re starts at simulation start (at time 0) and
each data point is the mean of 50 simulation runs, except for Fig.s 6.6 and 6.7 which
are cumulative plots. Results are shown with their 95% condence intervals where
possible.
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Figure 6.6: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for population densities 10pf{
40pf, building scenario with 3rd oor re, CN range 10m.
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Figure 6.7: Percentage of casualties versus time for population densities 10pf{40pf,
building scenario with 3rd oor re, CN range 10m.
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Figure 6.8: Evacuation performance versus population density, building scenario
with 3rd oor re, CN range 10m.
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Scenario: Large-scale area
These results are from the large-scale area scenario where re starts at simulation
start (at time 0) on multiple locations in the area as given in Fig. 3.9. The CN range
is set to 50 or 100 meters and the total number of people varies from 180 to 720, in
increments of 180. Each plot is cumulative of 10 simulation runs. Note that Fig.s
6.9c and 6.10c are discussed in Sec. 3.2.3 (as Fig. 3.23), but they are repeated here
for completeness.
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Figure 6.9: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for 180{720 people, large-
scale scenario.
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Figure 6.10: Percentage of casualties versus time for 180{720 people, large-scale
scenario.
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6.1.2 Eect of communication range
This section presents additional results on the eect of CN communication range on
evacuation performance of ESS.
Scenario: Building with 2nd oor re, ESS 
These results are from the building scenario where re starts on the second oor.
CN range varies from 4 to 10 meters in increments of 2 and the number of people
per oor (pf) varies from 10 to 40 people in increments of 10. The re starts at
simulation start (at time 0) and plots are cumulative of 50 simulation runs. The
simulated system is ESS without alarm (ESS ).
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Figure 6.11: Percentage of evacuated people versus time for population densities
10pf{40pf, building scenario with 2nd oor re, ESS .
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Figure 6.12: Percentage of casualties versus time for population densities 10pf{40pf,
building scenario with 2nd oor re, ESS .
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6.2 Resilience of Opportunistic Communications to
Node Failures
In this section, we present additional results on the eect of CN failures on evacuation
and communication performance of oppcomms.
6.2.1 Scenario: Building with 2nd oor re, ESS+
The results in this section are from the building scenario where re starts on the
second oor. The simulated system is ESS with alarm (ESS+). Each data point is
the mean of 50 simulation runs and results are presented with their 95% condence
intervals.
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Figure 6.13: Evacuation performance versus CN failure ratio, building scenario with
2nd oor re, ESS+.
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Figure 6.14: Communication performance versus CN failure ratio, building scenario
with 2nd oor re, ESS+.
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6.3 Security of Opportunistic Communications for
Emergency Support
In this section, we present additional results on the eect of network attacks on
evacuation and communication performance of oppcomms.
6.3.1 Eect of number of attackers with 60 civilians
The simulation setup for the results presented in this section are the same as the
setup for experiments looking at the eect number of malicious nodes in Secs. 4.3.1
and 4.3.2, with the dierence that there are a total of 60 civilians in the building,
i.e. N = 60.
 40
 45
 50
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
1 2 4 8 12 16 20
E
v
a
c
u
a
te
d
 c
iv
ili
a
n
s
 (
%
)
Number of malicious nodes
Evacuation ratio vs. number of malicious nodes (20pf)
no attack
drop-all
RF jam
false info
false info + defense
(a) Evacuation ratio
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
1 2 4 8 12 16 20
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
v
a
c
u
e
e
 h
e
a
lt
h
 (
%
)
Number of malicious nodes
Evacuee health vs. number of malicious nodes (20pf)
no attack
drop-all
RF jam
false info
false info + defense
(b) Average evacuee health
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
1 2 4 8 12 16 20
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
v
a
c
u
a
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
s
e
c
)
Number of malicious nodes
Evacuation time vs. number of malicious nodes (20pf)
no attack
drop-all
RF jam
false info
false info + defense
(c) Average evacuation time
 100
 110
 120
 130
 140
 150
 160
 170
 180
 190
 200
1 2 4 8 12 16 20
W
o
rs
t-
c
a
s
e
 e
v
a
c
u
a
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
s
e
c
)
Number of malicious nodes
Evacuation time vs. number of malicious nodes (20pf)
no attack
drop-all
RF jam
false info
false info + defense
(d) Worst-case evacuation time
Figure 6.15: Evacuation performance versus number of malicious nodes, 20pf
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Figure 6.16: Communication performance versus number of malicious nodes, 20pf
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Figure 6.17: Defense performance versus number of malicious nodes, 20pf
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6.3.2 Evacuation times
The simulation setups for the results presented in this section are the same as the
setups for experiments looking at the eect number of malicious nodes, population
density and communication range on evacuation performance in Sec. 4.3.1. These
results include non-malicious users only.
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Figure 6.18: Evacuation times under network attacks
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6.3.3 Eect of pmsg in false info attack
The results in this section are from the building scenario where re starts on the
second oor. The simulated system is ESS without alarm (ESS ). There a total
of 120 civilians in the building (N = 120) and the number of malicious nodes are
set to 12. CN communication range is 6m. Each data point is the mean of 50
simulation runs and results are presented with their 95% condence intervals. We
present results on the eect of the malicious message creation rate (pmsg) in the false
info attack on evacuation, communication and defense performance.
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Figure 6.19: Evacuation performance versus malicious message creation rate (pmsg)
under false info attack
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Figure 6.20: Communication performance versus malicious message creation rate
(pmsg) under false info attack
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Figure 6.21: Defense performance versus malicious message creation rate (pmsg) un-
der false info attack
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